What Would You Do? — Abu Ghraib

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2008/09/01 00:00:00

One way MOAA attempts to fulfill our goal of being the professional association of choice for all military officers and their families is by promoting enduring values of military professionals, including the highest ethical standards.

Each month, this page will feature a different ethics case study provided by Capt. Rick Rubel, USN-Ret., distinguished Professor of Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy. With each case study, Rubel will provide suggested questions, and readers will be able to discuss and comment. Whether you are currently serving, in a second career, or retired, there will be something here that makes you think. Unlike rules of engagement or standards of conduct, remember there is not necessarily a right answer to an ethical dilemma.

We hope you find this series interesting, but more important, we hope to promote discussion and thinking about ethical challenges facing people in uniform, whether in combat or in the normal course of duty. Be sure to check back Oct. 1 for the author’s comments on this case study. 

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By Capt. Rick Rubel, USN-Ret. 

One of the most difficult questions regarding military ethics is, “Do we want our servicemembers to be morally responsible, or do we want them to do as they are told?”

The answer to this somewhat paradoxical question is “Yes, we really want both.” We train our servicemembers to follow orders, but there also are times when we want them to be morally responsible. Does that imply that we want them to refuse an immoral order? Sometimes, we do. Often the legality of an order is not clear to a servicemember, so they have to rely on their own morals and values to decide, “Am I going to follow that order?”

Case 1 

Questions for the reader:
If you were the guard who was told by the intelligence officer to harass the prisoner

• What questions would you want to ask the sergeant telling you to harass the prisoner?
• What are the reasons you would consider doing what the intelligence officer told you to do?
• What are the reasons you would consider not doing what the intelligence officer told you to do?
• What would you do? What is your primary consideration from all the reasons on the two lists?

Consider the following situation:

You are a private in the Army and have just arrived in Iraq to join your first unit, the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade. You arrived in Iraq this morning, and your trip from the airport was eye-opening as you observed dozens of U.S. military and Iraqi civilian vehicles burned out along the side of the road. Iraqi men along the route stared dully at your vehicle as you passed by them. When you arrived at the prison, you received a 10-minute brief from your sergeant, who essentially told you, “You’ve been to MP school. You know what to do.”

As you follow the directions to go to the cellblock office for your first duty, you walk down corridors with cells on both sides full of Iraqi prisoners. This certainly is the strangest walk of your life. The smell of human feces and urine is just about enough to make you vomit. The prisoners look at you with sullen, sunken eyes — eyes filled with both anger and hatred. They taunt you by spitting on you and saying in clear English, as they reach out and try to grab you, “I will kill you. I will kill your family.”

In the cellblock office you meet the specialist in charge of the block, who introduces you to an American wearing plain khaki pants and a shirt with no insignia or markings. They both tell you your job during this eight-hour watch is to harass detainees No. 150216 and No. 150849. They say they think both of these guys set off an improvised explosive device and killed a few soldiers. You ask them what “harass” means, and they tell you, “It just means break their spirit so they will talk. Keep them awake, smack them around a bit, and get inside their heads. Make them feel less like a man, more like a weasel.”

You think, They didn’t teach me this at the 22-week MP school at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. But if they’re all doing this, it must be good to make them talk to find out who burned up all those vehicles I saw along the side of the road.

What do you do, Private?

Case 2

 Questions for the reader:

1. How would you morally judge each of the groups of people below?
   • the sadist, Spc. Charles A. Graner — Would you know a sadist if he or she were in your unit?
   • the immature, dependent follower and onlookers
   • those confused about mission but participated (Staff Sergeant Fredrick)
   • those who refused to participate
   • the reporter of the abuse (Spc. Joseph Darby)
2. What was different about Joseph Darby that caused him to report the abuse and eventually stop it? 
3. When should we expect our servicemembers to challenge orders?

