Overcoming Race: Army Lessons for American Society
The status of race relations in America has long been debated and often comes to the fore during Black History month. Here, noted Northwestern University sociologist - and former Army specialist - Charles Moskos offers his thoughts. He is the coauthor of All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way (Basic Books, 1997). He draws on the U.S. Army's experience for lessons to improve race relations in the broader society.

Race relations have been termed the "American dilemma." One American institution, however, contradicts the prevailing race paradigm. It is an institution unmatched in its level of racial integration and its broad record of black achievement. It is the only place in American society where whites are routinely supervised by blacks. It is the U.S. Army.

Noting the generally good race relations in the Army is not turning a blind eye to real problems. The Army is not a racial utopia. Black and white soldiers are just as susceptible to interracial suspicion and resentment as members of a civilian society are. The Army is not immune to the demons that haunt race relations in America.

Still, give or take a surly remark here, a bruised sensibility there, the races get on remarkably well. Even in the grueling conditions of deployments to the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan, not one racial incident occurred that was severe enough to come to the attention of the military police. According to survey data [compiled by the author for All That We Can Be], black soldiers are three times more likely than black civilians to say that race relations are better in the Army than in civilian life (white soldiers are five times more likely than their civilian counterparts to say so). In addition, a study of military veterans found that almost twice as many black veterans (69 percent) as white (37 percent) wished they had stayed in the Army.

The proportion of blacks in the American armed forces has risen substantially since the end of the draft in 1973. Blacks, who comprise 12 percent of the American population, had roughly proportionate numbers in the military during the draft era (especially in the enlisted ranks). Today, blacks comprise slightly more than one-quarter of all Army personnel, about double the proportion in the other services.

By rank, blacks comprise about 25 percent of the Army's junior enlisted force, 35 percent of NCOs, and 12 percent of all officers. Especially noteworthy is that 8 percent of Army generals are black. A significant event in American history was the 1989 appointment of Army Gen. Colin L. Powell to chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the most prestigious military position in the world.

Contrary to popular belief, blacks did not suffer disproportionate casualties in the Vietnam War. In fact, black fatalities were 12 percent of all Americans killed in Southeast Asia. In military operations since Vietnam, blacks have accounted for 14 percent of the total killed in action, slightly higher than their numbers in the population, but somewhat lower than their numbers in the armed forces. Indeed, one interesting development is the declining number of blacks in the combat arms. Blacks made up 30 percent of the infantry in 1980 but only about 15 percent today. The percentage of blacks in special operations units is even lower.

Black women comprise about 22 percent of all female officers, but their presence at the enlisted level is especially notable. Today there are more black enlisted women in the Army (47 percent) than there are white women (40 percent) or women of other racial backgrounds (13 percent). Also, black women are more likely to complete an enlistment tour than white women.

Whatever its racial tensions, the Army stands out as an organization in which equal opportunity fares better than anywhere else in American society. President Truman issued an executive order in 1948 calling for desegregation of the armed forces, but racial integration really began with the Korean War and was accomplished by the early 1950s. The period between the wars in Korea and Vietnam was one of relative racial calm in the armed forces. Over the course of the Vietnam War, however, white-black polarization heightened, with racial clashes occurring worldwide throughout the services. Racial conflict grew even worse with the end of the draft in 1973 and the Vietnam War. Fights between black and white soldiers were endemic in the mid- and late-1970s, an era now remembered as the "time of troubles." Since the 1980s, however, the picture has been positive.

So we come to the core question: Can civilians draw any lessons from the Army experience? Surely the organizational differences are so great, say the doubters, that little from the Army can be applied to the larger society. One cannot deny the significant differences between military and civilian life, but this does not mean that the Army experience has no applicability to the broader society. Indeed, anyone could easily argue why race relations should be worse in the Army than in civilian life. The military, after all, is overwhelmingly populated by young males, a group more typically prone to trouble. The military enforces constrained living conditions and potential danger, which should aggravate rather than reduce social tensions.

However, the Army experience does offer a broad principle: Race relations can best be transformed by an absolute commitment to nondiscrimination, coupled with uncompromising standards of performance. To maintain standards, however, paths of opportunity must be created - through education, training, and mentoring - for those who otherwise would be at a disadvantage. Comprehension of how race relations work in the American Army suggests five concrete lessons.

