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Departments - Your Views

Mission Creep

Expanding Mission” [May 2004] is outrageous! It is obvious the left-leaning author ... simply wants to point out the dangers of a more influential Defense Department in the national (and international) political arena. He talks about the Clinton years as if DoD was expanding [then]. The truth is, DoD was contracting by almost 40 percent in size and budget from 1992 to 2000.

I do not accept the view that Clinton “permitted” DoD to pursue its agenda unchecked … the historical facts do not bear this out. Do you not review articles before you publish them? You should at least publish a counterpoint article to show balance. MOAA members deserve better.

Lt. Col. James L. Beach, USAF-Ret.
Tucson, Ariz.

I’m sure you will get a myriad of views on this article. I thought the article was well-written and accurate in its portrayal of our evolving foreign policy. I think we must look objectively at these changes and ask:

  1. Are our senior officers qualified to act as diplomats?
  2. Are our forces trained for nation building and police actions?
  3.  Are our forces properly and adequately equipped for this role?
  4. Do we recognize the difference between sending active duty regular soldiers to long-term conflicts and sending the Reserve/Guard components, e.g., the base/post support structure?
  5. Are our senior officers being honest and forthright in their personal communications with senior government officials?

I believe the answer to all of the above is no. That doesn’t mean we don’t have outstanding, well-educated, and highly trained military personnel. It just means we have neither a policy strategy for such use of the military, nor the equipment and required training to perform such a mission. These are all mismatches; strategic and tactical bombing sorties have little to do with resolving civil unrest conflicts.

Maj. Melvin E. Huffman, USAF-Ret.
Glenmoore, Pa.

Reserve Responsibilities

With all due respect to Col. Michael Gray, this and the next administration need to run off those reservists who can’t “accommodate so much mobilization.” I have a similar active duty and Air National Guard background and fully expected to be called to active duty under the “total force” concept. Why have reserves if they cannot be called to active duty when needed?

We, as a nation, may indeed need to rethink that concept, but as long as it governs policy, Reserve and Guard personnel need to put that into the calculus when making the decision to sign up in the first place and whether to remain in. One weekend a month and two weeks in the summer doesn’t, itself, do much for national defense. The idea, as I understand it, is to be ready to go get shot at if the call comes.

Col. J. Bruce Laubach, USAF-Ret.
via e-mail

Attu, Brutal

Although I was not in the Coast Guard, [“Ice Station X-Ray,” May 2004] brought back memories of my one year “remote” tour in 1964 at a U.S. Air Force Distant Early Warning radar site at Port Heiden, Alaska, also in the Aleutians. We also were staffed with 25 men and only one officer.

Our job was to provide long-range radar surveillance as well as “troposcatter” communications relay to NORAD for all the other sites and bases west of us. That was in the days before satellite communications. Around our one composite building there were remnants of Quonset huts, foxholes, etcetera, from World War II, similar to those that exist near Attu.

One big difference between the tour of the “coasties” today and us back in those days is that we were there for 365 days without leave, except in case of an extreme medical or family emergency—and “Dear John” letters did not count as an extreme emergency.

Nevertheless, I salute the Coast Guard members who get assigned to that duty. Having “been there, done that,” I know what they give up in order to serve our country.

Maj. John C. Fernandez, USAF-Ret.
via e-mail

Right Guy, Wrong Ship

The “swim” by Lieutenant Kinder [“Encore,” May 2004] was witnessed by myself and a number of the crew of the USS Robinson (DD-562), upon which the incident occurred. Then-Lieutenant Zumwalt was at the time the operations officer on the Robinson. ...

Robinson was directed to be the flagship (under Captain Campbell, commodore) for mine-sweeping operations in the South China Sea in September 1945 after the end of hostilities. Kinder at that time was assigned as the medical officer aboard Robinson.

The idea that a sailor would toss a $100 bill over the side is pretty unbelievable, as even the highest-rated enlisted man at that time made barely $100 a month. ... My recollection of the incident was that Kinder was showing someone the contents of his wallet (pictures?) and it inadvertently fell over the fantail. He did indeed dive over the side in a (successful) attempt to recover the wallet and was caught up in the strong current and unable to swim back to the ship.

The whaleboat was put in the water and sent back to pick up a very wet and somewhat chagrined Kinder. Kinder also was the unofficial ship photographer and provided many of the crew (including myself) with many memorable pictures of shipboard life and some of the Robinson adventures.

As a matter of record, USS Dewey (DLG-14), referred to as the ship upon which the swim incident occurred, was not placed in service until her commissioning on Dec. 7, 1959. ...

I am not being critical of Captain Moxon or his recollections of the Kinder incident, but I did want to correct any misunderstanding about what actually occurred and where.

Lt. Cmdr. Jack Bozarth, USN-Ret.
via e-mail

Mars Attacked

I have not [read] The Burma Road, [“Bookshelf,” May 2004], but the review worries me. The article mentions Merrill’s Marauders, the British Chindits, etcetera, but not the only other American ground combat unit to serve on the mainland of Asia in World War II: The Mars Task Force.

We veterans of that unit always have resented the oblivion to which we seem to have been consigned. We are the ones, together with the Chinese, who drove the Japanese out of Northern Burma and enabled the opening of the Burma Road from India to China in January 1945.

We suspect we were crowded out of the news by the Battle of the Bulge, Okinawa, etcetera, even though our battle casualties were twice that of the Marauders.

Mars was a brigade-sized unit, consisting of the 475th Infantry (which absorbed the few remaining Marauders after the liberation of Mytkyina in August 1944), the 124th Cavalry (dismounted), the 612th and 613th Field Artillery Batteries (Pack 75’s carried on mules), some quartermaster troops, and two mule-portable medical units.

I was an 18-year-old machine gunner in the 475th Infantry, and the neglect of this unit still rankles after all these years.

Capt. Richard W. Hale, USAR-Ret.
Sanibel, Fla.

.

In Ralph Wetterhahn’s excellent article, “Ice Station X-Ray,” in the May 2004 edition of Military Officer, I believe the rusted-out vehicle shown on page 73 and identified as “the hulk of a rusting jeep” is not a jeep, but more likely a 3/4-ton truck. The front fenders are much too wide for those of a jeep, a jeep of that era didn’t usually have light guards on its fenders, and a jeep of that era didn’t usually have rear fenders or a high cargo compartment.

— Lt. Col. Clay R. Smith Jr., USA-Ret.
Alexandria, Va.