2008/08/01 00:00:00
One way MOAA attempts to fulfill our goal of being the professional association of choice for all military officers and their families is by promoting enduring values of military professionals, including the highest ethical standards.
Each month, this page will feature a different ethics case study provided by Capt. Rick Rubel, USN-Ret., distinguished Professor of Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy. With each case study, Rubel will provide suggested questions, and readers will be able to discuss and comment. Whether you are currently serving, in a second career, or retired, there will be something here that makes you think. Unlike rules of engagement or standards of conduct, remember there is not necessarily a right answer to an ethical dilemma.
We hope you find this series interesting, but more important, we hope to promote discussion and thinking about ethical challenges facing people in uniform, whether in combat or in the normal course of duty. Be sure to check back Sept. 1 for the author’s comments on this case study.
By Capt. Rick Rubel, USN-Ret.
This case is based on the story of Capt. Al Balian, USN, commanding officer of the USS Dubuque (LPD-8). The sources used for this case are “Rescuing the Boat People,” a case by Paul E. Roush; the CBS 60 Minutes interview of Captain Balian by Diane Sawyer; and NROTC Holy Cross University case “The BOLINAO Affair: A Case Study of USS Dubuque (LPD-8).” The storyline in the case is added for narrative.
The U.S. Navy has a history of sending COs “over the horizon” with general guidance and asking them to use their best judgment. Often this judgment is used to decide between two competing obligations — completing the mission versus saving innocent lives. There are times when a CO cannot completely meet both obligations.
Questions for the reader:
Knowing what the captain knew at the time, if you were the captain:
- What are your options?
- What are your first, second, third considerations?
- What would you do? (Drive by and stay on time schedule, assist them, or embark them?)
U.S. Navy Lt. David Soleski moved his sunglasses out of the way so he could look through his binoculars. As he looked at “skunk Charlie-Delta” (surface contact-D), he mumbled out loud to Ensign Davis, his junior officer of the deck: “Looks like another junk going nowhere fast.” Soleski was the officer of the deck (OOD) of the USS Dubuque, an Austin-class amphibious transport dock. As OOD, he was the captain’s watch officer on the bridge responsible for the operation and safety of the ship. At this moment, they were transiting the South China Sea, near Singapore, one of the busiest seaways in the world. The Navy indexes its surface contacts by starting with “A” each morning and going through the alphabet, they already were up to D, and it was only 2:20 p.m. Soleski was doing his best to weave in and out of the surface traffic, trying to keep all shipping more that 4,000 yards away from his warship.
Davis answered Soleski: “Sir, CIC [combat information center] has this guy, skunk Charlie-Delta, with zero speed, currently at 6,000 yards.”
“Very well,” said Soleski, and he continued to watch.
As the contact got closer, the two officers observed a large number of people in the boat, standing and waving at the ship. They were not waving greetings but were quite frantic and appeared to be waving pieces of white cloth. Soleski was hoping he could keep skunk Charlie-Delta more that 4,000 yards away from the ship, so he wouldn’t have to notify the captain, who was in his cabin. “It’ll be close to 4,000 yards CPA [closest point of approach],” he told Davis. Both officers were looking through their binoculars as the boat approached 4,500 yards. Soleski and Davis both were startled and said at the same time, “Did you see that? It looked like one of them jumped in the water!”
Soleski reached for his phone to call the CO. “Captain, this is Lieutenant Soleski, officer of the deck. I have a contact off the port bow, bearing 220 degrees true, at 4,500 yards, with zero speed. It appears to be a junk with a lot of people waving.” The captain didn’t see a problem with that description and said, “OK, proceed on your course and speed.” Soleski then quickly added, “Sir, they are waving frantically at us, and we think we just saw one of the people jump into the water.” After a short pause, the captain, said, ”I’ll be right up to the bridge.”
As Captain Balian walked from his cabin to the bridge, a trip he could make with his eyes closed, he huffed under his breath, “We don’t have time for this.” The ship was transiting from its homeport of Sasebo, Japan, to Bahrain to assume the flagship for minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf. Just two months earlier, USS Roberts had been struck with a mine, so minesweeping operations were high priority. The Dubuque also was carrying 900 Marines to the Gulf, including a force reconnaissance team and was slightly behind planned intended motion.
