2009/02/02 00:00:00
One way MOAA attempts to fulfill our goal of being the professional association of choice for all military officers and their families is by promoting enduring values of military professionals, including the highest ethical standards.
Each month, this page will feature a different ethics case study provided by Capt. Rick Rubel, USN-Ret., distinguished Professor of Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy. With each case study, Rubel will provide suggested questions, and readers will be able to discuss and comment. Whether you are currently serving, in a second career, or retired, there will be something here that makes you think. Unlike rules of engagement or standards of conduct, remember there is not necessarily a right answer to an ethical dilemma.
We hope you find this series interesting, but more important, we hope to promote discussion and thinking about ethical challenges facing people in uniform, whether in combat or in the normal course of duty. Be sure to check back in March for the author’s comments on this case study.
Questions for the reader
Introduction
Background
MV-22 program overview
Chain of command
Maintenance
Situation
By Gary E. Slyman, Patricia Jacubec, and Jonathan Cox
Courtesy of Capt. Rick Rubel, USN-Ret.
There are several case studies of military ethics that ask the question: “Why do good people do the wrong thing?” The premise of this question is that we are all good people, and we all probably have done the wrong thing. So it is worth analyzing why the good in someone can allow him or her to act immorally or illegally. This case study will look at that question.
Questions for the Reader
- What are the four times in the case when someone was asked to lie or falsify?
- Why do you think these Marines did the wrong thing when they falsified maintenance records?
- Do you think the Marines were being too loyal to their service?
Introduction
Nineteen Marines were killed April 8, 2000, when their MV-22 Osprey crashed in Arizona. Four more were killed Dec. 11, 2000, when a second MV-22 crashed in North Carolina. These accidents, which closely preceded the following incident, might have contributed to closer scrutiny of maintenance readiness reporting of the MV-22 aircraft. The pressures perceived by officers to get the Osprey program into production and the two MV-22 mishaps probably provided the impetus for increased awareness of the training squadron’s readiness reports. In short, the accidents helped set in motion a series of events which resulted in some senior officers manipulating MV-22 data to show false aircraft readiness.
Marine Corps leadership still considers the MV-22, which has been in development since 1981, a vital component in the transformation and modernization of the Marine Corps’ warfighting capabilities. All recent Marine Corps commandants have testified before Congress on the importance of the Osprey to the Corps. For various reasons, MV-22 funding had been in jeopardy more than once over the long course of its procurement history.
On Jan. 10, 2001, the commander of Naval Air Systems Command — the command responsible for the acquisition, development, and support of all navy aircraft — received an anonymous letter alleging the CO of Fixed Wing Marine Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron 204 (VMMT-204) directed his subordinates to “lie” about MV-22 maintenance and readiness data. The anonymous package also contained aircraft status reports purportedly showing falsified data, several photographs of the squadron’s aircraft status display board, and an audiotape of the squadron CO during a meeting with all hands.
Background
The MV-22 Osprey is a medium fixed wing, tilt-rotor aircraft. It is designed for vertical-lift to replace aging helicopters (specifically, the CH-46 and the CH-53) used by the Marine Corps for combat and support. Essentially, the MV-22 is a propeller airplane that can take off and land like a helicopter.
MV-22 Program Overview: The Navy’s testing, which was completed in July 2000, concluded that the MV-22 had several major deficiencies, including a low mission- capable/fully mission-capable rate (also called the “readiness rate”) but also that the aircraft was operationally effective and suitable in a land-based environment. A decision to proceed with the next phase of the program — full-rate production with the aircraft delivered to the Marine Corps — was planned for December 2000. But officials believed low MV-22 readiness rates would adversely affect the decision to proceed with full-rate production.
Chain of Command: The mission of VMMT-204 was to train all MV-22 aircrew and maintenance personnel. In June 1999, Lt. Col. Odin F. Leberman Jr., USMC, assumed command of the squadron, which was one of 13 aviation squadrons subordinate to Marine Air Group-26 (MAG-26), commanded by Col. James Schleining, USMC. Marine Air Logistics Squadron-26 (MALS-26), another squadron within MAG-26, provided supplies and maintenance support to aircraft in MAG-26, including those in VMMT-204. MAG-26 was subordinate to Second Marine Aircraft Wing (2nd MAW), commanded by Maj. Gen. Dennis Krupp, USMC, who took command in June 2000.
Maintenance: When VMMT-204 received the first Osprey, the squadron also switched to an improved logistics information system. The newer system was designed to increase data accuracy and prevent technicians from manipulating the information.
