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Joint Effort
America’s military branches have got each other’s
backs in Iraq. More than at any other time in history, they’re
pulling together — this time to win the war on terrorism.
By Eric Minton The weapon of choice for the Iraqi
insur-gency is the “roadside bomb,” known more formally as the
improvised explosive device (IED). The bombs have accounted for the
bulk of U.S. Army and Marine Corps casualties since the end of major
combat operations in 2003. As you might expect, when the enemy
develops a crippling weapon, America looks for a solution. But what
many might be surprised to learn is that no single branch of
military service has been given responsibility for finding the
solution. Instead, all branches of the U. S. military are
working together to find an answer.
“The first part of our charter from [then Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul] Wolfowitz was to coordinate the multiple efforts under
way in [each of] the services,” says Col. Lamont Woody, USA, deputy
director of DoD’s Joint IED Defeat Task Force. “Our first chore was
to go to each service to get the best folks we could possibly get
and look across the department, in the laboratories, in the field,
and in training centers to get an idea of current activity and
protocols.” Although the Joint IED Defeat Task Force grew out of an
Army initiative and still is led by the Army, the mandate was clear:
Every service was to participate, bringing their individual
expertise to bear from the bomb-loading Air Force to the
mine-countering Navy. The results have been profound and immediate:
Despite an increase in IED incidents, the rate of casualties from
such incidents decreased 45 percent from April 2004 to April 2005.
America’s armed forces have reached the apex of jointness. Two
decades’ worth of experience aided by the Goldwater-Nichols DoD
Reorganization Act of 1986 has created an institutional framework
for a military force in which the four individual services behave
more like components than commands. The military now has raised a
generation of joint-minded officers and NCOs. “I’ve not had a joint
assignment,” says Col. Wayne Scott, USAF, director of communications
and information for 12th Air Force at Davis-Monthan AFB in Tucson,
Ariz. “But through various training venues or deploying to support
joint operations, I’ve been taught to approach things from a joint
perspective. It’s no longer how the Air Force does business, it’s
how air power can be employed to serve the other services.”
Says Capt. Terry Pudas, USN-Ret., acting director of the DoD’s
Office
of Force Transformation, “It’s fundamentally about culture. Joint
experience is really about relationships and trust, and we’ve
succeeded in creating a joint culture in the military.”
Beyond joint
“We’re at a level beyond joint,” says historian Maj. Gen. Robert
Scales, USA-Ret., former commandant of the Army War College in
Carlisle, Pa. “It’s beyond military to include diplomatic, commerce,
economic, and information facets.”
As the Pentagon progresses to the “beyond joint” level, the joint
culture is not as uniform as it could be, even within individual
branches, where stovepipe tendencies still exist within components.
“I will say the Army among the services has been more joint than
ever,” says Col. James Moentmann, USA, chief of strategic plans,
concepts, and doctrine division in the Army’s G-3 office. “The Army
has been doing joint operations forever. We rely on the other
services to get to the fight and for some of our fires. We’re used
to working with other forces.”
Scales thinks the nature of early-21st-century warfare also explains
why the Army and Marine Corps — the land power forces — would be at
the forefront of thinking joint, while the air and sea forces might
be less so. “What we have now is joint by fiat or by the gods of war
dictating that we own the global commons, so there’s no threat to
our air, sea, and space — only on the ground. The culture has not
been overcome because everybody has learned to embrace each other.
It’s been overcome because of the dominance of the land dimension.”
Cultures, however, evolve, and though the joint culture might not be
consummate, it is undoubtedly pervasive. “I would say we’ve never
been better at it,” Moentmann says of cooperative efforts. “There
are still stovepipe things. It’s human nature. Anytime you’re
dealing with budgets there’s going to be that concern. But the trend
over the past couple of years has been unprecedented cooperation.”
He attributes that trend to leadership, starting with Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld. “If you want to get in trouble with our
chief
of staff, signal that you’re not on board as being a joint officer.”
The primary difference in joint today from joint in the past,
though, is institutional, Moentmann says. “Now the buzzword is ‘born
joint.’ We’re not just deconflicting operations and not just being
interoperable where we can talk to each other; there’s synergy in
what we do now. Systems and training and organizations are developed
from the outset to be joint.” Even the budgetary process works
through jointure. “We can’t buy a piece of equipment or put a design
in unless the other services have seen it.”
Joint thinking cuts across the military spectrum.
* As the Army transforms to a modular force, that force’s
foundation units, the brigade combat teams (BCTs), are designed to
plug into joint task forces. Even the command-level units replacing
the current division structure will be capable of fusing with
combined combatant headquarters, because they will not have their
own organic forces.