“The captain’s on the bridge!” announced the quartermaster of the watch as the CO arrived. The captain wore several Vietnam campaign ribbons on his chest, a Silver Star, and a Purple Heart. He was familiar with this situation, because he had rescued refugees twice before.
“What do you have, Dave?” he asked Soleski.
“Sir, we have this Chinese-type junk at about 3,800 yards, and we think we saw someone jump into the water.”
The messenger of the watch handed the CO his binoculars without being asked. “Let’s get closer to them and slow down.”
“Aye, sir. Left standard rudder, make turns for 10 knots,” Soleski ordered the helmsmen and lee helm.
As the ship pulled within 500 yards of the junk and stopped, the waving became more frantic and about a dozen more people jumped into the water. As the swimming refugees slowly worked their way toward the ship, the sailors grabbed life jackets to prepare to throw to the swimmers. As they watched the swimmers get tired and flounder, it was hard to tell if any of them went under the waves. When the swimmers reached about 100 yards from the ship, the sailors began throwing the life jackets into the water.
“Who said to throw life jackets in the water? That’ll just encourage more of them to jump in the water,” the captain said.
Soleski took that to mean crewmembers should stop throwing life jackets, and he put the word out.
The captain got on the ship’s loudspeaker and ordered, “Don’t let the refugees aboard the ship.” The crew began pulling any lines that were in the water to prevent any of the refugees from boarding the ship.
The captain said, “They look Vietnamese. Have seaman Phan come to the bridge.” Phan spoke Vietnamese, so when he arrived on the bridge, the captain gave him the microphone and said, “Tell them not to board our ship and to go back to their own boat.” Phan translated the captain’s orders, but it came out very choppy as he struggled to remember the words from his childhood.
The captain told Soleski to have the executive officer (XO) and the operations officer come to the bridge. He told the XO to put a small team together in the ship’s motor whaleboat, including Phan, and go check out the junk. “Do not board the junk, we don’t know what’s going on there, and I don’t want to put anyone at risk. Take a grunt with you for small arms protection,” the captain said.
The operations officer reported to the captain and was asked to summarize the standing orders from higher authority that govern this situation. The operations officer ran below and came back within a few minutes with a summary of the operation orders and regulations:
- U.S. Navy Regulation 0925. A commanding officer must render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost.
- COMSEVENTHFLT OPORDER 201. “The natural inclination of mariners, the customs and traditions of the sea, and reference (a) [Navy Regulations] require U.S. Navy ships to render aid to vessels and persons found in distress. In those instances wherein relief of persons in life endangering circumstances cannot be accomplished; by repair to boats, reprovisioning or navigational assistance, rescue is normally by means of embarkation.”
- CINCPACFLT OPORDER 201. “If refugees encountered at sea are experiencing, or are apt to experience undue hardship or if circumstances (e.g. adverse weather, pirates in vicinity, unseaworthy vessel, etc.) are such that death may ensue, refugees may be embarked.”
Although events were moving slowly, things were becoming a bit chaotic. It took about 20 minutes to get the team together and launch the motor whaleboat. A few minutes after it left the side of the ship, the XO reported back on the radio: “Captain, it looks like they have a makeshift sail about 5 feet by 6 feet, and we have asked them several times, and they say they don’t have an engine. The boat seems seaworthy; it only has a slight list to starboard. And I think that’s because all the refugees are on the same side and it’s trimmed (fore and aft) about right. There are about 60 people on the boat, including women and children. The people look a bit emaciated and are pretty desperate-looking. To be honest, sir, seaman Phan is struggling with their dialect, and we have to ask everything several times and may get a different answer each time we ask the same question. They left Vietnam seven days ago, heading for the Philippines. Also, about 20 people have died so far on the trip. Over.”
The captain asked through his radio, “Do you see any bodies in the water?”
“ I don’t see any, sir,” the XO said as he looked around.
The captain had seen this before: refugees risking everything to leave their country.
He thought about what he should do. The operation orders were not completely definitive, and because the boat seemed seaworthy, maybe he was not required to embark them. He had orders to transit for an important mission in Bahrain. If he spent much more time with this junk, he would be endangering his mission. If he picked up the refugees and embarked them, he could be endangering his crew with unknown diseases and security concerns. And with the Marines on board, there was no extra space. Also, if he picked them up, he would have to find a country to accept them — that is not an easy diplomatic problem to solve without a lot of time.
