Thousands of Army reservists were surprised to learn they would be spending a full year in Iraq. One reason for the longer rotation is a sustained Iraqi insurgency atop other worldwide challenges. Another, arguably, is Lt. Gen. James R. Helmly, the blunt-spoken chief of the Army Reserve, who says he fought for one-year rotations during an internal debate last summer.

“Once you have interrupted the soldier’s civilian life, stay the course,” Helmly says he advised superiors. “Bringing them home in six months, and then having to remobilize a year later for another six, is 10 times worse than keeping them on the ground for a year.”

Since assuming leadership of the Army Reserve May 25, 2002, Helmly has pressed to make 211,000 Selected Reservists more responsive to 21st century missions, including the war on terrorism, and to make the Army Reserve’s “bureaucracy” more responsive to soldiers and families.

Helmly, 56, entered service in 1966 as an enlisted man and earned his commission in 1967 through Officer Candidate School. He served two combat tours in Vietnam with the 101st Airborne Division. He also commanded an infantry company in Panama before leaving active duty in 1973. As an Army Reserve officer, Helmly held logistics and operations assignments, including command of the 352nd Maintenance Battalion in Macon, Ga., and the 449th Area Support Group in Forest Park, Ga.

In an interview with contributing editor Tom Philpott, Helmly discusses the impact of the war in Iraq on the Army Reserve and his plans to reorganize this reserve component and change the mindset of some reserve leaders. Answers have been edited for space and clarity.

In your 38-year association with the Army, have you ever seen the nation more reliant on the Army Reserve?

No. The nation was always reliant on reserve components. If we had to go to war during the Cold War, we’d have had large-scale use of reserves. In Desert Shield/Desert Storm we had a fairly large mobilization.

But if you look at recent history, there was a reluctance to mobilize. We overcame that, starting with Bosnia in 1996, although the number mobilized was small. And there was no reluctance by political leadership after [the Sept. 11 terrorist attack]. The president quickly declared partial mobilization. There did not appear to be reluctance by the services to execute that authorization with larger numbers.

The reality of that dependence on reserve forces we now see more clearly. Casualties have forced an understanding of the totally integrated nature of our formations. Reserve component soldiers are equally exposed [to the dangers] and equally disposed toward service. [Twenty-seven Army reservists died in Iraq in 2003, 14 by hostile fire; 151 were wounded in Iraq, three were wounded in Afghanistan.]

What’s been the impact on the morale of mobilized forces?

The press seeks the sensational, the million-dollar stockbroker mobilized who is losing his business. We haven’t had any members saying “I don’t want to serve,” or wholesale refusals. Instead, there’s a quiet pride.

I just returned from theater. In the main, I did not get complaints about being mobilized or “Why me?” The biggest resounding complaint was, “We wish more people would be straight with us, like you are.”

It appears some people have promised [the troops] a rose garden. “I guarantee you’ll be home by this date,” and so on.

Is this greater reliance on reserves a good thing for the nation, and for the Army Reserve?

For a long time the reserve components have said, “Put me in the game, coach.”

Well, once you’re in the game, you’re in. It’s not all pep rallies. There are deaths and wounds, sheer boredom, and uncertainty—all of the things that go with the use of a military force.

It is a good thing for the nation because reserve forces maintain the linkage with communities that small, regular forces do not; are much less costly to maintain; and, in the case of the Army Reserve, bring strong civilian-based skills to apply against military requirements that are candidly more difficult to maintain in the regular component. But if we’re not going to use an Army Reserve, why have it? The nation is at war.

The issue now is optimization of capabilities. A reserve component is not an active component. One should address whether keeping the same member on active duty is proper or [whether it’s] an optimum use of reserve capability.

The impact on the members is different than on the institution. The Army Reserve has been in a continuous state of mobilization since 1996. What we failed to do in that time is recognize that reality and adjust the way we organize, man, train, and sustain our force so we do not place undue stress on individuals. That’s at the heart of our transformation. When you’re in a long-duration war, you need predictability and balance so soldiers get a rest from deployments. You burn them out otherwise.

Can you describe the current strain on reserve forces?

Some stress comes from change in personal expectations for people who never expected to be mobilized or who perceived a mobilization like Bosnia, a predictable pattern [in which] we were able to accommodate six-month deployments. Institutional stress comes from the number of soldiers we have to “cross-level” between units because we’re not manned properly. It breaks teamwork, breaks cohesion. It does not allow for a tight tie from deployed unit back to family readiness groups.

How prevalent is cross-leveling?

