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Between Iraq and a Hard Place |
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| Spring
2005 |
MOAA members know the pain of
military family separations depicted in the daily news media. But
there seems to be a qualitative difference today.
For instance, past wars were fought with larger forces, if not a
broader national commitment. The entire country mobilized for World
War II. In the Vietnam War, draft-era forces spread one-year combat
tours across a large rotation base, and multiple involuntary combat
tours hardly were universal.
Today’s smaller force faces expectations of repeated sacrifice that
are unprecedented since World War II. Army units have been alerted
for second rotations to Iraq within a year of returning from earlier
tours. Their leaders acknowledge that today’s career troops can
expect more frequent family separations than in decades past.
The Army says combat arms soldiers can expect to be separated from
their families one year out of every three from now on. Guard and
Reserve combat units can expect extended call-ups every five or six
years. This tells us the Army still will be too small for its
mission. The Joint Chiefs testified in 1998 that forces were
stretched thin by commitments in the Balkans, Southwest Asia, and
elsewhere even before taking on Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather than
seek manpower increases, DoD has extensively mobilized the Guard and
Reserve, extended combat tours, and barred separation of thousands
of active duty, Guard and Reserve members.
By mid-2004, DoD leaders finally agreed to add up to 30,000 more
Army troops over three years. DoD prefers “transforming” the force
to convert support jobs to combat positions. But transformation
isn’t a short-term process.
Meanwhile, overstressed troops and families pay a steep price. With
150,000 people in Iraq and thousands more deployed elsewhere, the
Guard and Reserve already heavily mobilized, and stop-loss already
implemented, it’s reasonable to question how an additional 20,000 to
30,000 will be enough to meet the Army’s need. Many service leaders
already worry what will happen when members are allowed to separate.
This is an extremely serious situation, with high risks for
long-term military readiness, and we can’t rely on “rosy scenario”
planning.
It’s neither cheap nor easy to add recruiting resources, expand
training pipelines, or take other measures beyond any current plans.
But executive and legislative branch leaders have been reluctant to
allocate additional resources for less-than-optimal retention
scenarios. They’ve counted on the continued willingness of the
troops and their families to accept ever-increasing measures of
sacrifice. But it’s a “pay now or pay far more later” situation. The
troops have shown extreme dedication, but there is a limit to
acceptable sacrifice. Surveys show family separation is the biggest
retention disincentive for the career force. We ignore the 500 lb.
retention-and-readiness elephant in the room at our collective
peril. BRAC Clock Ticking
Another round of base realignments and closures (BRAC) is coming.
But what’s the timeline? Defense leaders have begun assessing future
threats and developing force levels and basing requirements to meet
those threats. The secretary of defense must offer specific
realignment and closure recommendations to an independent BRAC
commission by May 16, 2005.
That commission is to be appointed by President Bush, who must
nominate a list of proposed commissioners to the Senate by March 15,
2005. The commission can change the Pentagon recommendations if it
determines that the secretary deviated substantially from the
force-structure plan or from approved selection criteria.
The commission must provide its recommendations to the president by
Sept. 8. If he approves them, he must forward them to Congress by
Sept. 23. If the president disapproves them, the commission must
submit revised recommendations by Oct. 20, 2005.
Congress will have 45 legislative days to approve or reject the
final BRAC recommendations on an all-or-none basis. If Congress
fails to act within that time, the commission’s recommendations
become binding on the Pentagon. Implementation must start within two
years and finish within six years. For more information, visit
www.defenselink.mil/brac.
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