On the other hand, he was concerned about the report that 20 of the refugees already had died. He reasoned that they had traveled more than 250 miles in seven days, so they should be able to go the remaining 200 miles in about the same amount of time. So maybe if he gave them provisions, they would be fine.
Read the author's analysis and tell us what you think.
About the Author: Capt. Rick Rubel, USN-Ret., currently is the distinguished military professor of Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md. After a 30-year career in the Navy, he has taught the Core Ethics Course for 10 years and has served as course director for the past six years. He is coauthor and coeditor of Case Studies in Military Ethics
(Pearson Publishing, 2006).
Read the author's analysis and tell us what you think.
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Lieutenant Ray |
8/27/2008 3:01:33 PM |
The mission, any mission, is important but unless our troops, ships, or aircraft are literally in a "firefight" situation we as warriors can also be humanitarians. Yes the waters that the refugee craft was in were dangerous waters so the CO should have armed his Gunners Mates and embarked Marines at a minimum, just in case. But leaving people who were in danger on the sea just to accomplish the type of mission that the ship was assigned to is an act of inhumanity, period. The laws and traditions of the sea require us to be warriors and seamen but not idiots. Gilbert Ray, Lieutenant, USN, Ret.
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Captain Williams |
8/15/2008 10:15:41 AM |
PART 2: A cursory inspection from the bridge wing or from a circling MWB is inadequate to determine the seaworthiness of the vessel. A boarding party is necessary. If the CO is unwilling to put people aboard the junk with the refugees onboard, he should embark the refugees while the inspection is carried out. I'm not buying the statement that there is no room at the inn. If Marines are embarked, there are probably LCUs in the welldeck. Launch an LCU and embark the refugees in the LCU. (If there are no LCUs, there should be plenty of room for refugees in the welldeck.) If the junk is seaworthy, re-embark the refugees, give them provisions, and send them on their way. If not, bring the LCU into the welldeck and keep the refugees in the LCU. Meanwhile call higher authority and let them know what's going on. If your presence in the gulf is critical, COMSEVENTHFLT can dispatch another ship to relieve you of your refugees. By the way, they were up to Surface Contact CHARLIE-DELTA. That means they were on their fourth pass through the alphabet, contact number 82. Also, 250 miles in seven days is only about 1.5 knots. I doubt that a 5 ft. by 6 ft. sail had much to do with their propulsion.
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Captain Williams |
8/15/2008 10:14:56 AM |
PART 1: Your options are 1) embark them, 2) give them food and water and send them on their way, or 3) do nothing. Obviously, option 3 is a non-starter. My first consideration is saving lives. The question is, whose lives? The lives of seamen in the Arabian Gulf who are at risk from mines, or the lives of Vietnamese refugees. Minesweeping ops in the gulf are being hampered by the fact that the minesweeping helos are shore based. They have to tow their sleds from the beach to the area to be swept. That eats up a lot of time and fuel. By the time they get to the Mine Danger Area, their on-station time is down to nothing. Dubuque would not only be a command and control platform, she would be a lilypad. The helos land on her flightdeck, refuel and hook up to the sled in the ship's well deck. She was needed in the gulf and it is a long transit from Singapore to the gulf. With that in mind, I would have to determine the seaworthiness of the refugee vessel.
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Master Sergeant Joos |
8/14/2008 4:29:53 PM |
This is an excellent scenario and due to the fact that this is a known pirate area. Pirates will do everything including throwing people overboard to convince ships to stop and provide help. I would have ignored the boat and continued on my mission. On the other hand if I suspected these were refugees and not pirates, I would order a boat into the water with fully armed personnel within 10 feet of the boat in distress. I would have a junior officer aboard with communications to provide the Captain with a full report of the situation and how many refugees were on the boat.
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Captain Larrabee |
8/14/2008 3:28:42 PM |
This is a very realistic, excellent scenario. Obvious ample evidence that the boat was in-extremis. Famous pirate area. The CO expected their safe 200 mi further transit on a sail? Regs clear. Pick-up demanded - outcome predictable. A msg to higher authority might have helped the CO
decide.
