Overview of Professional Military Education

The armed services have recognized the value of an education and they have placed special emphasis on the importance of professional military education. An officer’s responsibilities and challenges change with each promotion. The education system developed by the military is reflective of this increasing scope of an officer’s responsibilities. The Services initially demand competencies from the Ensigns and Lieutenants in Service specific weapons. This broadens to requirements for strategic level thinking from the Generals and Admirals. There is somewhat of a blurring of the lines between the military education system and the training system that has evolved over the years. Generally, the training programs are highly utilitarian while the educational system, particularly at the senior level, is similar to that of a traditional liberal arts education.

The reason for having a system of higher education in the military is fundamentally the same reason civilian higher education institutions exist. The professional military education system fulfills an array of purposes and this large spectrum is not unique to military colleges; both the military and civilian sectors of American society need educated leaders. The nature of the type of education has been debated for quite some time. In 1828 the faculty at Yale debated and reported on the purposes of higher education. Some faculty firmly believed students should acquire content applicable to the professions they would be joining. Others thought an education should be more liberal, teaching students how to think (Yale, 1997). The professional military has deliberated the same question. Today’s professional military education system includes the spectrum of possibilities. The goal of the senior Service college’s education is comparable to that described in the 1828 Yale Report and that is to exercise the students minds to teach them how to think. Other institutions in the system, such as the primary level schools, provide very content specific educations.

The Framework for Professional Military Education of Officers in the United States Armed Forces

The educational framework corresponds to the progressive nature of an officer’s career (figure 1). There are five levels: (a) precommissioning, (b) primary, (c) intermediate, (d) senior, and (e) general/flag officer. The curriculum of each level is designed to build upon the knowledge attained at a previous level (Shelton, 2000, p. A-B-1). Figure 1 provides a portrayal of the framework.

Figure 1. Progression in U.S. Military Education.

Figure 1. The years of commissioned Service and the officer’s rank determine what level of education for which the officer is eligible.

Progression through the professional military education system is a responsibility of the respective Service. The Service needs to weigh the individual’s professional development with other needs of the Service and decide whether or not an officer should participate in an education program at that point in his or her career (Cheney, 1997; Shelton, 2000).
 
The highest level of professional military education is CAPSTONE and only occurs at NDU. Every newly selected flag and general officer is required by Congress to attend this course at National Defense University. The six-week curriculum concentrates on national security strategy and joint matters. There is a provision to waive the Congressional requirement if operationally necessary (Skelton, 1989).

Figure 2. Professional Military Education Institutions in 2005



Figure 2. Each Service operates its own institutions and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for National Defense University

Joint Professional Military Education

Within the professional military education system is a program of joint professional military education. This program contains curriculum components designed to educate students in preparation for working with officers and civilians from other Services, agencies and countries. Each school in Figure 2 includes an emphasis on joint issues with different foci. The schools at National Defense University (NDU) are specifically designated joint professional military education schools.

The educational philosophy of a joint education is to foster intellectual growth and development through an understanding of multiple perspectives. This is accomplished through curriculum and having a faculty and student body that represent multiple viewpoints. President Eisenhower was a great believer and supporter of joint professional military education.

Eisenhower’s Influence

At the end of any major conflict, the United States military has gone through a period of assessment and instituted change based on lessons learned. Following the Viet Nam War, in the mid-1970s, political and economic considerations evolved to a point to induce the merger of two joint professional military education colleges. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) and the National War College (NWC) joined together to create the National Defense University (NDU). The Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) joined the University in 1981. Dwight D. Eisenhower attended and taught at the Industrial College and had great influence on establishing NWC and AFSC.

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)

The oldest component of NDU is ICAF, situated at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, D.C. This institution was created as a result of America’s inability to efficiently support war efforts in a time of need. This section will describe the circumstances leading to the establishment of ICAF and a synopsis of its early history.

World War I was the conflict that brought to light the need for ICAF. American industries and the military had a difficult time coordinating the war effort (Abrahamson, 1983;Gropman, 1997; Koistinen, 1998). For example, the War Department ordered approximately 50,000 pieces of 75mm field artillery for use during World War I, yet only 143 American-made units were available to U.S. forces on November 11, 1918. The statistics for U.S. wartime production were similarly dismal for critical war items such as tanks, aircraft, and food.