Introduction 

Beginning in September 2003, Abu Ghraib prison became a U.S.-operated holding facility for various Iraqi prisoners. One of the primary missions of the prison was to obtain valuable intelligence from prisoners who would help the U.S. win the war against terrorism and insurgency. As this mission was pursued, there were numerous breakdowns in leadership, organization, legal interpretations and compliance, and individual morals. These breakdowns led to documented abuses of prisoners by a number of guards. These abuses included sexual humiliation, exploitation, and assault and the beatings and deaths of other prisoners.


Background 

Abu Ghraib is a large 280-acre facility 20 miles west of Baghdad, Iraq. During the regime of Saddam Hussein, more than 4,000 people reportedly were executed in that facility and many more tortured. After the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, the U.S. used the facility to detain several categories of prisoners, including common street criminals, security detainees, insurgents, terrorists, and high-value leaders of the insurgency.¹

In June 2003, the 800th MP Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Janice Karpinski, was placed in charge of the prison. Because one of the missions of the prison was gathering intelligence, the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade also was assigned to the prison to interrogate prisoners.

The function of the prison was to provide a safe, secure, and humane environment that supported the expeditious collection of intelligence.² As the post-war insurgency and terrorism grew in the second half of 2003, the pressures to obtain more intelligence from the prisoners grew proportionally. In this type of counterinsurgency operation, intelligence is everything and directly can save many lives outside the prison walls.

It was the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade’s job to interrogate the prisoners and obtain this valuable information. As a rule, the MP gather only passive intelligence or information overheard — they do not participate in interrogation sessions. In established procedures, there is a clear separation between the role of the MP guards, whose job is to secure the compound, and the role of the military intelligence, whose job is to obtain strategic and operational intelligence.³

The rules governing the treatment of POWs are derived from the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. In part, this document defines POWs as captured enemy personnel in various categories. These categories include:

• members of the armed forces;
• members of a resistance movement — they must have a command and rank structure and
• identifying badges or insignias. This does not include soldiers operating on their own;
• levée en masse — individuals who are defending their home country. This status applies only until the land is occupied, and the individuals must adhere to the Law of Armed Conflict and carry arms openly.

The Geneva Convention specifically excludes the coverage of terrorists.

At a minimum, the convention requires all prisoners “must be humanely treated and are entitled to respect for the persons and their honor. This includes protection from acts of violence, intimidation and public curiosity.” With respect to interrogations, the convention says no physical or mental torture or any form of coercion may be inflicted on POWs to secure information of any kind whatever, and they may not be threatened, insulted, or abused.⁴


Abuses at the prison 

Numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several Abu Ghraib detainees. The documented abuse by guards included:⁵

• punching, slapping, kicking, and jumping on detainees’ bare feet with boots;
• photographing and videotaping naked detainees;
• forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photos;
• forcing detainees to remain naked for several days at a time and forcing male prisoners to wear women’s underwear;
• forcing male detainees to masturbate while being photographed;
• arranging naked detainees into a human pile and taking pictures;
• posing with a detainee with a dog leash around his neck;
• breaking chemical lights and pouring dangerous phosphoric acid on detainees;
• beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;
• sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and broom stick;
• allowing military dogs to threaten and bite detainees; and
• taking photos of dead Iraqi detainees while making gestures;

Breakdowns 

From the long list of documented abuses above, it is clear there were many breakdowns at Abu Ghraib prison. These breakdowns can be grouped in four categories:

Organizational. When the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade was assigned to the prison to gain intelligence, the relationship between them and the 800th MP Brigade was not clearly defined. Because they were colocated, the prison guards were not sure if they should follow the instructions of the intelligence officers. There was evidence in investigation reports that although there were no organizational orders, there were lower-level instructions to guards to “set conditions for detainees for subsequent military intelligence interrogations.” Specifically, “they did not have authorities and procedures in place to effect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and export information from detainees in Iraq.”⁶

In one instance, an MP guard, Sergeant Davis, said he heard a military intelligence officer tell guard Staff Sergeant Fredrick: “Loosen this guy up for us. Make sure he has a bad night. Make sure he gets the treatment.”⁷

This organizational confusion was made even more complicated by the use of civilian contractors from several U.S. corporations. These men and women wore generic civilian clothing and had free access to all cellblocks, but the guards never were sure of their status within the organization.