* Based on the experience of the successful drive to Baghdad in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force is increasing participation
of its joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) — the ground crews
that call in targets for aircrews — in Army companies. The Air Force
is looking to increase the number of JTACs to meet the increased
number of combat companies in the new modular Army, while the Army
is providing customized Stryker vehicles to JTACs assigned to
Stryker BCTs.
* The Army’s and Marine Corps’ operations, acquisitions, and
sustainment communities have formed the Army Marine Corps Board,
with representatives meeting regularly to discuss initiatives in
each service. “They make sure that as we develop a new radio system
for our tanks, the Marine Corps benefits from that,” says Moentmann.
Representatives of the Air Force and Navy have been attending
meetings, too, Moentmann says.
* The Army’s Blue Force Tracker, a GPS device that registers its
combat vehicles on an electronic map, has also been placed on Marine
Corps and Air Force vehicles.
* The Navy is developing a force structure initiative called “sea
basing” in which forward initial response units plus support,
reconnaissance, and command-and-control elements will be stationed
on floating communities rather than land bases in foreign countries.
The Army, looking to move out of those foreign land bases, has been
intimately involved in the plans.
* The services are assigning teachers to the other
branches’ schools, and some initial skills training has gone joint.
“There’s a particularly strong relationship in our fires
communities, the fires guys at Fort Sill [in Oklahoma] and Air
Ground Operations School at Nellis [AFB in Nevada],” Moentmann says.
“We’ve now initiated classes where Army fire support specialists are
teaming with Air Force JTACs in their schools.”
* This past spring the Air Force hosted Joint Red Flag, one of
the largest distributive exercises in the history of the U.S.
military with more than 10,000 participants from the four largest
services. The exercises, featured joint live air and land arms,
joint tabletop scenarios, and virtual participants using simulators
at 44 different sites. Such a large virtual tie-in was
unprecedented.
Spirit of cooperation
From now on, though, the unprecedented will be inevitable. DoD
has established the “Four Pillars of Force Transformation.”
The first is “Strengthening Joint Operations”; the fourth,
“Developing Transformational Capabilities,” is wholly joint in
concept. (The other two pillars are “Exploiting U.S. Intelligence
Advantages” and “Concept Development and Experimentation.”)
“Everything we do, all the initiatives we undertake, are in a joint
context,” says Pudas, who has been with the Office of Force
Transformation since it was established in 2001.
This is not to say the individual services inevitably will or should
fuse into one armed force. Pudas sees value in the services bringing
their unique cultures, experiences, and mindsets to the joint table,
just as successful corporations have embraced gender, ethnic, and
cultural diversity to become more flexible and creative (i.e., agile
in the military setting). “To a certain degree it’s good to have
competition among alternatives to some of our problems,” he says.
“It catalyzes a debate about alternative ways of doing things, and
in the end, the hope would be [that] we’d come to the best solution,
and it would be a joint solution.”
Scott witnessed this dynamic when he served as the director of
communications information for Joint Red Flag’s Combined Air
Operations Center (CAOC). “Everybody really wanted an understanding
of how the other services approached the scenarios and challenges,”
he says. “Rather than say ‘That’s not the way we do it,’ it was more
of ‘How do you guys go after this?’ ” For the first time he
experienced the Army’s air and missile defense command contingent
colocating with his CAOC. During the exercise the Air Force feared
that, because of a surface-to-air missile threat, it could not
safely attack an identified target. “The Army goes, ‘No problem. If
we can move this ground unit toward this area, we can take that
target,’ ” Scott says. “We at 12th Air Force had never worked with
that before. In the past it was all about how to strike every one of
these targets from the air. Now, given a ground-based unit, we could
prosecute that particular target.”
“Jointness has given us the flexibility to reach different resources
each service individually might not have the operational and
informational capability to gain,” says Woody. As joint as his task
force might be, however, it is perhaps more significant as a
harbinger of “beyond joint” in U.S. military doctrine. While the
first part of the task force’s charter was to go across services for
information and expertise, the second part of the charter, Woody
says, “directed us to seek interagency assistance. That opened a lot
of doors for us.”
The third part of the task force’s charter is to “identify
innovative near-term solutions,” and for that it has extended its
reach beyond the four largest military services and government
agencies to commercial industry and international allies. “Our
coalition partners have really been effective in helping us here,”
Woody says. “Their industrial bases have started to come to us and
say, ‘Here are some technologies that we’ve used.’ We’ve always had
access to our coalition partners and international friends, but for
this single cause we’ve seen a greater synchronization of effort and
contribution.”