In the late 70s, my P-3 crew came upon a visual ctc (later ID: 34 foot wooden boat) dead-in-the-water in the central South China sea. We dropped 2 special sonobuoys and they dove into the water and swam to retrieve the buoys. We taped the hysterical Vietnamese transmissions and it was clear they needed rescue. We climbed and tried to contact every radar contact we had within 50 miles on the int'l VHF shipping freq and flew alongside several vessels trying to persuade the Captain to divert to rescue the boat people. All "had schedules" and "no help". Only recourse was to come up on Fleet Common and we raised a US destroyer, explained the situation and he got approval from his OPCON to proceed asap to the position. We made one last wing-waving pass over the boat to reasssure and departed due to fuel. Two days later we read in the Stars and Stripes in Cubi Point that the DD made it and rescued 60+ people -80% of the number that had departed Vietnam 10 days before. It was a humanitarian no brainer to do everything we could to try and save those brave refugees (75 people in a 34 ft boat risking their lives for freedom). Excluding armed combat or inviolable orders, there is no other option. This is a terrific exercise.
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Captain Kahrs |
8/14/2008 3:45:32 AM |
Since it was not a combat mission and a relatively slow vessel, the lives of 60 odd souls should have taken priority over a few days late on station. The intent should have been communicated to the next highest level of command (something ship CO's are sometimes reluctant to do)which would have either reinforced his decision to save them or relieved him of any consequences if his orders were countered. Only if the risk to his ship and crew exceeded the value of saving those lives should he have just provided assistance and sailed on.
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Chief Warrant Officer Andresen |
8/14/2008 1:54:08 AM |
Part 2 of 2
What followed is history. The CO was relieved of command and Court-Martialed. In actuality the "Bolinao" (refugee boat) was not seaworthy and barely managed to drift close enough to an island where it was rescued by fishermen. Many other refugees had died and cannibalism had been resorted to. The Navy's method of developing and selecting individuals fit for command at sea has worked pretty well for the past 200 plus years but not without the occasional problem. Once the ship takes in all lines and the shoreline fades into the horizon, the Captain reigns supreme and his authority is abosolute and so is accountability. This system's weak point is that it relies on a human being to make the right decision 100% of the time and human beings are ultimately fallible. Arleigh Burke got away with doing 30 Knots in a minefield but what if his ship or another of the little beavers hit mines and sank? Maybe we wouldn't have a class of ships named for him.
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Chief Warrant Officer Andresen |
8/14/2008 1:53:17 AM |
Part 1 of 2
Arleigh Burke also said "Any commander who fails to exceed his authority is of little use to his crew" I would add the caveat that he should also be prepared to accept the consequences. The regulations cited would seem to cover such situations with more than adequate guidance. The problem is as with anything written, such is subject to interpretation. If the CO is inclined to resort to a certain course of action, naturally he will tend to interpret the directive in a manner supporting his desires. The Dubuque of course was equipped with advanced satellite communications systems. He could have sought guidance from higher authority but that would also depend on his communicating an entirely accurate assesment of the situation. Of the three
obvious choices; 1.) Pick them up, 2.) Provide some assistance i.e. food, supplies etc, and proceed or 3.) just proceed; I would like to think that I would choose #1. I sort of have a dog in this fight. You see, I was assigned as the Dubuque's Electronics Material Officer during this period before and after. As fate would have it, I was on emergency leave during the actual incident. When I caught up with the ship in the Persian Gulf, I was back on board for only a few minutes before I was inundated by reports from my shipmates about the incident. There was a general sense of outrage and shame concerning the CO's decision to go for option #2.
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Chief Warrant Officer Andresen |
8/14/2008 1:46:37 AM |
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Commander Kosling |
8/13/2008 10:39:57 PM |
The story of the rescue of the Boat People for the most part is heartening, not from the displacement of ethical intervention and rescue, but for the time, effort and reaction of the wonderful men who gave their comments in support of rescue. My husband, Lt.Cmdr. Henry P. Kosling, USN-Ret. could identify with those in need of rescue ten years ago when he and a fishing buddy lost their engine and driffed in the Gulf of Mexico for 12 hours as all sorts of crafts and ships came and went, disregarding their distress flags and desperation. My Henry was 82 years old with a cardiac condition, dehydrated and burned. A little old lady, herself in her 70's in a very small craft, tugged them to shore and medical assistance. I had already inlisted the Coast Guard to look for them when they did not return. Rescue of any kind, is an afformation that we all have value and need rescue from time to time. I thank Capt. Rick Rubel, USN-Ret for his story as a reminder of the human value of caring and acting on that care. Nancy Kosling