Situation
Shortly after Krupp assumed command of 2nd MAW in June 2000, he made it clear to Leberman and Schleining that he was disappointed with the low readiness rate of the Osprey. On Sept. 25, 2000, Schleining e-mailed the month’s readiness rates to Krupp — 23-percent mission capable, and 77-percent not mission capable — and predicted an improvement in readiness rates in the coming weeks. Krupp directed Schleining to “keep the heat on” to improve readiness rates.
In October 2000, high-level Navy, office of the Secretary of Defense, and contractor officials involved in the MV-22 acquisition effort indicated they were not impressed with the Osprey squadron’s readiness rates. There were some personnel in the program office — the Navy’s organization responsible for the acquisition of the Osprey — who strongly believed Leberman was not always considering readiness in his decision-making and that he needed a strong counseling session to get him focused.
Leberman felt the pressure for improved readiness. He was witnessed commenting to squadron personnel that his seniors questioned his ability to command the squadron and he might lose his job. In that same month, Krupp warned Schleining that the low readiness figures had high visibility and they needed to reach 75 percent before he would back off his oversight and scrutiny. (The squadron told Krupp 75 percent was necessary to accomplish the required training of pilots and enlisted servicemembers.)
While the readiness results from the first two weeks of November were making their way up the chain of command through e-mail, senior Marine Corps officials at Headquarters Marine Corps noted the readiness figures were “bad news” and not helpful for the production decision. Senior officials also thought the reported readiness rates would have been higher under the old computer tracking system because “you can’t cheat” on the new version of the computer program, NALCOMIS. Krupp cautioned against confusing the old and new reporting systems and said, “we must be very careful” about what was entered on work orders. “ ‘This is not cheating’ but simply understanding how the system works.” Schleining forwarded the e-mail exchanges containing the senior officials’ concerns and comments to Leberman. Krupp instructed Schleining to “see if we can put a positive spin on” the data. Schleining advised Leberman and others that guidance from Krupp directed them to “put a positive spin on what we are really doing at this end.” Marine headquarters “needs some help on the [Osprey production] decision in December.”
Krupp’s e-mail requesting a “positive spin” on the November readiness figures was forwarded to the VMMT-204 assistant aircraft maintenance officer, Capt. Christopher Ramsey. Ramsey decided that to reduce the amount of down time, the maintenance personnel initiating work orders for aircraft would annotate the aircraft status as up in the status code field, a block not used by the system to record aircraft status. Therefore, the computer system would recognize the aircraft as up when it was really down. As a result, the down clock would not be ticking. Maintenance control personnel would later review the work order and only then would they assign a job code, which would, in turn, start the down clock for that aircraft. The aircraft would accumulate less down time, thereby improving readiness rates.
On Dec. 5, 2000, the Department of the Navy postponed the decision on full-rate production until April 2001 and requested more information on the most critical issues of MV-22’s rapidly declining reliability rate.
On Dec. 19, 2000, VMMT-204’s quality assurance division conducted training for its personnel. Several attendees at that meeting said Ramsey directed them to write all work orders as up — meaning the aircraft was capable of flying a mission. Some recall this was done to improve down time by having the system track the aircraft as up in the computer system instead of down. Attendees collectively decided to write “*D*” in the system reason block of the work orders for an aircraft with a downing discrepancy. The asterisks denoted the aircraft was falsely entered in the computer as being up. This was done to ensure that down aircraft would be recognized internally as unable to fly even though all computerized work orders were showing them as up. The investigation by Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) determined that personnel under Ramsey initiated 26 of these false work orders.
CWO2 Matthew Smith, the maintenance material control officer, had been on temporary duty away from the squadron Dec. 11 to Dec. 22, 2000, investigating the second Osprey mishap. When Smith returned, Ramsey notified him that VMMT-204 had put into effect “a new way of reporting readiness” and that all aircraft would be reported up and readiness would be reported at 100 percent on the daily reports. Smith disagreed with this implementation and went to Leberman to discuss his concerns. Leberman said he understood Smith’s concerns but that “Wing” had directed it. Leberman subsequently told Smith to come up with a way to internally keep track of inoperable aircraft but still to report them in the computer system as mission capable. This would prevent “unsafe” Ospreys from being flown.
Smith returned to maintenance control to review the measures that were instituted in his absence, including the *D* annotation and other measures used to code an aircraft as up in the reporting system.
