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MAY 2008
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Between Iraq and a Hard Place

Spring 2005

MOAA members know the pain of military family separations depicted in the daily news media. But there seems to be a qualitative difference today.

For instance, past wars were fought with larger forces, if not a broader national commitment. The entire country mobilized for World War II. In the Vietnam War, draft-era forces spread one-year combat tours across a large rotation base, and multiple involuntary combat tours hardly were universal.

Today’s smaller force faces expectations of repeated sacrifice that are unprecedented since World War II. Army units have been alerted for second rotations to Iraq within a year of returning from earlier tours. Their leaders acknowledge that today’s career troops can expect more frequent family separations than in decades past.

The Army says combat arms soldiers can expect to be separated from their families one year out of every three from now on. Guard and Reserve combat units can expect extended call-ups every five or six years. This tells us the Army still will be too small for its mission. The Joint Chiefs testified in 1998 that forces were stretched thin by commitments in the Balkans, Southwest Asia, and elsewhere even before taking on Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather than seek manpower increases, DoD has extensively mobilized the Guard and Reserve, extended combat tours, and barred separation of thousands of active duty, Guard and Reserve members.

By mid-2004, DoD leaders finally agreed to add up to 30,000 more Army troops over three years. DoD prefers “transforming” the force to convert support jobs to combat positions. But transformation isn’t a short-term process.

Meanwhile, overstressed troops and families pay a steep price. With 150,000 people in Iraq and thousands more deployed elsewhere, the Guard and Reserve already heavily mobilized, and stop-loss already implemented, it’s reasonable to question how an additional 20,000 to 30,000 will be enough to meet the Army’s need. Many service leaders already worry what will happen when members are allowed to separate. This is an extremely serious situation, with high risks for long-term military readiness, and we can’t rely on “rosy scenario” planning.

It’s neither cheap nor easy to add recruiting resources, expand training pipelines, or take other measures beyond any current plans. But executive and legislative branch leaders have been reluctant to allocate additional resources for less-than-optimal retention scenarios. They’ve counted on the continued willingness of the troops and their families to accept ever-increasing measures of sacrifice. But it’s a “pay now or pay far more later” situation. The troops have shown extreme dedication, but there is a limit to acceptable sacrifice. Surveys show family separation is the biggest retention disincentive for the career force. We ignore the 500 lb. retention-and-readiness elephant in the room at our collective peril.

BRAC Clock Ticking

Another round of base realignments and closures (BRAC) is coming. But what’s the timeline? Defense leaders have begun assessing future threats and developing force levels and basing requirements to meet those threats. The secretary of defense must offer specific realignment and closure recommendations to an independent BRAC commission by May 16, 2005.

That commission is to be appointed by President Bush, who must nominate a list of proposed commissioners to the Senate by March 15, 2005. The commission can change the Pentagon recommendations if it determines that the secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan or from approved selection criteria.

The commission must provide its recommendations to the president by Sept. 8. If he approves them, he must forward them to Congress by Sept. 23. If the president disapproves them, the commission must submit revised recommendations by Oct. 20, 2005.

Congress will have 45 legislative days to approve or reject the final BRAC recommendations on an all-or-none basis. If Congress fails to act within that time, the commission’s recommendations become binding on the Pentagon. Implementation must start within two years and finish within six years. For more information, visit www.defenselink.mil/brac.


 



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