This is in keeping with Scales’ contention that the global war on
terrorism will be decided not by a military solution but via
diplomatic, commercial, economic, and information functions as well
as the military. Pudas points to DoD’s stated “Force Security
Challenges” which are listed as traditional challenges, irregular
challenges, catastrophic challenges, and disruptive challenges. “The
reality is that those [last] three challenges are not strictly
confined to [DoD],” Pudas says. “They require a larger national
security team to work together in a joint construct. You see
manifestation of that all over the place” — including Joint Red
Flag, which involved forces from Germany, England, the Netherlands,
Kuwait, and Canada.
“It was challenging,” says Scott, whose CAOC included British and
Canadian participants, forcing him to run two information systems, a
“coalition-releasable” network and a U.S.-only one.
The higher ratio of coalition-releasable network use seems more
inevitable than ironic these days. “The word I’ve been hearing in
the air operations business is we are going to fight combined,
always alongside allies,” Scott says. “So, we have to have that
mindset going in.”
Preparing Joint Fighters
“We are at a point in history where it is absolutely essential
that we have creative, joint planners in order to successfully
execute the global war on terrorism,” says Col. Frederick R. Kienle,
USA.
Kienle is dean of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) in
Norfolk, Va., which saw its first class of 25 military officers
graduate in June 2005. “They are a corps of highly joint campaign
planners. They are innovative, strategic thinkers at the operational
level of war,” says Kienle. Already 18 of the 25 graduates, who each
have a masters degree in joint campaign planning and strategy, have
stepped into influential joint assignments, reports Kienle.
JAWS is part of the Joint Forces Staff College of the National
Defense University. The class of 2005 boasts 100 percent MOAA
membership. MOAA supported the school, sponsoring the Distinguished
Campaign Planner Award, which went to Maj. William A. Ryan III, USA.
Joint Warfighting: A History
When Rome conquered the western world it used highly trained,
well-organized armies and a body of warfighting strategy to
effectively carry out campaigns and collapse its enemies’ will, says
historian Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, USA-Ret., former commandant of
the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. Sea campaigns supported the
land campaigns.
Over the centuries, the dimensions of warfare multiplied, and the
fragmentation of military efforts ensued. As seafaring commerce
grew, so did the independence of naval warfare, which focused on
commandeering or protecting ships and shipping lanes. The invention
of the airplane added another dimension to warfare, first as
additional support for land and sea forces, then taking on a
strategic mission all its own. Space flight added a fourth
dimension.
In the United States the fragmentation of forces reached its nadir
with the National Security Act of 1947, which formally created the
Air Force from the Army’s rib, along with the National Security
Council and Central Intelligence Agency. The same act also laid the
foundation for today’s joint environment by merging the
cabinet-level War Department and Navy Department into DoD, and
adding the Air Force.
Meanwhile, the rapid evolution of warfighting in the 20th century
resulted in an evolution of joint thinking. Through two world wars,
the Army grappled with the need to coordinate its own infantry,
artillery, and armored units into combined-arms campaigns,
succeeding finally with the first Gulf War, Scales says. The notion
of separate dimensions was beginning to blur by the end of World War
II, as well. The assault on Okinawa, Japan, was a fully joint
operation launched from a sea base and involving the Army and its
air corps in addition to the Navy and Marine Corps. Nevertheless,
the post-War Pentagon saw the three branches focus more on guarding
their own political domains than on building on the lessons learned
on D-Day and from Okinawa.
Unlike so much of military doctrine that was altered by Vietnam, the
military nightmares that ultimately triggered the doctrine of joint
were the botched Iranian Hostage rescue mission in 1980 and the 1983
invasion of Grenada. During both operations, communications and
coordination almost completely broke down among Army, Navy, and Air
Force elements. “What came out of the fiasco in Grenada was the
realization that it’s not enough just to cooperate, but that the
power of all the services had to become interdependent,” Scales
says. “The ultimate consummation of joint warfare was that all arms
in all dimensions — air, land, sea, and space — could be brought
together as a single element.”
The individual branches began sharing knowledge, training, and
people, and Congress gave further impetus with the Goldwater-Nichols
DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, which removed the individual service
chiefs from the operational chain of command and created combatant
commanders and unified commands. The military saw the fruits of
these efforts with the 2003 march to Baghdad in which the Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force operated as a single entity in a
highly effective ground campaign.
Just as Caesar would have done.
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