On Dec. 28, 2000, Schleining called a meeting with Leberman, Ramsey, and Smith and the CO and aircraft maintenance officer from MALS-26. Schleining told them he wanted to ensure the squadron was flying safe aircraft and reporting accurately. He also told them that maintenance control was no longer authorized to down aircraft. Later that day in an e-mail to Krupp, Schleining said he was “changing the way 204 does business.” MALS-26 would begin to order parts offline and then initiate the work order afterward, thus avoiding having to put an aircraft in a down status. Ordering parts off-line — meaning not through automated channels — would hide from the computer system that an aircraft needed repairs because the necessary parts would not be tracked in the system.
Krupp acknowledged receiving Schleining’s message: “I believe this is ethical, will save [down] time, and will not cause the system to say we are forging documents or cutting corners.”
Schleining e-mailed Leberman saying, “We need to explore options before we down an aircraft.” Leberman instructed Ramsey to bring all downing discrepancies to him, and he would take them to Schleining for approval. Schleining now was making the decisions normally made by a maintenance controller, a senior enlisted Marine with significant maintenance experience.
On Dec. 29, 2000, Leberman advised Schleining that the readiness rate would be 100 percent or “very close” on the next daily status report. The next morning report did state 100 percent, although two out of seven aircraft actually were down. Replacement parts for the two down aircraft were ordered, but the order said the parts were for an out-of-reporting-status aircraft, thereby avoiding accumulating down time against the in-reporting-status aircraft.
In theory, to reduce down time, the parts could have been removed from the out-of-status aircraft to get the two down aircraft operational. Later, Ramsey rationalized his actions stating he ordered spare parts against the out-of-reporting-status aircraft for the two downed aircraft to save time. Rather than the maintenance crew removing parts from the out-of-reporting-status aircraft and putting them into the two downed aircraft, and then later installing the newly ordered parts in the two repaired aircraft and returning the removed parts to the out-of-status aircraft, the newly ordered parts would be put directly into the downed aircraft. Ramsey said he briefed this plan to Leberman, who approved.
On Dec. 29, 2000, Leberman held an all-hands meeting. His remarks on readiness included Krupp’s concern about accumulating down time for an aircraft that was downed over the Christmas holiday. Here is some of what he said: “What you’ve been doing all week is trying to stop the SCIR (down) clock. Why is that important? We all know [the new and improved automated system] is put into place to keep us from lying. In the past, we were able to screw with the data a little bit in the [older version]. And we were able to show readiness in, much greater than what it really was — which was a lie. … The problem is we have it here and we need to lie. And the reason we need to lie or manipulate the data — however you want to call it — is that until … a full rate production decision [is made] this program is in jeopardy. Everyone says readiness is bad. … Everybody is hinging on that particular bit of information. … So what we have to do is … try to reduce the [down] time as best we can until that [MV-22 full production] decision is made. …”
After the all-hands meeting, Leberman met with senior NCOs and told them they were going to hear some “off the wall things come out of upstairs here and down to you guys this week to stop the [down] clock. It’s that important … I don’t want you to do anything dishonest, totally, I want you to be creative” in trying to gain 100-percent readiness.
After the meeting, Ramsey and the NCOs continued the debate about the maintenance process. Ramsey told them to find new ideas for improving the maintenance process: “Safety is paramount, [but] we need to explore ways to try to meet both objectives.”
On Jan. 3, 2001, the e-mailed morning report to Schleining, Leberman, and others showed seven aircraft were 100-percent mission capable and one out-of-reporting status. The report also showed nine parts ordered against the single out-of-status aircraft. Investigations later revealed that, in fact, three of the seven up aircraft were down and unable to fly on that date.
In a Jan. 9, 2001, meeting that included Schleining, Leberman, and the CO of MALS-26, Leberman said data was being manipulated at VMMT-204 to show 100-percent readiness on daily reports. This was the first the CO of MALS-26 had heard this alarming information. After the meeting, the MALS-26 CO discussed Leberman’s remarks with Schleining, who said he would take care of it.
On Jan. 10, 2001, Leberman met with the maintenance department to discuss how maintenance was being performed, including using a new code to obtain parts faster without accumulating down time. Leberman seemed unaware that maintainers were already using the *D* codes on work orders.
The next day, the CO of MALS-26 reported to Schleining that VMMT-204 still was reporting 100-percent readiness. That afternoon, Schleining met with Leberman, Ramsey, Smith, and officers from MALS-26 to discuss the squadron’s maintenance reporting. Schleining told officers his intention was not for the squadron to report 100-percent readiness if it was not accurate, nor did he want anyone to go outside the procedures of the naval aviation maintenance program. As a result of the meeting, VMMT-204 returned to normal reporting.
