Guard and Reserve units traditionally have been touted as budget bargains. But that was before wars in Iraq and Afghanistan accelerated the transformation of reserve components from strategic to operational forces.

The chair of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve says analyses being done for Army and Defense officials suggest that reserve components aren’t the better-bang-for-the-buck bargain usually claimed. But Arnold L. Punaro also says he’s skeptical of the work and hopes it won’t be used by Army or Defense leaders to skimp on dollars to restore and modernize Guard and Reserve equipment to fund other priorities.

“There are those in the analytical community, perhaps even in [DoD, who] are … suggesting that the Guard and Reserve are as expensive as the active military, even more so in certain cases,” Punaro says. He views such claims, he says, with “healthy skepticism.”

Guard and Reserve units traditionally have been touted as budget bargains. They are, for example, 54 percent of the Army’s total force but use only 8 percent of its budget. But that was before wars in Iraq and Afghanistan accelerated the transformation of reserve components from strategic to operational forces. Guard and Reserve personnel now assume major day-to-day roles in both theaters for homeland security.

Much of the cost savings historically linked to reserve forces is tied to personnel. Reservists typically serve only 39 days on active duty a year and train less intensely than active counterparts. In 2000, Reserve tanks drove an average of 112 miles annually versus 800 miles for active Army tanks.

But current wars have left reserve components with equipment and vehicle shortages, and state governors are complaining that Guard units aren’t adequately equipped or manned to respond to domestic emergencies.

Defense and service finance experts testified before the commission May 16 that Reserve and Guard budgets have been increased to ensure that deploying forces and first responders in homeland emergencies have the people and equipment they need.

J. David Patterson, DoD’s deputy comptroller, says the baseline budget in FY 2008 for reserve components is 73 percent higher than in 2001 — compared with a 67 percent increase in total defense spending. If supplemental war budgets are counted, reserve spending is up 103 percent in the past seven years.

Patterson says the budget assumes the annual cost of an active duty infantryman is $199,000 compared to $35,000 for a reservist in drill status and $33,000 for a drilling guardmember. Those figures include the cost of health care and the accrual cost of military retirement for those populations.

“So this tells me that the Guard and Reserve member still enjoys that substantial monetary differential we historically have always said was a bargain for the taxpayer,” Punaro says.

Patterson agrees. But he also acknowledges seeing the cost comparisons so troubling to Punaro, analysis showing reserve members who mobilize for war actually cost as much as or more than active duty members per day deployed.

“Of course it costs you more to have people you can call on [in wartime] who aren’t with you 100 percent of the time,” Patterson explains. “But it’s the time you really need them that more than makes up for the premium you pay when they are not on orders.”

So Patterson agrees with Punaro’s contention that “it is more cost-effective for the taxpayer to take out that insurance premium than to have that same capacity on full-time active duty.”

But Nelson Ford, the Army’s assistant secretary for financial management, defended the analysis that challenges perceptions about reserve component cost efficiencies.

Ford said it’s more than straight cost comparison of a guardmember to an active soldier. More important is comparing the soldier, equipment, training time, and “frequency with which the soldier is used.” If an active soldier can be deployed three times as often, the cost difference per deployable day tightens. The depreciated value of equipment over time also should be included and might narrow the reserve advantages a little more.

“I think we’ll get a pretty good sense of what the cost per deployable day is against very different standards of deployment,” Ford said.

If that’s the way the Army wants to begin to compare relative costs of forces, it shouldn’t forget to count all the active duty tanks, armored trucks, and other equipment that stand idle from day to day.

“I understand why this analysis is being done,” says Punaro. “But I think to somehow suggest that it costs more to the taxpayer to have a brigade in the National Guard than [in] the active Army, well, you’re going to have some big skeptics to convince.”

Tom Philpott is a freelance writer and syndicated news columnist. His column, "Military Update," appears in 48 daily newspapers throughout the United States and overseas.