Leadership. Beginning at the top, Karpinski was cited in the investigation for failure of leadership. Her failures included not demanding that her unit follow standard operating procedures and the Geneva Convention and not actively walking around her prison command and knowing what was going on there. She also was cited for failure to remove ineffective officers and failure to follow “basic soldier standards.”

In her interview with the senior investigator, Karpinski completely refused to “either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership.”⁸ Karpinski was relieved for cause for dereliction of duty.

Other officers also were relieved of command for lack of leadership and failure to adequately train their troops. In a CNN interview with Larry King in 2005, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he offered his resignation to the president twice over the Abu Ghraib situation but was asked to stay on the job.⁹

Legal. The prison detained several categories of prisoners, including common Iraqi criminals awaiting trial, captured insurgents, and terrorists. The Geneva Convention invokes different protection for each of these categories. Particularly, insurgents without a command structure and terrorists do not specifically fall under captured combatant protection. It could be argued that all detainees should be treated with equal respect and dignity, but it also could be argued that some categories do not have the specific coverage of the 1949 Convention.

Moral. In the presence of organizational, leadership, and legal breakdowns, the final remaining source of decision-making is the moral reasoning of individual servicemembers. At Abu Ghraib, five individuals/groups handled the same situation very differently.¹⁰

1. The Sadist: Spc. Charles A. Graner, 35 years old, from Unitown, Pa., was accused of numerous acts of abuse against the detainees. He was reported to have piled up naked men, jumped on their bare hands and feet with his boots, and “merrily whistled, sang, and laughed while brutalizing the prisoners and forcing some to eat pork and drink alcohol” (which is against their Muslim religion). In several testimonies, it was reported that Graner seemed to enjoy the abusive acts and invented many of them himself for photo opportunities, while he posed and smiled. He also was convicted in a court martial of punching a prisoner until he became unconscious.¹¹ When the military intelligence officers realized Graner worked the prisoners over, they continued to ask him to abuse the prisoners. Graner was found guilty of all charges, including conspiracy to maltreat detainees, cruelty, and maltreatment as well as charges of assault, indecency, adultery, and obstruction of justice. On Jan. 15, 2005, he was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison.
   
   
2. Immature, dependent followers and onlookers:Pvt. 1st Class Lynndie England, 21 years old, from Ashby, W.Va., was reported and charged with severe abuse and humiliation of detainees. Although reportedly she did not directly physically injure any detainees, she can be seen in photos with a naked Iraqi prisoner with a dog collar around his neck and forced one prisoner to masturbate. She also can be seen in other photographs posing with naked prisoners. Given the sensitivities of Muslims and Arabs to sexuality, nudity, and women, these actions can be seen as particularly degrading. Other Army guards can be seen in pictures standing on edge of the scene watching prisoners being abused.
   
   England was convicted of one count of conspiracy, four counts of maltreating detainees, and one count of committing an indecent act. She was sentenced to three years in prison and dishonorably discharged.
   
   
3. Confused about mission, yet participated: Staff Sgt. Ivan Fredrick was the senior enlisted servicemember at the prison. Although he took part in the scenes of abuse, he was quoted to have said, “I questioned some of the things I saw … such things as leaving inmates in their cells with no clothes on or in female underpants. … I questioned this, and the answer I got back was, ‘This is how military intelligence wants it done.’ ”
   
   He also said: “We had no support, no training whatsoever, and I kept asking my chain of command for certain things … like rules and regulations. And it just wasn’t happening.”
   
