Joint professional military education fosters intellectual growth through exposure and understanding of multiple perspectives. If anyone understood the importance of this, it was Dwight D. Eisenhower. Today the National Defense University (NDU), which includes the Joint Forces Staff College (previously the Armed Forces Staff College), the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), educates leaders for the 21st century. They are able to accomplish this thanks to the support of Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The oldest component of NDU is ICAF, located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, D.C. ... Originally chartered as the Army Industrial College, it was established by the War Department’s General Orders, No. 7, Feb. 25, 1924. The orders read:

Establishment of The Army Industrial College. 1. A college ... is hereby established for the purpose of training Army officers in the useful knowledge pertaining to the supervision of procurement of all military supplies in time of war and to the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organization essential to war-time needs.

A major voice in the creation of the college was Bernard Baruch, a well-known industrialist and personal advisor to several U.S. presidents. Most notably, during World War II Baruch advised President Franklin D. Roosevelt about economic mobilization. Also during World War II, Baruch had some influence on other eventual components of NDU. After the war, Baruch played a prominent role in formulating policy at the United Nations regarding international control of atomic energy.

Two other individuals, both Army officers, had early associations with the Army Industrial College and later would become instrumental in establishing institutions that eventually would become part of NDU. Maj. H.H. “Hap” Arnold, who would become one of the pioneers of military aviation, was a member of one of the first classes to graduate from the Army Industrial College. The other was then-Major Eisenhower, who began lecturing at the Army Industrial College in 1931 shortly after his graduation from the Army War College. Earning a degree while teaching, Eisenhower graduated with the Army Industrial College class of 1933 and continued to teach at the institution during the inter-war years. During this time he established a close relationship with Baruch. According to Eisenhower, few people understood the importance of the Army Industrial College as well as Baruch.

Eisenhower had great appreciation for the purpose of the industrial college and its joint education. In the fourth lecture of the year he told the class of 1932 that those planning for war must work with those that resource the war. Eisenhower described a “cleavage” that had developed between those who plan for operations and those who would supply the efforts. The planners had direct access to the secretary of war and secretary of the Navy, while those responsible for mobilizing and resourcing the war were further down the chain of command. Eisenhower’s concern remains fundamental to the ICAF curriculum.

In the development of joint professional military education, Eisenhower would ensure the plan for the education system was resourced. Almost from the beginning, the Army Industrial College included students from other services and stressed the importance of understanding each service’s capabilities. The positive aspects of a joint student body were something Eisenhower frequently would refer to later in his career. As the U.S. strategy to win World War II found success, extensive recognition and publicity was given to the Army Industrial College for helping the United States prepare for war. The first joint professional military education college validated the importance of students from different services learning together. The institution also helped the nation avoid the problems of mobilization encountered in World War I.

The Army Industrial College was the first joint professional military education institution, but it had a specific mission: mobilizing and resourcing a nation for war. Early on during World War II, it was apparent to the key service leaders that there was a need for officers educated in joint operations. They desired new means of education to alleviate the conflicts surrounding respective roles and capabilities of the Army and Navy. [The joint Army-Navy Staff College was] created to fulfill an immediate requirement. ... Following the war, the military leadership believed joint professional military education was beneficial, so they evolved the Army-Navy Staff College into two institutions: the National War College (NWC) and the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC).

Postwar military structure

Determining the nature of the postwar military required that several broad issues be addressed: Should there continue to be separate services? What should become of the Army Air Corps? How joint should the military be? To answer those questions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formed the Special Committee for Reorganization of the National Defense in late 1944, frequently referred to as the Richardson Committee after its chairman, Adm. James O. Richardson, USN-Ret. ... General Eisenhower and Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz returned to Washington, D.C., following the war and each became the officer in charge of his respective service. They participated in the congressional hearings, voicing opposite opinions of how the armed forces should be structured. Eisenhower supported consolidation of the administration of the War and Navy departments. Nimitz adamantly opposed the change, particularly since a major world war had just been won with the existing organization. This was not an Army versus Navy argument; plenty of individuals from each service differed in their views.

With military leaders of the Navy and Army so polarized, it was necessary for the commander in chief to go public with a unifying position. President Harry S. Truman wanted Congress to make a timely decision on the organization of the armed forces. On Dec. 19, 1945, Truman forwarded a special message to Congress recommending the establishment of a Department of National Defense. His message contained indirect references for joint education: ...

True preparedness now means preparedness not alone in armaments and numbers of men, but preparedness in organization also. It means establishing in peacetime the kind of military organization [that] will be able to meet the test of sudden attack quickly and without having to improvise radical readjustment in structure and habits.

A total security program has still other major aspects. A military program, standing alone, is useless. It must be supported in peacetime by planning for industrial mobilization and for development of industrial and raw material resources where these are insufficient.