During the post war assessment, American industries and businessmen were strongly criticized, not only by the U.S. government but by U.S. allies as well. David Lloyd George (George, 1936), Britain’s Prime Minister during the war, later reflected that:

No field guns of American pattern or manufacture fired a shot in the War. The same thing applies to tanks. Here one would have thought that the nation who were the greatest manufacturers of automobiles in the world could have turned out tanks with the greatest facility and in the largest numbers, but not a single tank of American manufacture ever rolled into action in the War.

Transport was so defective that ships sometimes took a couple of months to turn round at the ports, and on land it was so badly organised that, in spite of help which was forthcoming from other armies, a large number of the American troops who fought so gallantly in the Argonne in the autumn of 1918 were without sufficient food to sustain them in their heroic struggle in a difficult terrain. The American soldiers were superb. That is a fact which is acknowledged, not only by their friends and British comrades, but by their enemies as well.

There were no braver or more fearless men in any Army, but the organisation at home and behind the lines was not worthy of the reputation which American business men have deservedly won for smartness, promptitude and efficiency. (pp. 452-3.)

The War Department’s supply bureaus and supply programs were sharply condemned in a series of Congressional hearings held in 1918 and 1919 (Annual, 1919). Tension between Congress and manufacturers led directly to the War Department’s review of America’s industrial preparedness. Political pressure forced the War Department to come up with a solution to preclude the mistakes of World War I from ever being repeated.

One of the initial steps taken to solve the problems was the National Defense Act of 1920, which reorganized the structure of the War Department. As a result of the new legislation, a new position was created, the Assistant Secretary of War. This individual was charged with the responsibility that the Department would be prepared for future wartime mobilization efforts (Eisenhower, 1931). Additionally, this new Assistant Secretary was empowered to plan for the entire wartime economy, a daunting task (A'Hearn, 1997). President Harding appointed John M. Wainwright to this post in the spring of 1921. One of the first individuals with whom Wainwright consulted was the Chairman of the War Industries Board, Bernard Baruch. Wainwright’s staff constantly asked Baruch to review their plans for industrial mobilization. Proposals of how to train and educate individuals in the arena of industrial support for a war were discussed frequently by the staff and reviewed by Baruch over the next several years (Thatcher, 1943). Wainwright was unable to procure funding to establish an educational institution for such training that he regarded as necessary (Bauer, 1983). Before Wainwright left his assignment, he kept the possibility of a school alive by assigning eight officers to plan for a curriculum, so if a college were approved, plans would be in place to begin classes.

President Harding replaced Wainwright with a new Assistant Secretary of War on March 21, 1923. Dwight F. Davis, a former Colonel in the American Expeditionary Force in France, became the new Assistant Secretary. Davis had a strong interest in educating more officers in procurement and industrial mobilization planning. Four months after taking office, two of Davis’ staff members presented him with a proposal to establish a school specializing in the education of industrial mobilization. Initially, Davis was skeptical. Davis carefully examined the preparations his staff officers had made for such a school. David is considered one of the founding fathers of the Industrial College.

Originally chartered as the Army Industrial College, the institution was established by the War Department’s General Orders, Number Seven, on February 25, 1924. The orders read:

Establishment of The Army Industrial College. 1. A college, to be known as the Army Industrial College, is hereby established for the purpose of training Army officers in the useful knowledge pertaining to the supervision of procurement of all military supplies in time of war and to the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of material and industrial organization essential to war-time needs. (Orders, 1924, p. 1)

A major voice in the creation of the College was Bernard Baruch, a well-known industrialist and personal advisor to Presidents Wilson and Harding. Baruch and fellow industrialist R. S. Brookings comprised the new College’s advisory board. Baruch was a frequent lecturer and friend at the Army Industrial College and urged the students to question him “mercilessly and pitilessly” (Yoshpe, 1965, p. 4). He considered each invitation to lecture as a great event. Baruch had great appreciation for the complexities and challenges of mobilization and for industries’ ability to support national defense. During a lecture to students at the Army War College on February 12, 1924, a student asked Baruch his opinion on how the United States should be organized in time of peace so it would be ready to mobilize in time of war. Baruch (1924) stressed the importance of establishing:

