Alternative Arsenal
Nonlethal weapons under development could offer U.S. forces new options as the nature of armed conflict changes.
By Shelley Bishop

James Bond, meet the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD). Tucked away in a nondescript building on Quantico Marine Corps Base outside Washington, D.C., the small JNLWD is quietly working to provide today's military forces with some Bond-like capabilities of their own. With only 19 full-time employees, the JNLWD aims to "provide commanders with options between shouting and shooting, from bullhorn to bullet," according to the unit's director, Marine Corps Col. David Karcher.

Weapons under evaluation at the JNLWD sound like they belong in Bond's arsenal. For example, the Mobility Denial System would stop vehicles by spreading a slick substance across a road. Another device, the Portable Vehicle Arresting Barrier (pvab), would be able to stop a 7,500-pound vehicle traveling up to 45 mph within 200 feet. The pvab is a mechanically activated net that can be launched to stop a moving target. James Bond, indeed.

A new world

But this is no movie. The changing nature of conflict has thrust U.S. troops into scenarios vastly different from those imagined by military planners a few decades ago. These new missions, often "military operations other than war," include fighting terrorism, humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuations, peacekeeping operations, and military support to civil authorities.

In this new military landscape, civilian populations often are intermixed with military forces. They may be friendly, neutral, or hostile, but they are nonmilitary. They may be used as human shields or threaten American or friendly forces, but their status as civilians makes confrontation with traditional - and lethal - military weapons untenable. Commanders are reluctant to fire an M-16 into an unruly mob, especially when they can't distinguish between tourists and terrorists.

Karcher tells the story of a confrontation between U.S. Army military police and an angry crowd in Sevce, Kosovo, in early April 2000. Responding to a report of contraband weapons in this small village, military police found and seized the weapons and the alleged perpetrator but were confronted by a group of villagers as they left the area. "The MPs were assaulted with rocks and sticks, and four U.S. soldiers were injured," Karcher recalls.

The commander faced a dilemma because the attacking crowd included women and children. Luckily, the MPs had deployed with nonlethal weapons, including 40 mm sponge grenades and sting balls, nonlethal projectiles meant to inflict superficial yet painful injuries. The commander directed their use against the mob, and "those hit with the nonlethal weapons left the area," explains Karcher. "The nonlethal weapons gave the commander the means to seize the initiative without making the situation more violent."

A new weapons concept

The concept of nonlethal weapons emerged during the Cold War as military strategists struggled to find ways to avoid the ultimate confrontation with the Soviets.

"We started thinking about this with something called 'competitive strategies' in the 1980s," explains retired Army Col. John Alexander, a proponent of the development and employment of nonlethal weapons.

His 1999 book, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First Century Warfare (St. Martin's Press), with a foreword by Tom Clancy, was heralded as a "must-read" by retired Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni, former commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command.

"We were looking at ways to take on the Soviets other than direct confrontation. ... Things that could delay a unit, for even a few minutes, would translate into hours later and be critical for resupply," Alexander explains.

In the midst of this intellectual exercise emerged a new genre of military operations, from Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 to Just Cause six years later in Panama. "There were lots of noncombatants in these scenarios," Alexander says. "We weren't really fighting a heavily armed adversary." This, he says, led to a search for "technologies and tactics to minimize collateral or unwanted casualties."

While commanding Special Forces teams in Vietnam, Alexander first began to see the value of nonlethal technologies as military operations spilled into urban environments. He cites the experience of U.S. Marines as they tried to recapture the Citadel in the ancient city of Hue in the aftermath of the 1968 Tet Offensive as an early lesson in the value of nonlethal technology.

"Because of the religious and cultural value of the area, [the Marines] weren't able to use bombs or even heavy artillery," explains Alexander. "In 10 days they moved three city blocks, with more than 50 percent casualties in the forward battalion." Finally, a decision to use cs tear gas allowed the Marine teams to quickly advance through the city nearly unopposed.

Alexander was later instrumental in developing and promoting the concept of nonlethal defense when he joined the Los Alamos National Laboratory after retiring from the Army in 1988. "I was out there pushing the concept broadly, hitting the people I thought were innovative thinkers," he explains. He cites retired Army Chief of Staff Edwin Meyer and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch as key early proponents of nonlethal weapons.

In addition to top-level support, Alexander says three other factors converged to create an environment receptive to the development of nonlethal weapons: a dramatic reorganization of the geopolitical landscape, advances in technology, and field commanders with experience in peace-support operations.