On Jan. 12, 2001, Leberman held an all-hands meeting where he said he believed he had been misunderstood at the Dec. 29, 2000, meeting. He directed squadron personnel to no longer change or manipulate data and instructed them to “return to doing business as usual.”
These events resulted in the initiation of the DCIS investigation, which was conducted from Jan. 26, 2001, to July 9, 2001. The investigation focused on the criminal charges brought against Marine Corps personnel who acted in this affair.
About the Author: Capt. Rick Rubel, USN-Ret., currently is the distinguished military professor of Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md. After a 30-year career in the Navy, he has taught the Core Ethics Course for 10 years and has served as course director for the past six years. He is coauthor and coeditor of
Case Studies in Military Ethics (Pearson Publishing, 2006).
Copyright Capt. Rick Rubel, USN-Ret., and Military Officers Association of America. All rights reserved.
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Commander McAleenan |
3/16/2009 6:17:10 PM |
The need to "look good" was an ever present pressure throughout my Naval career. I have had superiors direct me to change reports regarding readiness (pilot qualifications, crew quals, maintenance status, & etc.) because "we can't report that our (pick your adjective) is that low". I, fortunately, was stubborn and secure enough to refuse. Equally fortunately I suffered no reprisals from my refusals - though the reports that I provided were not always the ones forwarded up the chain of command. Aircraft readiness was such a hot topic that there were debates on how to report an aircraft missing a propeller or other obviously downing discrepancy. (I've also had the pleasure(?) of being ordered to preflight an alert aircraft that had only 3 of the required 4 propellers installed!) As long as squadron, wing, group, & fleet commands are afraid to admit that there is a problem and continue to pressure for high readiness figures in spite of the facts we will continue to see our personnel caught in the press. Hopefully we won't kill our own troops in the interest of looking good. M. P. McAleenan LCDR USN Ret.
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Admiral Hekman |
3/11/2009 11:24:16 PM |
VADM Ret. P. M. Hekman comments: The additude and actions described in the article are inexcusable in all circumstances and should never have occurred. That said, I have often found in my long career in and out of the military a failure to adhere to principle, mostly caused by an unprincipled command environment along with lack of attention to detail from the top, or for the fortutude to stand up for what is right in the face of political pressure. What caused this V-22 debacle? in 1985, as DepDir for RDT&E-Navy I witnessed the V-22 being jammed down the throat of a reluctant Marine Corps which wanted a new helo. V-22 was viewed as extremely high risk, costly, and did not meet operational requirements. In testimony before the Congress I witnessed a very strong, politically driven push for the V-22, one member actually expressing the idea that every airline in the world would be buying them for use as commuters, thus bringing the price down. Moreover, Congress terminated R&D funds for a new Helo, which could have been developed using proven technology and in a few years. 22 painful years later, V-22 was finally pushed to completion - if one can call it that. Being prohibited from building what they wanted, the USMC of course pushed the very high risk development of V-22, and when one pushes from the top, those at the middle and bottom tend to bend to the prevailing wind, again proving the principle that says, if you want it really bad, your troops will do what they have to in order to give it to you really bad. This whole program should have been stopped, as recommended to the Secretary, in 1985, by the Secretary. Instead, principles were set aside, expediency accepted, and the results could be, and were, predicted.
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Commander Cooper |
2/23/2009 3:40:07 PM |
First, there is no valid excuse for false reporting period. A commander has to have accurate information about the status of his assets to maximize his effectiveness. Second, if adequate readiness numbers are not being achieved, it ids incumbent that the cause(s)be uncovered. There are a number of possibilities: design, training, supply support...It is interesting that at the top of the article reference is made to the Osprey as having been declared operationally effective and SUITABLE. These terms have specific meaning. Suitablity includes those attributes commonly referred to as the "ilities". These include reliability and maintainability. Low numbers for these factors are usually the result of design deficiencies. If testing has shown that maintainablity is satisfactory, then poor performance in that area points the finger at inadequate training and/or insuffiently skilled personnel. It is the responsibility of the CO to try to ascertain the root cause(s). Falsification of records does not solve the problem - it obscures it.