…a little school or something of the kind...where those of us who did serve…could give the benefit of our experience to these possible industrial leaders. …Let it be a living thing. …The military-minded man who has to devise the machines of destruction should keep in touch with the man of industry who can go out and get those things and who knows how he can turn a factory that is making one thing into another thing. They should keep in touch all the time so that if war has to come, we shall be ready for it. (p. 15)

Simply put, it was Baruch’s vision for the College to stay in touch with industry. This would serve society’s best interest by ensuring that the military knew the capabilities of industry to support a national security strategy and thereby avoid the problems encountered in World War I. Today, the purpose of ICAF is the same as the vision that Bernard Baruch had for the institution in 1924.
Baruch became an advisor to several U.S. Presidents. Most notably, during World War II Baruch advised President Franklin D. Roosevelt on economic mobilization. Also, during World War II Baruch had some influence on other eventual components of NDU. After the War, Baruch played a prominent role in formulating policy at the United Nations regarding international control of atomic energy.

Two other individuals, both Army officers, had early associations with the Army Industrial College and would later become instrumental in establishing institutions which would eventually become a part of NDU. Major H. H. (Hap) Arnold, who would become one of the pioneers of military aviation, was a member of one of the first classes to graduate from the Army Industrial College (A'Hearn, 1997). The other was Major Dwight David Eisenhower who began lecturing to the Army Industrial College in 1931 shortly after his graduation from the Army War College. Earning a degree while teaching, Eisenhower graduated with the Army Industrial College class of 1933 and continued to teach at the institution during the inter-war years (Eisenhower, 1960; 1969). During this time he established a close relationship with Bernard Baruch. According to Eisenhower, few people understood the importance of the Army Industrial College as well as Baruch (Eisenhower, 1960).

Eisenhower had great appreciation for the purpose of the Industrial College and its joint education. He told the students during the fourth lecture of the year for the class of 1932 of the importance of those planning for war working with those that resource the war. Eisenhower described a “cleavage” that had developed between those that plan for operations and those that would supply the efforts (Eisenhower, 1931, p.5). Those that plan had direct access to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy while those responsible to mobilizing and resourcing the war were further down in the chain-of-command. Eisenhower’s concern is the point of the ICAF curriculum in 2005; that is, the planning of a national security strategy must be accomplished with those responsible for resourcing the strategy. In the development of joint professional military education, Eisenhower would ensure the plan for the education system was resourced.

Almost from the beginning, the Army Industrial College included students from other Services and stressed the importance of understanding each Service’s capabilities. The first Navy students arrived in February of 1925. When Eisenhower was a student, twenty-five percent of the class of 1933 was composed of Navy and Marine Corps officers (A'Hearn, 1997). The positive aspects of a “joint” student body were something that Eisenhower would frequently refer to later in his career.

As the U.S. strategy to win World War II found success, extensive recognition and publicity was given to the Army Industrial College for helping the U.S. to prepare for war (Bauer, 1983). The first joint professional military education college validated the importance of students from different Services learning together. The institution also helped the nation avoid the problems of mobilization encountered during World War I.

The National War College (NWC)

The Army Industrial College was the first joint professional military education institution but it had a very specific mission, mobilizing and resourcing a nation for war. Other educational needs were identified, requiring new schools. To help define the exact requirements, several studies were undertaken. The organization of the Armed Forces and the education system to support the Services needed to be examined so an informed decision could be made on any new institutions. This section will describe the evolution of events leading to the establishment of NWC. The progression begins with the creation of the Joint Army-Navy Staff College, followed by a decision on the organization of the post war military, and then a decision on the post World War II joint education system.

The Creation of the Joint Army-Navy Staff College

Early on during World War II, it was apparent to the key leaders within the Services that there was a need for officers educated in joint operations. A new means of education was desired to alleviate the conflicts surrounding respective roles and capabilities of the Army and Navy (Sweeney, 1943). This section will address a school created in minimum time to fulfill an immediate requirement.