The lessons of Somalia

The U.S. forces' experience in Somalia in the 1990s provided a baseline to shape requirements for nonlethal weapons. After little progress and increasing violence in this war-torn country, in 1995 the United Nations decided to extract its forces. Under the command of then-Lieutenant General Zinni, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit was assigned to help evacuate U.N. forces in operation United Shield.

Zinni's mission marked the first time the United States announced the use of nonlethal weapons in a real-world operation. Subsequent media coverage gave the public a glimpse into this new breed of weapons. Fielded nonlethal technologies in Somalia included riot control agents, sticky foam, optical systems, and low-kinetic-energy rounds. For example, the Marines employed a battlefield optical surveillance system to illuminate areas at night and discourage people from approaching and used sticky foam to create a barrier between evacuating troops and local residents.

When United Shield concluded without a shot being fired, Zinni proclaimed that he would never go on another peace-support mission without nonlethal weapons and urged their further development.

Establishing the JNLWD

Still, by the mid-1990s the U.S. military had no formal organization to coordinate the use and development of nonlethal technologies. The Somalia experience, combined with a growing body of evidence (including a 1995 Council on Foreign Relations report that concluded nonlethal weapons would be of value in future conflicts), pushed nonlethal weapons onto an organizational chart in 1996.

The Marine Corps was designated executive agent for the Department of Defense (DoD) Non-Lethal Weapons Program, making this service responsible for "program recommendations and for stimulating and coordinating nonlethal weapons requirements." The establishment of the JNLWD at Quantico provided a home base for the organization.

Although the JNLWD operates with a small staff and small budget, it already has developed a reputation for excellence. One of the most visible accomplishments of the JNLWD is the development of the Non-Lethal Weapons Capabilities Set. First fielded in 1997, these sets contain about 50 items to equip military units with a range of nonlethal support, including pepper spray, portable bullhorns, plastic handcuffs, high-intensity light systems, and personal protection equipment such as face and body shields and shin guards.

As a joint organization, the JNLWD works closely with all services to meet their growing needs for nonlethal weapons technologies. "The services have unique missions, and we are working with them to develop nonlethal weapons to support their needs," says Karcher. As an example, he cites the Running Gear Entanglement System (rges) developed for use in a Coast Guard nonlethal weapons capabilities set. rges helps the Coast Guard protect high-visibility national landmarks such as the Statue of Liberty by providing a rapidly deployable rope that can stop a boat by entangling its propellers.

Nonlethal - to a point

While there have been advances in the development of nonlethal weapons, concerns remain that the ready availability of these technologies may, instead of saving lives, actually lower the threshold of military action, resulting in the inadvertent loss of life. The JNLWD considers research into this area a cornerstone of nonlethal weapons development.

Air Force Lt. Col. Mark Wrobel, a health physicist assign-ed to the JNLWD, explains, "Some of our nonlethal weapons can have unintended effects. Our job is to characterize the human effects and to ensure there is an appropriate safety margin."

One example of the use of nonlethal weapons resulting in casualties was demonstrated last fall when Russian troops pumped an opiate derivative into a Moscow theater where Chechen rebels held more than 850 civilians hostage. While the incapacitating gas was intended as a nonlethal weapon, more than 200 of the hostages, including elderly, young, and immune-compromised individuals, perished from the gas.

The incident raised questions about public acceptance of nonlethal technologies and prompted rapid U.S. denials of plans to use similar incapacitating agents in any potential scenario. International treaties and conventions limit the United States' development of such agents, from the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and ... bacteriological warfare" to the Biological and Chemical Weapons conventions of 1972 and 1983.

The Moscow hostage crisis, in Alexander's opinion, exemplifies the dilemma facing proponents of nonlethal weapons: Calling something a nonlethal weapon carries no guarantee that it will not be lethal in some scenarios. "There's nothing that is completely nonlethal," says Alexander. "Enough marshmallows, properly placed, will kill you."

The DoD definition of nonlethal weapons does not guarantee that such weapons will be 100 percent nonlethal. According to DoD, nonlethal weapons "are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment." Karcher adds, "We are giving a commander an option between shouting at a truck coming at him or using lethal weapons."

"Every study I get involved in begins with the debate, 'What do you mean [by] nonlethal?' " Alexander says. "The bottom line is that what percent [of casualties] is ok depends on the kind of operations you plan to get involved in." Over the years, various study groups have considered other terminology, such as "less than lethal" or "soft kill," but nonlethal has stuck in military usage.

Karcher stands by the definition, saying it has "stood the test of time." He believes the growing need for this technology within DoD is becoming more clear. "As the educational process on the need for nonlethal weapons continues, and as greater focus is applied to this need, the budget priorities will follow."