Transforming the Forces
By Tom Philpott

"Transformation" of the military is the major pursuit of the Department of Defense under the George W. Bush administration. The full-time task of helping Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld define and execute that goal, particularly as it applies to weapon systems and technologies, belongs to retired Navy Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski. Appointed in October, Cebrowski is the first director, Force Transformation, reporting directly to Rumsfeld.

Cebrowski, 59, is a naval aviator with combat experience in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War and leadership experience commanding a fighter squadron, carrier air wing, and two aircraft carriers. He served on the Joint Staff as director, command, control, communications, and computers. He capped his 37-year naval career as president of the Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

In an interview with contributing editor Tom Philpott, Cebrowski explains transformation and what role he expects to play in the process.

What is transformation?

In transformation, we are looking at those processes that generate sustained advantage through the understanding and exploitation of changes in the underlying rules that govern the generation and use of military power. If there is no fundamental change in the rules, then I'm not particularly interested in the activity. Those would be modernization or readiness enhancements [as opposed to transformation].

We all know the world is changing. But many people don't understand the underlying rules have changed. Americans can win every time if they know the rules. We want to get in, do the research, and say what the rules are.

The most fundamental shift in the rules has been from the industrial age to the information age where, for example, you substitute information for mass, and it has an enormous ripple effect. For example, the Air Force will say it used to take 1,000 bombs to destroy this or that target; now it takes only one. What happened? You informed the bomb. In Afghanistan it was informed, perhaps, by laser-guided bomb kit—the only difference, [but] what a profound difference.

How much is information worth? In this case, it's 1,000 bombs. Consider what that means to your logistics train: How many fewer people do you need managing the weapons? How many fewer ships do you need shipping weapons? How condensed, and possibly mobile, [can] your transshipment points become? Consider the design pressures you take off of the aircraft that delivers the bombs. The impact is enormous.

There are critics who say the administration's 2003 budget is not transformational, that it backs a familiar array of weapons, including three separate jet fighter programs. Legitimate criticism?

The budget [with its $48 billion increase over 2002] proves we're willing to put the money into national defense. So, to a certain extent, what you see is the creation of maneuver space, which is very valuable.

Could you explain that?

A legitimate criticism is that [weapon-system procurement] takes much too long. It is a laborious risk-reduction process. But in that process, risk is actually increased. Funds are assigned against a program, contracts are let, and in the time it takes to do all that and to go into production and field something, the world moves along rather briskly. It becomes difficult to make adjustments. And the tighter the budget, the more difficult it is. The larger the budget, the more flexibility it yields. So [the bigger budget] creates more maneuvering room.

But how transformational is this first Bush budget?

Transformation can be looked at in two parts. One is for things we already have in the force or in the pipeline. The second part is what to do next, things perhaps not even yet conceived. Creating space to do that is very important. Considering how long it takes to design and develop items, it's probably naïve to suppose we could, in one year, make the fundamental shifts. However, I don't think you can doubt the commitment of leadership to pursue transformation.

That the secretary created your position makes that point. What impact were you able to have on the 2003 budget request?

This office is very new; I'm still acquiring staff. I had no role in the 2003 budget. The budget rolls along at its own pace. It's a very high-speed treadmill, and you jump on it as you can.

Didn't you influence the decision to cancel the Navy's DD-21 program [the land-attack destroyer for the 21st century]? And why didn't you like that program?

The decision to pursue a new family of ships [instead] reflects methodology I would prefer my office have—to do the research [and] analysis, conduct gaming, formulate positions, and then inform decision-makers and the public at large on what we learn. I play the role of advocate, of focal point, of catalyst for transformation. My small office won't actually do the transformation. That requires literally tens of thousands of other people.

One thing I did in the case of [dd-21] was identify the compelling need for a different approach. I identified the existence of alternative technologies and designs. I demonstrated the potential payoff of pursuing them. But it wasn't me alone. It was several other people with me. Then ideas take on a life of their own. So you could say [we] catalyzed, advanced, and informed the debate, which then [led] the decision maker to realize he [did] have alternatives to the way business had been done for so many years.

At what point can your views influence a decision on a weapon system?