A graduate of the Army Industrial College, Lieutenant General H. H. Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, submitted a proposal to his fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. These three were the original members of the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chambers, 1999; Lucas, 1987). Arnold proposed that a study be undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine the feasibility of the establishment of a United States War College. Arnold’s recommendations established the initial groundwork for two colleges that today are a part of NDU. The two institutions are AFSC and NWC. Arnold’s December 26, 1942, memorandum stated that the purpose of the War College would be twofold:

1. To train selected officers of the Army and Navy for command and staff duties with unified (Army-Navy) commands.

2. To develop methods and ideas for the most effective unified employment of all arms and services and to translate lessons learned in the field into appropriate doctrines. Conclusions reached should be spread through the services both by service publications and by the influence of the graduates of the College in planning and conducting operations. (Arnold, 1942, p. 2)

Arnold proposed that the College be located in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. to maintain contact with the “high command” and take advantage of existing facilities (Arnold, 1942).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff resolved a few issues with the proposal and on April 10, 1943, Marshall signed a memorandum titled: Establishment of a United States War (Staff) College. This memorandum documented the requirement for a special course of instruction to train Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers for staff and command duties with unified commands. The course of instruction would fall under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Marshall, 1943). The Army-Navy Staff College was established in Washington, D.C. on April 23, 1943 with a mission to train selected officers for command and staff duty in unified or coordinated commands. The students in the initial class were told to meet in Washington, D.C. on August 5, 1943, in the new War Department Building at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue, N.W. (Kinworthy, 1943). In a display of the nature of the unity of effort envisioned for the College, General Marshall and Admiral King each spoke at the opening ceremony and the individual responsible for proposing the College, Lieutenant General Arnold, provided the concluding remarks (Arnold, 1943). Admiral King’s remarks may have summed up the spirit behind the college the best. Referring to the purpose of the College, he stated:

Certainly it is to promote better teamwork, to enable unified or coordinated commands to work more effectively, but to my mind what may be called a by-product is the most important of all, and that is to indicate that there is basically but one uniform in the armed services—that of the United States. (King, August 5, 1943, p. 7)

The composition of the student body reflected the desire for an increased understanding of each other’s Service. Classes for the four months of instruction were composed of officers from each Service, and at times included officers from the United Kingdom and Canada. An Australian officer participated in one class. To help fulfill the goal of producing students who understood the relationship between the diplomatic corps and the military, the eighth, and all subsequent classes of students, included one to three Foreign Service officers from the State Department (Reading, 1972). The backgrounds of the students created a joint learning environment.

What became of the new Army Navy Staff College following the war was a function of the post war educational requirements. The military leadership believed that joint professional military education was beneficial, and they demonstrated this conviction by evolving the Army Navy Staff College into two institutions: NWC and AFSC.

Deciding on the Organization of the Post World War II Military

Planning for the organization of the post-war military began prior to the end of World War II. At the heart of the issue was whether or not the Services should operate independently, as they had been, or fall under an umbrella organization such as a new Department of Defense. Once the structure of the Services was established, plans could be made for the professional military education system necessary to support the organization. The sequence of establishing the organization first, then determining the education required to support the system, was important. Separate Services implied that a system of independent Service colleges was necessary; whereas, if the new organization stressed a more unified approach, then new “joint” colleges might be necessary. The purpose of this section is to frame the debate about the organization of the military and portray the final decision.

Determining the nature of the postwar military required that several broad issues be addressed. Among the concerns were: Should there continue to be separate Services? What should become of the Army Air Corps? How “joint” should the military be? To answer those questions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formed the Special Committee for Reorganization of the National Defense in late 1944 (JCS, 1945). The committee was frequently referred to as the Richardson Committee after its chairman, retired Admiral James O. Richardson, United States Navy.

To answer the questions posed above, the Richardson Committee interviewed senior military officers worldwide in over 80 meetings. Ultimately, the Richardson Committee was in favor of a “single department system of organization” for the military. A two-department arrangement had a War Department and Navy Department whereas this proposal would have a single department of defense and the Navy and Army would operate within that structure. The Committee’s report pointed out that a new Department of the Air Force, if established at a later date, could fall under either a unified defense department or three-department system. One member of the committee was very much opposed to changing from the current system and cast a dissenting opinion. That member was the chairman of the committee, Admiral Richardson. Richardson thought the two-department system under the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be adequate if a Joint Secretaryship were added (Report, 1945, p. 434). The premise behind the Joint Secretaryship was that the civilian Secretaries would form a committee to take joint action on areas of mutual interest. The majority of the Committee members felt this would never work because any decision would require unanimous agreement (Report, 1945, p. 416). Important decisions would be unduly delayed trying to reach agreements among different Services. The Committee’s final recommendation in April 1945 included Richardson’s objections, but made it clear the rest of the members favored a single department of defense.