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Major Charles |
2/14/2009 9:31:53 PM |
After serving the Marine Corps for 20 years as a Supply/Logistics officer, I.G., Field Supply Maintenance Assistance Office, and Naval Inspector Office, and C.G. inspections, and "visits" became little more than annoyances to supply and maintenance personnel trying to support their units. No senior officer that I knew wanted to know true readiness unless it was outstanding. Frankly, the modern military has a fear of ascertaining its true mettle based upon the criteria that it has placed upon itself. Frankly, one wonders how George Washington would have fared at Valley Forge if he had to produce the type of readiness report we have today. Washington developed his battle plans based upon what he had available not what he was supposed to have available. An inspection of personnel and equipment should ascertain two things: personnel and equipment capability. Correction of deficiencies comes from additional training and repair/acquisition of equipment. Marines commanders on the ground or in the air are exceptional gunfighters used to winning. When you make them gunsmiths, they refuse to fail and "put a positive spin on things." There was a movie about the Marine Corps that had a line "... you can't handle the truth". That fact did not change before I came and retired from the Corps and it will not change, despite the death of past and future Marines. Capt Rubel wrote a nice article that we can all comment upon, but the reality exists that we have a culture of "pencil whipping" the records because "looking good" is sometimes better than "being good" and nobody and I mean nobody likes to air laundry until it has been "sanitized"
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Commander Allison |
2/13/2009 5:41:57 PM |
As I read some of the responses to this case, I am appauled that some will say "This was never a case of endangering lives", or "I would agree this is not uncommon". What a crock! Failure to report honestly and accurately is a dereliction of duty and a criminal matter and should be prosecuted under the USMJ. I suspect that lack of attention to duty has led to the death of more than one of our precious service members. Our sacred duty is to report the truth to our superiors - no matter how difficult - without fear of the consequences. There is too much at stake.
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Commander Van Oteghem |
2/12/2009 10:07:31 PM |
Wow. I can certainly relate to this story and the ethical dilemnas in it. As a retired nuclear-trained submariner, who once upon a time was a strategic weapons officer on an SSBN responsible for the Trident missiles on board, what really grabbed me, almost as much as the safety and ethical issues, was the phrase straight from a nightmare, "DOWN TIME". Unfortunately for those in the "NO DOWN TIME!" business, this is what drives the problem to too great an extent sometimes. While the implications of DOWN TIME for strategic weapons that were "ready to launch" and on station, but really were not, could have far-reaching political implications, the reckoning that "it is what it is" should be swift and openly recognized. I can remember spending more than one night agonizing over getting necessary missile repairs made and tested, and the "DOWN TIME" clock STOPPED by appropriate means (probably still classified). The climax of this story, I believe, was almost missable to the casual reader: "Safety is paramount, [but]".
These types of ethical stories really give us points to mull over. Thank you for this forum.
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Colonel Quinlan |
2/12/2009 8:23:15 PM |
I feel the need to comment a bit further and perhaps enlighten some of those who have commented who may not have served in aviation. This was never a case of endangering lives..that would be an undeserved indictment of the thousands of dedicated and hardworking enlisted aircraft maintenance Marines and supervisors who would never allow a non mission capable aircraft to fly. Never. These falsifications of readiness numbers had nothing whatsoever to do with safety, or with the previously mentioned MV 22 mishaps. And that is why this case is an interesting discussion of an ethical dilemna..the unit commander falsifies his numbers, the brass is off his back, he doesn't have to work his people around the clock and he saves his career, to boot. It's easy..no harm is done and everyone goes home happy, and that is precisely why we have all seen examples of this, albeit in many different iterations. But of course there IS harm done, great harm, to the American taxpayer who has every right to expect that his tax dollars are employing a top notch military force led by professionals bound by honor and integrity, and that no one is lying when we say we are ready to defend our nation's security.
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Colonel Quinlan |
2/12/2009 7:51:04 PM |
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Colonel Kruse |
2/12/2009 2:58:50 PM |
For the last 2 or 3 years the Army had required units coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan to report themselves C-5 for 180 days. This may not test the commanders' ethical mettle, but it certainly is a way that a Service Chief of Staff can accept responsibility to higher authorities such as Congress for the units' degraded status, vice putting subordinates in what was for the MV-22 squadron commander, an ethical dilemma. Unfortunately for him, he didn't enjoy the top cover Army commanders have today.
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Colonel Armstrong |
2/12/2009 2:58:28 PM |
Colonel Armstrong
I would agree this is not uncommon - but still unacceptable. The Osprey is high profile and high profile for all involved from the CO on down. What about leading by example and setting standards? It appears these officers were willing to risk lives rather than address the real problems.