   Fredrick pleaded guilty Oct. 20, 2004, to conspiracy, dereliction of duty, and maltreatment of detainees and was sentenced to eight years in prison. Unlike those in the first two categories, Fredrick believed the actions he observed were wrong but could not get the mission confirmation he needed from his superiors.
   
   
4. Refusal to participate: Not everyone participated in the abuse. An army captain who was stationed at the prison said an intelligence officer approached him and requested that his MPs keep a group of detainees awake around the clock until they talked. The captain said, “No, we will not do that.”
   
   
5. The intelligence officer asked him: “What’s the problem? We’re stressed, and all we are asking you is to keep them awake.”
   The captain said, “How? You’ve received training on that. My soldiers don’t know how to do that. And when you ask an 18-year-old to keep someone awake and he doesn’t know how to do that, he’s going to get creative.”
   
   The captain’s superior backed him up, and the request was withdrawn by military intelligence.¹²
   
   
6. Reported the abuse: Spc. Joseph M. Darby, 24 years old, from Corriganville, Md., is credited with turning the pictures over to authorities. He said in his testimony, “I knew I had to do something. I didn’t want to see any more prisoners abused … because I knew it was wrong.”
   
   Other soldiers saw the abuse but apparently tolerated — and eventually accepted — it. For example, a photo of the naked pyramid was used as a screen saver on many of the guards’ computers.
   
   Darby left the disk of photos with a letter describing the scenes with the criminal investigation division.
   
   Darby is described as: “One [who] didn’t go along with his peers. He didn’t worry about what people thought. He was just doing his job.” A friend of Darby said, “Growing up, he didn’t have much at all. But he was brought up properly. He was brought up to know right from wrong.”¹³

The writer of this case appreciates the editorial assistance received from Dr. Albert Pierce; Dr. Shannon French; Dr. Chris Eberle; Dr. Patricia Cook; Capt. Bob Schoultz, USN-Ret.; Virginia O. Rubel; Dr. Brad Johnson; Dr. Dave Garren; Lt. Cmdr. Clyde Haig; Kim Rawson; and Dr. George Lucas Jr. 

Be sure to check back after Oct. 1 for the author's comments.
¹ The New Yorker. Annals of National Security, “Torture at Abu Ghraib”, Seymour Hersh 5/10/05

² The U.S. Army report on Iraqi prisoner abuse; executive Summary of Article 15-6 investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, Background

³ The U.S. Army report on Iraqi prisoner abuse; executive Summary of Article 15-6 investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, Background B.6-b

⁴ Geneva Convention, 1949, Summary

⁵ The U.S. Army report on Iraqi prisoner abuse; executive Summary of Article 15-6 investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, Background –Part One

⁶ The U.S. Army report on Iraqi prisoner abuse; executive Summary of Article 15-6 investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, Background –Part One

⁷ The U.S. Army report on Iraqi prisoner abuse; executive Summary of Article 15-6 investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, Background –Part One -1.11.b

⁸ The U.S. Army report on Iraqi prisoner abuse; executive Summary of Article 15-6 investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, Background –Part Two – 14

⁹ CNN Interview with Larry King, Feb. 4, 2005

¹⁰ Dr. Al Piece discussed very similar categories of behavior in his remarks at the U.S. Naval Academy in September 2004

¹¹ The New Yorker. Annals of National Security, “Chain of Command,” Seymour Hersh, May 17, 2004

¹² The New Yorker. Annals of National Security, “Chain of Command,” Seymour Hersh, May 17, 2004

¹³ CBS News.com Who’s who person, May 4, 2004 

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About the Author: Capt. Rick Rubel, USN-Ret., currently is the distinguished military professor of Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md. After a 30-year career in the Navy, he has taught the Core Ethics Course for 10 years and has served as course director for the past six years. He is coauthor and coeditor of Case Studies in Military Ethics (Pearson Publishing, 2006).