This message helped military leaders put to rest the controversy of what should be done with the two-department system. They now could focus on planning for the training and education necessary to support DoD.

The National War College

Every war fighter testified to the need to fight together as a team, but unified peacetime training and education was another matter. One of the fundamental questions was how professional military education should be structured: Is it more constructive to educate forces in a joint environment, like the Army Industrial College with students from both services, or in a separate environment, like the Army War College? Nimitz subscribed to the philosophy of separate organizations and education:

… There is need for improvement in the systems of interservice education and training in order to ensure maximum efficiency of all arms under unified command in the field. Such a system can be inaugurated without impairing technical proficiency in each service and at the same time preserving the morale and esprit de corps of the individual services. It seems unnecessary to enforce a merger upon the services to accomplish the needed improvements in this field.

Eisenhower participated in the same congressional hearings as Nimitz, expressing an opposite point of view. In response to questioning, Eisenhower highlighted the importance of determining the overall structure of the military first, then deciding the education requirements. Eisenhower’s words clearly reflected his belief that officers should be educated together, a theme he would return to as commander in chief:

Sen. Warren R. Austin: I am curious to know whether you regard it important for us to determine upon this general organization before we undertake to determine such details as education, military education?
 
Eisenhower: I am absolutely certain of it. For one thing, I think there should be one grand overall war college for all three of them. But we cannot have that if we do not know how we stand. And if we do not know that we are going to have such a combined war college, soon we will have an Army war college, a Navy war college, and an air war college. I am talking now about the very highest level of military intelligence, not the special services.

There are a number of things involved there. Suppose I ask you, gentlemen, for a special, separate amount of money for research and development. If I do that, then the Navy and the Air Force will be trying to get as much money as the War Department, they will be asking for money for their services.

Austin: Yes. Then, may we judge from what you have said, General, that the idea of postponing the consideration of this very vital subject in order to give a special commission appointed by the president time to restudy and go over it again, would not strike you as in the interest of the services or according to the public good?

Eisenhower: Senator, I adhere to one simple principle—there may be exceptions to this generalization, as there are, certainly, to all generalizations—but I believe in people studying and deciding and bearing responsibility. This committee bears the responsibility to the Senate and through them to the people of the United States; the War Department heads bear responsibility to the government and to the Army. And it is the same with the Navy; they have a responsibility to this Congress and to the people. The Congress bears the responsibility to the people, because they are the people.

This debate about whether a single war college or separate war colleges are desirable was not resolved in 1945 and, to a certain extent, remains with the military today. Eisenhower, in his last response to Austin, recognized that the discussions could go on but thought it was the responsibility of Congress to make a decision. Congress was not ready to decide if joint professional military education was preferable to the services providing each branch a separate education.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to develop a postwar joint education plan while Congress was considering the reorganization of the armed forces. Soon after Truman’s special message to Congress, the War Department commissioned another major study of officer education. The commandant of the Army’s Command and General Staff School, Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, USA, was placed in charge of the study board, and the board report became known by his name. ...

In February 1946, Gerow submitted his board’s recommendations to Eisenhower, who now was chief of staff of the Army. The Gerow Board proposed five joint colleges, which would collectively form a National Security University in Washington, D.C., and fall under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to ICAF and NWC, Gerow’s Board proposed a Joint Administrative College, a Joint Intelligence College, and a Department of State College. The function of the university was to provide guidance, determine overarching policy, and supervise instruction for the five colleges.

Ultimately, the fate of the proposed university and the five colleges came down to a matter of resources. The Gerow report recommended that the Army War College, which suspended operations during World War II, remain closed; that the new NWC occupy the facilities; and that the Army War College funding be used for the new college. The proposals for a National Security University, Joint Administrative College, Joint Intelligence College, and Department of State College ultimately were rejected as a result of limited resources. ...

The Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC)

The Richardson Committee’s report had recommended an intermediate-level school to develop officers capable of preparing and participating in joint operations. However, no detailed planning had been conducted to arrange for a joint college to fulfill that requirement. Recognizing this, Eisenhower sent the following memorandum to Nimitz April 17, 1946:

... There is a need for a school which will conduct short courses of approximately five months duration in joint staff technique and procedures in theaters and joint overseas operations. These courses will be similar to those conducted at ANSOL [Army and Navy Staff College] during the war. I visualize that this school will be operated on a coequal basis by the Army, Navy, and Air [Force]. There is a distinct joint necessity for a school of this type for officers of our services prior to attendance at the National War College, thus permitting the scope of this college to embrace national planning and strategy. Since the National War College and the Industrial College are located at an Army installation, I presume you would like to have this new school located at a naval installation.