It's not so much a particular weapon system. The power comes from the concept, which creates context to make decisions about tangibles of warfare: weapons, sensors, platforms, people. In this [dd-21] case, we were looking for concepts that would allow us to operate in the highly contested, close-in littoral, a very important strategic requirement. In the littorals are the nodes through which the vast majority of the world's power and wealth are created and distributed. Frequently, it's only when you play multiple parts together that you begin to see the value of the concept. So that's what we did.

As to when [a concept] takes traction, well, you conduct a war game and invite people into it; you sit down with people in the press and have a discussion; the services conduct workshops that you attend, and [you] discuss things. Then, if you're fortunate, you may actually have [the] opportunity to spend a few moments with the senior decision maker himself and advance the idea.

People like to think that creating national defense is a very monolithic, top-down, command-directed, highly disciplined process. In fact, it's like most other American processes—it looks a lot like sausage-making. It comes from the bottom up. Many voices need to be heard.

When we surface a new idea, people assume that we're going to throw away all of the old. That's not really true. With transformation there is going to be the devaluing of certain things and some amount of dislocation. But it's rarely sudden. If people see these things coming, they understand the rationale; they reposition themselves and are able to roll. The brightest try to jump on the new idea early.

At what point do you jump aboard that '04 budget train and have your say?

I do participate in some discussions. I don't formulate positions on particular systems, but rather I intend to identify the powerhouse or driving concepts that will help shape the decision-making process. For example, it seems a concept will emerge concerning sensors, the ability to sense the battlefield. As we realize the great power of these sensors, we will want to adopt a more robust and responsive approach to them.

One will be the concept of sensing in depth. In depth from space down, in depth through the surface of the earth, in depth even below the sea. And depth horizontally, into denied or difficult-to-penetrate areas. Depth operationally so there is a great mix of alternative methodologies to bring sensors to bear to support people at various levels.

I will encourage decision makers not to choose the one best answer but to recognize that both power and risk-management flow from the diversity and breadth of approaches.

Are you comfortable with evidence of transformation cited in the 2003 budget, such as missile defense, the interim armored vehicle, or conversion of strategic missile subs into cruise missile platforms?

All of these are steps. What we're trying to get at are not so much things but fundamental changes in behavior and organization and doctrine. That's where transformation really shows up. How did U.S. forces behave in Afghanistan? Was it [according to doctrine]? No. So right there is changed behavior. What made it possible? They had a very well-informed, well-connected force. That's information. They could navigate very well. That's information. They could communicate their needs for logistics or weapons. That's information.

This is transformation in the information age. With no new equipment, behavior changed.

A decade ago the military decided to shape its force and resources to the possibility of having to fight two major wars nearly simultaneously. Did that handicap transformation?

Whether the [two-major-theater-wars] construct was of value in the '90s, it certainly isn't now. One could argue it should have been abandoned sooner. The fact is, we now have made a fundamental and strategic change. Most people don't realize the power and value of our shifting from threat-based to capabilities-based planning.

With threat-based planning, you essentially are saying "the threat will control my planning, govern my capability. If I do not see the threat, I will not deliver a capability." You can immediately see the flaw: "I will not buy something unless the threat is manifest." This has been a problem for our requirements process. Somebody says, "You have no requirement. There is no validated threat." To me, this is the height of arrogance. It's the same as saying, "If I don't know it, it doesn't exist, and therefore we don't have to plan against it."

With a capabilities-based strategy, you say, "I will take control of my own destiny. I will manage my risk by spreading my capabilities across a range of threats." We used to say, at the height of the Cold War, that 50 percent of U.S. forces [were] designed by the Soviet Union. But that was a looming, monolithic threat that had to be addressed. It would have been irresponsible to do otherwise.

But when you do threat-based planning, you tend to optimize for that threat, which is the same as trying to predict the future. And that future almost never happened.

By the secretary shifting to a capability-based approach, instead of asking "How much is enough," he's asking, "How much breadth do I have, and how much agility to move across that breadth?" This leads to different kinds of decisions. I think [Sept. 11] proved that a broader approach is required.

If you let capabilities drive transformation, can you leave yourself short of actual numbers of things—tanks and ships—to fight a conventional war against, say, North Korea, China, or Iran?