Very prevalent. Out of 71,000 soldiers mobilized for Operation Iraqi Freedom I, we had to cross-level 22,000. That is stressful. It produces individual stress. I feel it here too, because I am unable to manage the damage I’m doing to “donor” units.

What can be done?

First, we have a structure allowance of 226,000 soldiers and an end-strength authorization of 205,000. So we’re out of kilter by 21,000 soldiers. Further, out of the 205,000 [soldiers], an average of 16,000 are in training, being chaptered for disciplinary action, have physical abnormalities, or [are] in transit.

So to man units properly, you need some number of soldiers above billets authorized?

Yes, but I’m not doing it at the unit level. That places the burden on the company commander. I want him concentrating on making soldiers ready to deploy rapidly to a lethal environment. Now he’s too busy accounting for his soldiers’ status. We have pushed everything to that commander’s level and not shared responsibility in the chain of command.

We’ve got captains explaining on briefing slides they’re short three trucks. “Well,” we say, “what are you doing about that?” That captain can’t do anything about it! Hell, in some cases we aren’t even buying these trucks. That’s my monkey.

How do you address organizational failures?

First, we’re having leaders lead at every level, putting on people’s backs the monkeys only they can solve. That includes me and my staff.

Second, we’re bringing down structure and establishing a manpower accounting mechanism to provide to unit commanders trained soldiers who are deployable so that they can train their unit properly before mobilization.

You’re creating a pool of trained personnel to fill out these units for deployment?

Trained and untrained. The active component Army does this well, though there is some stress and strain. It has authorized end strength of 480,000 [soldiers] but a force-structure allowance of 417,000. That 63,000 difference is soldiers in training, in transit, in hospitals, or students.

Nothing like that exists in the reserves?

That’s right. The other thing the active component does is build inventory. We have not. For example, we put our bonuses against a specific unit. We try to recruit truck drivers for the 1st Truck Company in some township in Pennsylvania. We localize everything. So, though I can recruit truck drivers in California, I’m putting all my bonus money against drivers in Pennsylvania. So I’m sitting there tying up bonus money. That’s crazy.

We’ve always said in the Army Reserve, “But we’re different. We can’t move soldiers around.” I’ve said to my people, “Find me a way to take an active component model and apply it to an Army Reserve environment.” So I’ve destroyed the unit bonus structure. By concentrating on the most critical fields— truck drivers, linguists, and so on—I’m walking them through how to build inventory and then assign soldiers against that.

This is what I mean about sharing monkeys. The Army Reserve staffs have lived a luxurious life, keeping records and statistics, pointing fingers at unit commanders. Now there’s friction. Their boss ain’t letting them do that.

But how do you fill truck-driver billets in Pennsylvania with truck drivers in California?

An Individual Augmentee (IA) program. Past practice was if you were a truck driver in California and there was not a truck there, we sent you to [non-drill status in] the Individual Ready Reserve. It’s a waste. Instead, I’ll turn on a slot for you as a truck driver in the IA. We will continue to pay you and attach you to a unit near your home. But I keep you in the Selected Reserve because I can almost guarantee I’ll need you within the next two or three years. The recurring requirement is for individuals. I don’t need whole truck companies. Today, the only way we get individuals is [to] go to another unit and pull a person out, which breaks that unit.

And what are the remaining ways you’re addressing organizational failures?

We’re concentrating on predictable leader development. We have not had a practiced way of growing leaders. While it is true [that] great captains of warfare are disposed to become great by personality, institutions provide them the wherewithal to achieve that greatness. We have not done that in the Army Reserve. We have been terribly sloppy.

[Also], we’re deciding on the kinds of structures we should invest in, saying to the Army, “If we’re not using these kinds of units, we ought to inactivate them and use the resources to make other units ready.”

Stress also shows up when we’re unable to provide a rotational base for high-demand units, like military police and transportation units. For other units, there’s no demand at all.

Some see the strain on high-demand reserve units and argue those missions should shift back to the active force.

In some cases, because of required responsiveness, it’s possible to increase the capability in the active component. In other cases, civil affairs for example, why would you want to do that? Civil affairs is teaching and organizing host-nation citizenry to provide basic necessities and set up economic, judicial, security, sanitation, and health systems. Try to replicate that in the active component and you pay a hell of a bill, sending senior officers and ncos to municipalities to learn how to do all that. Civil affairs is a core competency of Army Reserve. Why not just grow more in the reserve and have rotation capability?

For military police, we are standing up more active component units as well as more in the National Guard and Army Reserve.

We’ve had this overly simplistic argument about active and reserve component balances. What we should seek is optimization of each component’s capabilities.