This initiative set into motion a working group that would develop a plan for establishing such a college. Soon after the working group drafted a plan for the school, a disagreement surfaced between Eisenhower and Nimitz concerning the curriculum. Nimitz sent a memorandum to Eisenhower indicating he was unhappy with the scope of the courses as described in a draft of the curriculum. He thought there should be a clear distinction between NWC and the proposed staff college. The War College should teach joint command and stress the development of commanders and doctrines associated with joint operations; these disciplines should not be taught at the new staff college. The draft directive Nimitz was referring to contained the following objectives:

• to produce officers of all armed services qualified to function effectively as commanders and key staff officers in joint and overseas operations;
   
• to develop commanders and key staff officers of all armed services [who are] qualified to establish theaters of operation and coordinate and direct strategic, tactical, and logistical operations therein;
   
• to foster mutual confidence and understanding among officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and
   
• to develop and suggest improvements in standard practice, instruction, and doctrine for joint overseas operations.

Nimitz initially disagreed with all but the third proposed objective. He felt that the other objectives were either accomplished elsewhere or unnecessary.

Eisenhower responded a few days later:

While I agree that the college must primarily teach joint staff procedure, I believe that the functions of command and staff are inseparable and that the former cannot be ignored in the instruction given the school. Since this is the only college in the school system where the basic mission will be to give instruction on the theater and major joint task force level, it is the only one in which the functions of command and staff on that level can be logically and efficiently taught. I feel that this college should be a prerequisite for entrance into the National War College where selected ground, air, and naval officers will be trained for meeting responsibilities in the highest echelons of the armed forces.

Nimitz ended up assenting to Eisenhower’s argument and concurred with the proposed objectives.

An appropriate name for the new institution also was negotiated between Nimitz and Eisenhower. Nimitz wanted to ensure that the distinction of its mission was clear by including the word “staff” in the name for the college. Eisenhower, conveying his belief that there would soon be an additional branch of the armed services, countered Nimitz’s proposal of “Army-Navy Staff College” with “Armed Forces College.”

The special committee of flag and general officers selected by Eisenhower and Nimitz drafted a directive for the new college and submitted it for approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The proposed name, “Armed Forces Staff College,” addressed both of the leaders’ concerns. The planned scope of instruction included “study of the organization, composition, and functions of theaters and major joint task forces and responsibilities of the commanders” as Eisenhower had suggested. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposal and approved the AFSC June 28, 1946, a mere two months after Eisenhower’s original memorandum. The stated mission of the college was “to train selected officers of the armed forces in joint operations.”

Similar to the students selected at the NWC, the students and faculty selected to attend and teach at the AFSC had equal representation in land, sea, and air forces. The student body and instructors were entirely military because the curriculum was focused on joint military operations. The first class of students arrived in late January 1947 for their five-month instruction course, which ran from Feb. 3 to June 28, 1947. The students and their families all lived on the 55-acre site that had been used during the war for processing and reassignment of Navy personnel. The U-shaped barracks housed the students and their families and each building was named after a World War II joint land, sea, and air operation such as Sicily, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.

The superintendent of the Naval Academy, Rear Adm. James L. Holloway, spoke to the students during opening ceremonies for the first class. His remarks captured the idea of improving relationships through acculturation. Holloway said:

You officers of the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps will work together and play together; your wives and children will live within the same compound and will come out of it as friends, with a mutual understanding and mutual customs.

The theme of attaining mutual understanding of different perspectives as part of an educational experience, in and out of the classroom, is the underpinning of “joint” in joint professional military education. The goal of attaining an enhanced appreciation for each other is the major difference between a service school, such as the Army’s Command and General Staff College … and a joint school.

A third joint professional military education institution now had been established, again as a result of Eisenhower’s support. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had oversight of all three. They were funded and operated independently. It was Eisenhower’s vision that students would attain one level of knowledge at the AFSC then build upon that knowledge later in their careers when they attended NWC. To build on knowledge would imply close coordination of curriculum development. Operating independently made coordination challenging. This would change once the schools became parts of one university. Though the AFSC initially was not a part of NDU, it joined the institution in 1981.

Improving the education system has been a solution to problems facing the nation and the military. The U.S. military had been encouraged to reorganize, reform, and transform—in other words, change. Change begins in the mind and that is why education has been the key. To achieve this, joint professional military education contains curriculum components designed to educate students in preparation for working with officers and civilians from other services, agencies, and countries. The birth of the Industrial College can be credited to Davis, Baruch, and others, but the birth of the system should be credited to its graduates. Eisenhower appreciated the joint education he received at the Army Industrial College. He appreciated it when he was supreme allied commander, Europe, and later when he was commander in chief. A few weeks before he passed away, Eisenhower wrote a note to the ICAF Commandant. He closed the note by stating:

It is my conviction that the educational programs conducted by the [Industrial] College are of the greatest importance in developing the kind of enlightened military and civilian leadership our nation must have if its purposes and security are to endure.

These words are as true today as when Eisenhower penned them from Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C., in 1969, and they also are applicable to the system of joint professional military education.