The debate on the organization and relationship of the Army and Navy escalated to Congress shortly after World War II. While the different options were being considered in Congressional hearings, the Senate Military Affairs Committee prematurely provided Richardson’s report and recommendations to the press on November 3, 1945. To add to the commotion, the Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, let the press know that Admiral King was in disagreement with Generals Marshall and Arnold regarding the recommendations in the report (Leviero, 1945). The effect of these dissentions was to prolong a final decision about the organization of the Services causing the loss of precious time to plan for a military education system.

General Eisenhower and Fleet Admiral Nimitz returned to Washington, D.C. following the war and each became the officer in charge of his respective Service. They participated in the Congressional hearings, each voicing opposite opinions of how the Armed Forces should be structured. Eisenhower supported consolidation of the administration of the War and Navy Departments into a single department. Nimitz adamantly opposed the change, particularly since a major World War had just been won with the existing organization. On November 16, 1945, the United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs questioned General Eisenhower on his views on unification of the Armed Forces. General Eisenhower stated at the hearings:

Competition is like some of the habits we have. In small amounts, they are very, very desirable. Carried too far, they are ruinous. When we have such competition in industry to produce such things as that, I do not think that competition produces the best. I believe that coordinated, scientific development and research is what we need to produce the best. Certainly it is more economical.

If we do not integrate the executive management of the three members of our fighting team, our postwar security establishment will become the patchwork improvisation that is inevitable where independent departments, at different times compete before separate congressional committees. With integration we can buy more security for less money. Without it we will spend more money and obtain less security. …Finally, there is no such thing as a separate land, sea, or air war; therefore we must now recognize this fact by establishing a single department of the armed forces to govern us all. (Statement of Eisenhower, 1945, p. 363)

This testimony was only one side of the debate. General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz led our forces to victory in opposite theaters of combat during the war and similarly were in opposite theaters in considering how the defense establishment should be structured. Each had a different wartime experience, and each was successful, but their views on how the military should be organized and educated were radically different. This was not an Army versus Navy argument as plenty of individuals from each Service differed in their views. Some feared that in the joint environment Service identity would be lost. They also believed that competition was healthy for an organization. Admiral Nimitz was a strong supporter of maintaining separate departments. In his Congressional testimony he stated:

But it is open to serious question that a merger of the War and Navy Departments would actually produce greater teamwork between the Army and Navy. If either service felt that the merger threatened its ability to discharge its peculiar functions, the result would not be teamwork, but discord within the new Department. Competition between the services—for example in the development of aircraft engines—has been healthy and will continue to be as long as it is in the open. To stifle it might well have unhealthy effects. (Statement of Nimitz, 1945, p. 390)

…A single Department of National Defense will have one of two consequences for the naval component. Either the Navy will retain all the autonomy, integrity, and prestige necessary to carry out its functions, in which case it might as well remain a separate department; or it will lose these advantages, either gradually or at once, and become a secondary service. (Statement of Nimitz, 1945, p. 392)

With the military leaders of the Navy and Army so polarized, it was necessary for the Commander in Chief to go public with a unifying position. President Truman wanted Congress to make a timely decision on the organization of the Armed Forces. On December 19, 1945, Truman forwarded a special message to Congress recommending the establishment of a Department of National Defense (Truman, 1961). His message contained many indirect references to the need for joint education:

I recommend that the Congress adopt legislation combining the War and Navy Departments into one single Department of National Defense. Such unification is another essential step—along with universal training—in the development of a comprehensive and continuous program for our future safety and for the peace and security of the world. (p. 547)

True preparedness now means preparedness not alone in armaments and numbers of men, but preparedness in organization also. It means establishing in peacetime the kind of military organization which will be able to meet the test of sudden attack quickly and without having to improvise radical readjustment in structure and habits. (p. 550)

A total security program has still other major aspects. A military program, standing alone, is useless. It must be supported in peacetime by planning for industrial mobilization and for development of industrial and raw material resources where these are insufficient. (p. 554)

This message from the President helped the military leaders put to rest the controversy of what should be done with the two-department system under which they had been operating. They could focus on planning for the training and education necessary to support a Department of Defense. Proceeding with the planning turned out to be a wise decision because President Truman did not approve the National Security Act of 1947 until July 26 of that year. The act provided for a Secretary of Defense and for a National Military Establishment comprising Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and related staff agencies (Truman, 1961, p. 560).

