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Mission Creep
“Expanding Mission”
[May 2004] is outrageous! It is obvious the left-leaning author ...
simply wants to point out the dangers of a more influential Defense
Department in the national (and international) political arena. He
talks about the Clinton years as if DoD was expanding [then]. The
truth is, DoD was contracting by almost 40 percent in size and
budget from 1992 to 2000.
I do not accept the view that Clinton “permitted” DoD to pursue its
agenda unchecked … the historical facts do not bear this out. Do you
not review articles before you publish them? You should at least
publish a counterpoint article to show balance. MOAA members deserve
better.
Lt. Col. James L. Beach, USAF-Ret.
Tucson, Ariz.
I’m sure you will get a myriad of views on this article. I
thought the article was well-written and accurate in its portrayal
of our evolving foreign policy. I think we must look objectively at
these changes and ask:
- Are our senior officers qualified to act as diplomats?
- Are our forces trained for nation building and police
actions?
- Are our forces properly and adequately equipped for
this role?
- Do we recognize the difference between sending active duty
regular soldiers to long-term conflicts and sending the
Reserve/Guard components, e.g., the base/post support structure?
- Are our senior officers being honest and forthright in their
personal communications with senior government officials?
I believe the answer to all of the above is no. That doesn’t mean
we don’t have outstanding, well-educated, and highly trained
military personnel. It just means we have neither a policy strategy
for such use of the military, nor the equipment and required
training to perform such a mission. These are all mismatches;
strategic and tactical bombing sorties have little to do with
resolving civil unrest conflicts.
Maj. Melvin E. Huffman, USAF-Ret.
Glenmoore, Pa.
Reserve Responsibilities
With all due respect to Col. Michael Gray, this and the next
administration need to run off those reservists who can’t
“accommodate so much mobilization.” I have a similar active duty and
Air National Guard background and fully expected to be called to
active duty under the “total force” concept. Why have reserves if
they cannot be called to active duty when needed?
We, as a nation, may indeed need to rethink that concept, but as
long as it governs policy, Reserve and Guard personnel need to put
that into the calculus when making the decision to sign up in the
first place and whether to remain in. One weekend a month and two
weeks in the summer doesn’t, itself, do much for national defense.
The idea, as I understand it, is to be ready to go get shot at if
the call comes.
Col. J. Bruce Laubach, USAF-Ret.
via e-mail
Attu, Brutal
Although I was not in the Coast Guard, [“Ice
Station X-Ray,” May 2004] brought back memories of my one year
“remote” tour in 1964 at a U.S. Air Force Distant Early Warning
radar site at Port Heiden, Alaska, also in the Aleutians. We also
were staffed with 25 men and only one officer.
Our job was to provide long-range radar surveillance as well as
“troposcatter” communications relay to NORAD for all the other sites
and bases west of us. That was in the days before satellite
communications. Around our one composite building there were
remnants of Quonset huts, foxholes, etcetera, from World War II,
similar to those that exist near Attu.
One big difference between the tour of the “coasties” today and us
back in those days is that we were there for 365 days without leave,
except in case of an extreme medical or family emergency—and “Dear
John” letters did not count as an extreme emergency.
Nevertheless, I salute the Coast Guard members who get assigned to
that duty. Having “been there, done that,” I know what they give up
in order to serve our country.
Maj. John C. Fernandez, USAF-Ret.
via e-mail
Right Guy, Wrong Ship
The “swim” by Lieutenant Kinder [“Encore,”
May 2004] was witnessed by myself and a number of the crew of the
USS Robinson (DD-562), upon which the incident occurred.
Then-Lieutenant Zumwalt was at the time the operations officer on
the Robinson. ...
Robinson was directed to be the flagship (under Captain Campbell,
commodore) for mine-sweeping operations in the South China Sea in
September 1945 after the end of hostilities. Kinder at that time was
assigned as the medical officer aboard Robinson.
The idea that a sailor would toss a $100 bill over the side is
pretty unbelievable, as even the highest-rated enlisted man at that
time made barely $100 a month. ... My recollection of the incident
was that Kinder was showing someone the contents of his wallet
(pictures?) and it inadvertently fell over the fantail. He did
indeed dive over the side in a (successful) attempt to recover the
wallet and was caught up in the strong current and unable to swim
back to the ship.
The whaleboat was put in the water and sent back to pick up a very
wet and somewhat chagrined Kinder. Kinder also was the unofficial
ship photographer and provided many of the crew (including myself)
with many memorable pictures of shipboard life and some of the
Robinson adventures.
As a matter of record, USS Dewey (DLG-14), referred to as the
ship upon which the swim incident occurred, was not placed in
service until her commissioning on Dec. 7, 1959. ...
I am not being critical of Captain Moxon or his recollections of the
Kinder incident, but I did want to correct any misunderstanding
about what actually occurred and where.
Lt. Cmdr. Jack Bozarth, USN-Ret.
via e-mail
Mars Attacked
I have not [read] The Burma Road, [“Bookshelf,”
May 2004], but the review worries me. The article mentions Merrill’s
Marauders, the British Chindits, etcetera, but not the only other
American ground combat unit to serve on the mainland of Asia in
World War II: The Mars Task Force.
We veterans of that unit always have resented the oblivion to which
we seem to have been consigned. We are the ones, together with the
Chinese, who drove the Japanese out of Northern Burma and enabled
the opening of the Burma Road from India to China in January 1945.
We suspect we were crowded out of the news by the Battle of the
Bulge, Okinawa, etcetera, even though our battle casualties were
twice that of the Marauders.
Mars was a brigade-sized unit, consisting of the 475th Infantry
(which absorbed the few remaining Marauders after the liberation of
Mytkyina in August 1944), the 124th Cavalry (dismounted), the 612th
and 613th Field Artillery Batteries (Pack 75’s carried on mules),
some quartermaster troops, and two mule-portable medical units.
I was an 18-year-old machine gunner in the 475th Infantry, and the
neglect of this unit still rankles after all these years.
Capt. Richard W. Hale, USAR-Ret.
Sanibel, Fla.
.
In Ralph Wetterhahn’s excellent article, “Ice
Station X-Ray,” in the May 2004 edition of Military
Officer, I believe the rusted-out vehicle shown on page 73
and identified as “the hulk of a rusting jeep” is not a jeep,
but more likely a 3/4-ton truck. The front fenders are much too
wide for those of a jeep, a jeep of that era didn’t usually have
light guards on its fenders, and a jeep of that era didn’t
usually have rear fenders or a high cargo compartment.
— Lt. Col. Clay R. Smith Jr., USA-Ret.
Alexandria, Va.
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