You can make a mistake. Many people point out that the French, after World War I, adopted what was then a transformational approach and ended up being overrun in 1940. They say, "That indicates the value of transformation." No, that indicates an error in strategy. That was an all-eggs-in-one-basket strategy—quite contrary to what we're doing now.

Secretary Rumsfeld, when asked about critical transformation decisions, said the most important will be selecting the next six to 12 major and regional commanders-in-chief. Is he insulting the current batch, or what is he getting at?

If you believe transformation is important, and he does, then the skills and disposition to support transformation become primary qualifications for advancement and for certain key positions. He is taking the principal personnel management tool available to him and bringing it to bear for transformation. That is a very powerful statement.

What's the mindset of an officer not inclined to support transformation?

Everyone is capable of doing his or her part. I use the simple formula that innovation equals creativity times implementation. You need creative people, implementing people, people who have, running through their veins, the juices to do some of both. So it's not as if you have to be at one end of that spectrum or the other.

On the other hand, you can be at either end and be an obstacle to transformation, a very creative obstacle or an implementing obstacle. The secretary is inviting people who may have been more rearward-looking to turn around and face forward.

People who use as their defense "this is the way we've always done things" identify themselves as precisely the kind of [people] Secretary Rumsfeld isn't interested in. Of course we've done well in the past. There are countless firms that have, too, and are no longer in business. It doesn't necessarily say anything about how well we'll do in the future, particularly when the game changes.

You tout something called "operational prototyping." What is that?

Let's point to a case I like, which is the high-speed vessel Joint Venture, a leased, ocean-going ferry we adapted for experimentation by the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Army, and Special Operations Forces. It's very similar to what the Australians used to bring soldiers to East Timor. A lot of people are naysayers until they are aboard for a few minutes and want to be in charge. It's absolutely compelling. That's part of the power of prototyping. You give people the experience by putting a tangible in their hands. It's a transformational experience, mind-opening. The conventional wisdom is "you can't do this—it's impossible." Then, all of a sudden, you're doing it.

Suddenly they realize the way they had been thinking is not the only way and not necessarily the best way. It might be better to have a mix of capabilities.

The impediments largely exist within the system. [Someone might ask,] "Did the Navy articulate a requirement for that ship?" No. "So there's no requirement."

Or, "Did it go through a milestone process?" No, it didn't.

Or, "Were there reviews in the Pentagon?" No, there wasn't any of that.

"Well, how could you do such a thing?"

You did it because it had to be done, because it's the way of progress.

Some people fear transformation because they fear money will be wasted or even lives lost. They point to the V-22. The Marine Corps tried to field a transformational technology. What went wrong there?

I obviously can't comment on the quality of the airplane or of program management. You will observe, however, that that program has been aborning for a very long time, that it sprung up within the system, and that it's in trouble. We badly need the kinds of capabilities that program represents. We're going to have to find a way to get those capabilities. We need to do that, and then we need to move on.

[The] V-22, you said, is a platform that came from "within the system" and took a long time aborning. Is that an indictment of that process?

Yes, it's an indictment of the process! It certainly is. I'm not your best witness on this. But is it right to be talking of programs that take 15 to 25 years in times of great change? How can you say that that system has no flaws or that it's the one best way to do things?

The Army next year is slated to get a smaller slice of science and technology dollars. We were told that's because the Army has a head start on transformation. Are there lessons in the Army experience so far for the other services?

Yes, people learn from it. The services watch what each other is doing, and that's good. You don't want them all taking the same approach. If you were to ask the Army, they'd say there are probably some things they wouldn't do if they had to do it over again.

But you can't fault people for trying something very difficult, particularly in the face of opposition. It's laudable. The decision to do transformation always involves an element of courage. It involves leadership. There are always dislocations. Frequently, people can't see the way ahead. So it's up to leadership to point to the way.

What does the war in Afghanistan tell us about transformation?

Through my lens, one key thing it tells us is the power of in-close sensor capability when networked to other elements of the force. We're seeing what happens when a force of considerable information-age capability encounters a force with very little. The results are devastating.

It, however, says nothing about what would happen when a force with considerable information-age capability encounters another force with considerable information-age capability. This is an area for further research and why the secretary said this war is not to be viewed as a model for all future wars.