Deciding on the Organization of the Post World War II Education System

President Truman’s message clarified for the military that the Commander in Chief was in favor of a single department. The Services could stop any internal debates and devote their energy to finalizing the plans for developing a professional military education system to support a Department of Defense. This section will describe the progression of those efforts.

While the debate on how the Services should be organized was ongoing, the Services began to examine the possibilities for improving professional military education. In January 1944, the Commandant of the Army-Navy Staff College, Lieutenant General John Dewitt, United States Army, was tasked with examining the future of joint education. One of the two civilians named to assist the Commandant in this study was Bernard Baruch. Dewitt’s study recommended that a national military university be established and that it should be composed of three colleges: (a) a Joint Industrial College, (b) a Joint War College, and (c) a State Department College (A'Hearn, 1997). These recommendations were set aside in 1944 until the organization of the Services was understood.

The Richardson Committee provided recommendations for the structure of the national defense system, which included professional military education in the United States. In fact, the Committee report included recommendations for the institutions that would later become a part of NDU. The report stated:

There are three basic requirements of the Armed Forces for the program of joint education and training. First there must be an exchange of duties and joint training on appropriate levels particularly designed to enable juniors to work together in the execution of joint plans drawn by their seniors. Second, joint education must be provided at intermediate levels to develop officers capable of planning and participating in joint operations. Third, joint education must be provided at high levels to develop officers capable of formulating strategic concepts and conducting, in command positions, large-scale operations employing all components. (Report, 1945 p. 433)

The third level of education referred to in the Richardson Committee’s report was directly applicable to NWC and ICAF. Intermediate-level education would be attained at AFSC, which today is a part of NDU. (The early history of this college is presented in the next section.) The committee recognized that the Army Industrial College already functioned as a joint institution, since its faculty and student body were composed of both Army and Naval officers. The Army oversaw the Army Industrial College since its creation in 1924. The committee’s intent was to place responsibility of the Army Industrial College with the Joint Chiefs of Staff instead of the Army, and to have the name of the College reflect the inclusion of all Services (JCS, 1945, p. 32).

The Richardson Committee recommendations pertaining to the eventual creation of NDU were:

That a joint college be maintained in Washington, D.C. to complete the formal joint education, at about the 25-year level of commissioned service, of senior officers of the armed forces in military strategy and war planning.

That the Army Industrial College be reconstituted as a joint institution to provide joint education of senior officers of the armed forces in the field of industrial mobilization for war and related subjects.
That the joint college of the armed forces, the proposed joint industrial college, and the State Department college (if established) conduct high-level education in all matters related to war and national policy, each within its own field, but with integrated effort in common fields. In the absence of the establishment of a State Department college, the continuation of the policy of accepting officers of the Foreign Service as students in the joint college of the armed forces is recommended. (JCS, 1945, p. 19)

These recommendations would eventually result in three actions that shaped the nature of NDU. In response to the first recommendation came NWC. In response to the second recommendation the Army Industrial College would become the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would oversee its operations (JCS, 1945, p. 32). The third recommendation loosely described a function of a university when it referred to an integrated effort in common fields. However, without some entity fulfilling the function of a university, this goal was not achieved until NDU was actually established years later. Instead of a State Department College being established as stated in the third recommendation, Foreign Service officers were included in the student body of NWC from the beginning and later added to the student population at the Army Industrial College/ICAF (Hill, 1946). Establishing NWC, renaming the Industrial College, and adding Foreign Service officers to both schools did not occur immediately because Congress and the President had not made a decision on how the Services would be organized.