 

 

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Chief Warrant Officer Sender

10/7/2008 11:33:02 PM

I am a retired CWO with a Counterintelligence MOS. I taught interrogation techniques at the 4th Army ITAAS for reserve personnel. My main points: torture produces what you want to hear not truth or facts. You have to study the culture of the prisoners you must deal with to know what approach will work. Before ignorant people are put in control, knowledgeable people must be given the responsibility. Humane treatment works well. Just ask anyone familiar with Chinese tactics used against our POWs in Korea. Confront an Iraqi with verses from the Koran on the soft side. Convince hardliners they will be buried in the skin of a Texas razorback hog. CWO Sender

Lieutenant Leonard

9/27/2008 2:06:54 PM

I am a retired Navy Mustang who also served two tours in Vietnam. I agree with Col. Morrison when he said "...much ado about nothing." Of course there were some mistakes made; however, for someone to send the pictures at Abu Ghraib to the press, which reflects negatively on the military, is actually worse than the acts themselves. In short, any disciplinary action should have been the command's - not as a result of what was publicized.

Captain Hager

9/25/2008 11:49:03 AM

CAPT Hager: I went through Enlisted Basic in 1976 and Officer Indoctrination in 1979. We were thoroughly trained on Law of War to include Geneva Conventions, our responsibility if captured, how to safeguard enemy prisoners, and our obligation to refuse illegal orders. I had a first hand experience as a Navy LT with a superior issuing an illegal order. Recognizing that acting on such a request would put my division on the wrong side of both ethics & military law), I requested the senior put it in writing and sign it. I was told this request was a "career ender", as he was responsible for my annual fitness report, but admitted it was my right to request doubtful orders in writing. He ended up canceling the order. Kudos to the Army Captain who said "NO" - give that man a Meritorious Service Award - he showed courage and leadership. I place full blame on the General and all subordinate mid-level military leaders (O's and SNCOs alike) for not issuing and enforcing clear operations standards of conduct and rules & responsibilities. The sadist and participants got what they deserved, however the General should have received a court martial. By the way, word of my action passed to my immediate superiors' boss and he summarily was administratively separated from the Navy. Sometimes the system works. Other times, like Abu Ghaib, it doesn't.

Colonel Morrison

9/25/2008 9:42:37 AM

I think the Abu Ghaib is much ado about nothing. It is much less severe than what occured after WW-II. It is simply a political issue, a disliked female General and a distraught pregnant soldier. No one died. No one was killed. The losers were oppressed but did they not oppress others, more specifically their own people? So it is a bunch of marlarky.

Colonel McPherson

9/24/2008 10:10:12 PM

No physical torture will produce valid result. Psychological stress does wonders. Physical torture sould never be condoned. However, much of what transpired was psychological and the ideas for these methods had to come from far up the chain of command. Thses soldiers were not sophisticated enough to invent these games. The greatest tragedy is NO ONE has stood up to say YES I suggested or directed these actions. The little guy has taken the blame and those responsible for the most part have never been named. Much the same as the current financial crisis the CEO reap the profits but call on the govt to bail them out. Reponsibility is lacking in the USA today!

Chief Warrant Officer Coots

9/21/2008 12:25:39 AM

After nearly 40 years, the thing that disturbs me the most is that too many officers forget their first responsibility is to take care of their troops and I doubt that much of the Abu Graib stuff that caused the problems would not have happened had those in command were doing their duty.