Lesson one: Blacks and whites will not view opportunities and race relations the same way. Even in the Army, blacks and whites have disparate views of equal opportunity. Blacks, regardless of gender or rank, consistently view racial matters in a less favorable light than do whites. These differing views likely will continue to exist in the military and society as a whole. What the Army experience does show, however, is that black and white social attitudes can become significantly closer in egalitarian settings with shared experiences. It also shows that blacks and whites do not have to hold identical views on race in order to succeed together.

Lesson Two: Focus on black opportunity, not on white racism. Better for an organization to have blacks in leadership positions with some white racists than to have few blacks and fewer black leaders with no racial bigots. On the other hand, the proclivity in civilian organizations, notably the academic world, is to foster a better racial climate through eradication of racist statements and symbols. Such efforts are meaningless unless accompanied by concrete steps to expand the pool of qualified black students and faculty.

The presence, even if not in great number, of white racists in the Army points to a profound and counterintuitive lesson. Their presence, lamentable as it may be, is not the key issue. Indeed, black history is eloquent testimony to how black accomplishment can occur despite pervasive white racism. In no way should the absence of white racists be considered a precondition for black achievement. This is one of the most significant morals of the Army experience.

Lesson Three: Be ruthless against discrimination. Formal efforts to prohibit racist expressions can be a way of avoiding a genuine opening of channels for black advancement. Rather, the emphasis must be on zero tolerance of racist behavior within an organization's leadership. Individuals who display such tendencies must not be promoted to positions of responsibility. Racist behavior in the Army effectively terminates one's career. The fact that one rarely hears racial remarks among Army NCOs and officers, even in all-white groups, reflects how much this has become the norm.

Lesson Four: Affirmative action must follow a "supply-side," not a "demand-side," model. In practical terms, the Army has developed an affirmative action program based on supply. This contrasts with the more typical demand version of affirmative action, in which goals and quotas are established without prior efforts to enlarge the pool of qualified people. Thus, the Army commissioning program relies heavily on the rotc presence at historically black colleges and universities. Almost half of all newly commissioned Army black officers are products of historically black colleges.

Lesson five: A level playing field is not always enough. The Army successfully produces black leaders because it recognizes this. Its experience shows how youths with deficient backgrounds can meet demanding academic as well as physical standards. The Army has introduced programs to bring young people up to enlistment standards, to raise enlisted soldiers to NCO standards, and to elevate high school graduates to West Point admission standards. These programs are not targeted exclusively toward minority soldiers, but the participants are disproportionately black.

Rather than compromise standards, the Army raises soldiers to meet competitive standards. Toward this end, the Army has established far-reaching educational programs that emphasize core academic skills. At the enlisted level this involves what is effectively one of the largest continuing education programs in the world. Some 60 percent of the enrollees are black. Without such an effective in-service program, the strong black representation in the NCO corps would be impossible.

The U.S. Military Academy at West Point remains the most prestigious source of commissions in the Army. Almost half of the black cadets who enter West Point are products of one of the most unusual secondary schools in America - the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School (usmaps). The 10-month program, in effect a 13th year of high school, has emphasized academic competency in reading, writing, and mathematics. Without usmaps, the number of black cadets would be perilously low. Black "prepsters" are just as likely to graduate from West Point as whites who are directly admitted to the academy.

Evaluating programs designed to boost academic skills and test scores is fraught with difficulty. But there is sufficient evidence from the Army experience to show that achievement test scores can be raised significantly through programs that are well-staffed, have motivated participants, and adopt a military regimen. Residential programs away from the participant's home area seem to be the most effective way to steer young people toward productive goals. Such programs emphasize core academic skills.

The skill-boosting programs that produce so many black leaders in the Army are costly. Such programs require a big commitment of money and resources.

The blunt truth is that the way many Americans see it, the greater the black proportion in an organization, the poorer its effectiveness. The armed forces are the welcome exception. That the disproportionately black Army stands out as one of the most respected organizations in American society has profound meaning. Not only has the military played a central role as an avenue of black achievement; it also has shown that a large black presence has been conducive to the better operation of a major American institution.

In the final analysis, any program of race relations must meet a single test: Does it improve the performance of the organization in which it is implemented? That is the ultimate lesson of the Army in overcoming the racial divide.