You have referred to “optimists” who thought we would be only six months in Iraq.

My responsibility is to be a force provider, an adjunct of the chief of staff who is in the business of organizing, training, and equipping forces. So I never tried to second-guess the Iraqi operation or any operation.

What I did do is look practically at the demand. I saw that an optimistic view caused soldiers and families to perceive we were only going to be there six months. A good commander owes soldiers the truth first. It’s not that people spoke untruths. It’s just that some believed you should tell soldiers things to make them feel good.

Perceptions that this was going to be a quick, neat victory, I believed, were probably not going to pan out.

In America we have this fanciful belief that you can make war nice, clean. It’s not that way. It’s dirty, ugly, nasty. And despite all we believed, that [Saddam Hussein] is a mean guy, somebody in power that long hasn’t kept it because everybody hates him. Tactical defeat, I had every confidence, would be over in weeks. Then the hard part would start: How the hell do we take this place and rebuild it?

It’s going to take a while, a lot of force, and be continually dangerous.

Have you been surprised by the big role given Reserve and National Guard in Iraq?

I have not. But I’m worried about an impatient attitude. “The war is over. I saw the statue of Saddam come down. I don’t understand why my husband won’t be home tomorrow. I don’t understand, General, why you can’t get those 71,000 Army Reserve troops demobilized in two months.”

[DoD] policy was mobilization for one year. I didn’t object to that after [Sept. 11] because numbers mobilized were smaller. But for the Army Reserve and Iraq, I argued to give me 16 to 18 months mobilization time, with a year on the ground.

I kept saying, “Look, I get paid to know how soldiers think. I’m telling you, for reserve soldiers, you cannot do this to them—i.e., let them continue to think they’ll be there less than 12 months.”

As a force provider, I don’t look [only] at Iraq. I look at Guantanamo, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, any place you need force. I kept arguing, “Look, you’re going to kill us restricting us to one year.”

Finally we had a session in the basement where we lined up all the numbers, requirements, and units available, and it was like a blinding flash.

“Yeah, we’ve got to get more time out of this thing. We can’t turn this over this fast.”

That’s when we finally got the announcement [that] we’re going to have to do an extension for a year boots-on-ground.

How do you restructure the Army Reserve to establish a more stable rotation plan?

The goal would be force sufficient to support a Bosnia, a Kosovo, and a Guantanamo-level mobilization and not have to mobilize the same soldier for more than a nine- to 12-month period in a four- to five-year window.

What about Iraq?

The requirement is higher for Iraq. But if we had that [properly sized] rotational force today, there wouldn’t be as much stress. That’s what lulled us. The volume requirement in the Balkans was low enough to accommodate without a change to the way we do business. Now, because we didn’t change and the volume is higher, the stress is really high.

How far are you from that force-structure goal?

We’ll make decisions shortly, going to Army and [DoD] leadership this fiscal year. More activations will occur in 2005 and [2006]. It will take us two to six years to complete restructuring.

What impact has Iraq had on retaining soldiers? Are you seeing warning signs?

Retention was a challenge before Iraq. We have not done the kind of intense job we should have with retention. We also have not had a transitional effort from active duty to Army Reserve that made sense. Before this year, the Army never set a goal for transition of a given number of officers to reserve components.

Some of our soldiers’ biggest complaints come from how they perceive they are treated by us—“You lost my records”; “You didn’t send me for promotion.” I’m tightening all that.
 
We have mandated that commands hold at least quarterly promotion boards. We had some holding them once a year. Once soldiers complete advanced individual training, they can be advanced to pay grade E-3. I asked how we were doing on this and found everything under the sun. I said, “The first day a soldier is eligible, I want him advanced to E-3 and, in turn, to E-4.”

Will you lose many soldiers who probably had no idea their duty might involve 18-month mobilizations?

Some are saying “This is not for me.” That’s all right. I’ve got leaders I’m having to order, “For soldiers who fulfilled their six-year enlistment, you will let them depart with a ‘been-there’ medal. You’re going to do a proper ceremony which honors their service.”

We’re going to make this a positive experience. We have a bureaucracy that, in some cases, is almost immune to the necessity to reach out and embrace a soldier and family, to say we love, respect, [and] admire you, and as long as you served honorably during your service, that’s what counts. If we do that, I
am firmly convinced our retention will turn around.

What’s difficult for a lot of people is accepting this as a war. We have to change the way we prepare ourselves to do this. It’s unfair to ask this nation to support the Army Reserve and for us not to be a contributor. We have to find a way to contribute, sustain that force, yet be respectful of the inactive duty nature of these soldiers.