IN THIS STORY:
>History of the drug trade
>On our shores
>Addressing the threat
>Slowing the epidemic

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In the first three months of 2003, thousands of alleged drug dealers were arrested. During these busts, hundreds of alleged drug dealers were killed in alleged shoot-outs with police, suggesting to some skeptical observers and civil libertarians that the Thai police, who have a history of brutality, were simply rounding up suspects and executing them. Some of the men and women killed later were found to have no links to the drug trade, including several elderly women who were killed.

Meanwhile, the Thai government stepped up random searches and seizures and on-the-spot urine tests at nightclubs and other entertainment establishments in Bangkok, a move that further angered civil libertarians and many ordinary young Thais. What's more, Thailand, China, and Laos have established a joint antidrug unit that will operate along their common border. The unit meets regularly to discuss the regional drug threat, and has vowed to work together to intercept shipments of precursor chemicals used to make yaba.

The combination of regional cooperation, interdiction, and striking into Burma has delivered some success. Although civil libertarians have raised concerns, the majority of the Thai public, so traumatized by the yaba plague, appears to support Shinawatra's tough methods, even if they include extrajudicial executions and forced on-the-spot drug tests. In addition to making arrests, the Thai police have seized more than three times as many yaba tablets during the first three months of 2003 than they did in the same period of time in 2002.

The American military has strongly backed the anti-yaba campaign. When Thai troops conducted their raid last May, American diplomats praised the Thais' actions, a move that only emboldened Thailand's military. According to U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency sources, American intelligence also has become more willing to share antinarcotics information with Southeast Asian countries.

In May 2001 the Pentagon sent a contingent of Special Forces to Thailand. The Special Forces troops, who are guerilla warfare specialists, serve as instructors for an elite Thai commando unit called Task Force 399, which is charged with battling UWSA traffickers and their Burmese allies. To help Task Force 399, the Pentagon has provided the Thais with Black Hawk helicopters and night vision equipment. In addition, U.S. Special Forces have helped lead Cobra Gold, an annual joint Thai-U.S. military exercise often held near the Burmese and Chinese borders. Cobra Gold, which brings together Special Forces, more than 5,000 regular American troops, and thousands of Thai troops, has become the biggest joint U.S. military exercise in Asia. 

America's Special Forces have not only served as trainers but also have allegedly gotten involved in interdiction themselves. Though the Pentagon says U.S. soldiers do not come within 50 kilometers of the Thai- Burmese border, according to the Thai media, U.S. Special Forces have accompanied Thai commandos on raids against smugglers crossing the border. This past fall, the Far Eastern Economic Review, the most respected current events magazine in Asia, reported U.S. forces provide operational support for Thai military incursions into Burma, and that three American servicememembers were wounded while providing this support.

Special Forces' involvement in Thailand has put them perilously close to the Chinese military, which is stationed less than 100 miles from the Thai-Burma border, but thus far, Washington and Beijing have managed to cooperate in the drug war.

One reason why America may have sent troops to Thailand is to preclude Beijing from taking a leadership role in the anti-yaba battle, which would help it gain favor with other Asian nations. Beijing has not reacted strongly to the presence of American troops. Instead, China has begun sending its top officers to the International Law Enforcement Academy, a U.S-run institution in Bangkok. China even has considered taking part in future Cobra Gold exercises as an observer, and Beijing has put pressure on Burma to extradite drug traffickers. Still, Southeast Asia specialists say, if American forces do maintain a long-term presence in northern Thailand, they could anger Beijing's more conservative military leaders, scuttling the nations' antidrug cooperation. 

Slowing the epidemic
Despite these limited successes, many narcotics experts remain glum about the potential for slowing the yaba epidemic. Though American law enforcement has begun making yaba busts, most European and U.S. narcotics officers remain focused on cocaine and heroin, and too many corrupt Southeast Asian cops actually are involved in the drug trade themselves. After Shinawatra launched his early 2003 get-tough campaign, some clean Thai policemen found that large numbers of their compatriots were taking bribes from drug dealers or even serving as drug conduits and resellers themselves.

"Yaba is only beginning to get onto cops' radar screen outside Southeast Asia, so it will be awhile before we can really fight back," says one former Drug Enforcement Administration agent who is based in Bangkok.

Other than Thailand, few countries in Asia have developed effective plans for reducing yaba demand. This also is true in the United States. China has built hundreds of drug rehabilitation clinics, but most of these centers rely on harsh treatment, including beatings, and do not provide counseling to addicts. Relapse rates among users who enter these clinics are very high.

Unless the country where the majority of yaba is produced -- Burma -- truly makes an effort to crack down on the trade, interdiction may be of little use. Burma has made some token busts, has opened an antidrug museum, has coordinated a public education campaign with Thailand about the evils of drug use, and has introduced a program to eradicate drug production within 15 years. 

Most of these actions, however, merely are cosmetic attempts to deter criticism. Refugees from Burma say the Burmese military often seizes drugs and resells them. The antidrug museum was funded in part by Lo Hsing-han, a businessman who made his first fortune selling drugs, and the Burmese junta has not been willing to extradite any top UWSA leaders. Narcotics experts based in Thailand expect the UWSA to produce at least 800 million yaba pills in 2003. In a recent Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the United States noted that, "The government of Burma has not made a concerted effort to stop amphetamine-type stimulant production and trafficking." According to one former Clinton administration official who focused on Burma and believes the Burmese junta has not changed, "the Rangoon regime fails to deny drug traffickers the two things they need to survive: money and freedom to operate."

The global war on terror also could compromise the fight against yaba. Last October, the Pentagon announced it would scale back its global efforts to battle narcotics in order to focus on counterterrorism, a decision that could impact the future of Task Force 399. The scaling back might include shifting intelligence-gathering equipment now used for finding drug traffickers to counterterrorism surveillance and merging some military divisions used for counternarcotics work. In fact, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who has blasted Congress for not approving some of his chosen aides quickly enough, has not named a permanent assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, the wing of the Pentagon that manages antidrug programs.