Colonel Ratliff

9/17/2008 4:41:06 PM

As a young officer in the 70s, our leaders ensured that we were thoroughly educated on the Law of Armed Conflict, the UCMJ, and the Geneva Convention. There was never a doubt in my mind that if an order seemed illegal or immoral, it was my duty to question it through the chain of command. During my 23 years on active duty, I sometimes observed senior officers that rarely left their offices. They were MANAGERS, not LEADERS. Successful leaders were the ones that got out and saw firsthand what was going on within the units they were responsible for. Personal responsibility. Accountability. Concepts that are not emphasized as much as they once were. It is a travesty that these incidents went on for more than a single shift without at least one officer in the chain of command finding out and putting an end to it. Here's how I would answer the questions: the sadist got what he deserved. The immature follower and onlookers - Be careful who you choose to follow. They got what they deserved. The confused who participated - The confusion was the warning they ignored. Should have taken their questions up the chain until they got answers. Those who chose not to participate - good, but not good enough. The reporter of the abuse - Meritorious Service Medal (as a minimum) and a BTZ promotion. What was the different about Joe Darby? One word - CHARACTER. He had it, others didn't. When should we expect our servicemembers to challenge orders? When they conflict with the Law of Armed Conflict, the UCMJ, or the Geneva Convention.

Colonel Czyzyk

9/16/2008 2:27:34 PM

One of the problems in the Prisoner of War structure is that senior leaders both Officer and Nco are constantly being rotated out to other units taking to expertise out of these units.Prisoner of War is something that you just learn over night. It takes years of experience. I know from experience duing the first Gulf War because the unit I came from rotated out its entire command structure approximately 6 months before going to war. Fortunately before they left their S-3 slot was filled with an individual who had spent approximately 10 years in POW units and they did well. The problem at Abu Ghraib was that most of the Command structure was probably new with limited experience. POW units should be aloud to rotate within their units to maintain the expertise needed to accomplish these missions. I know that Officers must rotate out for their careers but don't rotate the entire staff out at the same time. Rotate one at a time so that you always maintain the expertise in the unit and the new member has someone to work with while he learns what's expected of him. I spent 23 years in POW units and it upsets me greatly what took place at Abu Gharib.

Major Hesser

9/14/2008 5:10:50 PM

Surely there is a retired general or admiral within the halls of MOAA who cares to weigh in here. Beneficial it would be to hear from one of Our Best & Finest's former top field commanders or member of the joint chiefs. Having thrice commanded Army Engineer units, my gut & experience tell me that one cannot discount Abu Ghraib as a random anomaly. That kind of gross misconduct can only be attributable to a pattern of negligence & neglect from the top to the bottom of the chain of command. The buck stops at the top, i.e., with the Commander in Chief, SECDEF & CJCS. It is odious when ALL of the responsibility floats past their door and lands on the doormat of young privates, NCO's & company grade officers. On even his worst days, General Patton didn't allow the buck to float by his door...this, even though frequently on the receiving end of Washington's & London's buck passing. Neither did he toss the lateral monkey. In recent years, our great nation has seen a lot of the blame game's "monkey tossing" and "buck passing". Where are today's Pattons? I won't believe that men of his caliber are merely tattered remnants out on the fringe of U.S. history. D. Hesser, USACE (Retired), Life Member MOAA, Vietnam 1966-67

Colonel Gavel

9/14/2008 11:40:07 AM

I recall a JAG lecture at Air Force Squadron Officer School that served me well during my follow-on tour in SEA as a three years service Captain in charge of a 230 man POL branch. While it dealth with solving problems by giving a legal, understandable, witnessed order -- they comply or refuse in which case the JAG assists your commander in taking USMJ action, either way the problem is solved. If you are on the receiving end and ordered to do something and it meets those criteria, comply. If in your judgement it doesn't question it or refuse it. I have seen personnel use legality as an excuse for causing problems but when put to the test they do not have the courage of conviction and back off. Each of us must be prepared to say "No, sir" if warrented and accept the conseqences. It takes courage to say no, but we are supposed to possess that courage. Had the Captain who refused to keep prisoners awake been punished I believe that he would not have regreted his actions and if he had complied he would not have been able to live with himself. Being human we do make mistakes. Being moral we recognize when we do. I am proud of the fact that our responses repeat this over and over differing only in how we come at the situation!