Every war fighter testified of the need to fight together as a team, but unified peacetime training and education was another matter (Report, 1945). One of the fundamental questions was how professional military education should be structured: Is it more constructive to educate forces in a joint environment, like the Army Industrial College with students from both Services, or in a separate environment, like the Army War College? Admiral Nimitz subscribed to the philosophy of separate organizations and education:

…There is need for improvement in the systems of interservice education and training in order to insure maximum efficiency of all arms under unified command in the field. Such a system can be inaugurated without impairing technical proficiency in each service and at the same time preserving the morale and esprit de corps of the individual services. It seems unnecessary to enforce a merger upon the services to accomplish the needed improvements in this field. (Report, 1945, p. 393)

Eisenhower participated in the same Congressional hearings as Nimitz, expressing an opposite point of view. Eisenhower’s Congressional testimony, in response to questioning, highlighted the importance of determining the overall structure of the military first, then deciding the education requirements. Eisenhower’s words clearly reflected his belief that officers should be educated together, a theme he would return to when he became Commander in Chief:

Senator Austin: I am curious to know whether you regard it important for us to determine upon this general organization before we undertake to determine such details as education, military education?

General Eisenhower: I am absolutely certain of it. For example for one thing, I think there should be one grand over-all war college for all three of them. But we cannot have that if we do not know how we stand. And if we do not know that we are going to have such a combined war college, soon we will have an army war college, a navy war college, and an air war college. I am talking now about the very highest level of military intelligence, not the special services.

There are a number of things involved there. Suppose I come up and ask you gentlemen for a special, separate amount of money for research and development. If I do that, then the Navy and the Air Force will be trying to get as much money as the War Department, they will be coming up and asking for money for their services.

Senator Austin: Yes. Then, may we judge from what you have said, General, that the idea of postponing the consideration of this very vital subject in order to give a special commission appointed by the President time to restudy and go over it again, would not strike you as in the interest of the services or according to the public good.

General Eisenhower: Senator, I adhere to one simple principle—there may be exceptions to this generalization, as there are, certainly, to all generalizations—but I believe in people studying and deciding and bearing responsibility. This committee bears the responsibility to the Senate and through them to the people of the United States; the War Department heads bear responsibility to the Government and to the Army. And it is the same with the Navy; they have a responsibility to this Congress and to the people. The Congress bears the responsibility to the people, because they are the people. (Report, 1945, pp. 370-371)

This debate on whether or not a single war college or separate war colleges are desirable was not resolved in 1945 and, to a certain extent, remains with the military today. Eisenhower, in his last response to Senator Austin, recognized that the discussions could go on but that it was the responsibility of Congress to make a decision. Congress was not yet ready to decide if joint professional military education was preferable to the Services providing each branch a separate education.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to develop a postwar joint education plan while Congress was considering the reorganization of the Armed Forces (JCS, 1945). Soon after Truman’s special message to Congress, the War Department commissioned another major study of officer education. The Commandant of the Army’s Command and General Staff School, Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, U.S. Army, was placed in charge of the study board, and the board report became known by his name. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in emphasizing the need for joint education, heavily influenced the group’s report. Gerow updated them frequently and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in turn provided him with feedback (Masland & Radway, 1957). The Board met in Washington, D.C. between January 3 and 12, 1946, and interviewed individuals knowledgeable about joint professional military education. Among those interviewed was Lieutenant General Dewitt, who was by now retired. Dewitt had been the Commandant of the Army-Navy Staff College and had previously conducted a study proposing improvements to the military education system. Gerow’s report had many similarities to Dewitt’s proposals from two years earlier. In February 1946, Gerow submitted his Board’s recommendations to General Eisenhower who was now Chief of Staff of the Army. The “Gerow Board” proposed five joint colleges, which would collectively form a National Security University located in Washington, D.C. and fall under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gerow, 1946). In addition to ICAF and NWC, Gerow’s Board proposed a Joint Administrative College, a Joint Intelligence College and a Department of State College. The function of the University was to provide guidance, determine overarching policy, and supervise instruction for the five colleges (Gerow, 1946, p. 6). Specifically, the report went on to state:

Close and definite coordination is required on the highest military educational level. This should be accomplished by the establishment of a National Security University under the jurisdiction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of War (because of his legal responsibility for industrial mobilization). The National Security University will be interested in all problems concerning the military, social and economic resources and foreign policies of the nation that are related to national security. (p. 27)

The Board’s report clarified that the recommendations should be implemented regardless of the pending decision on the reorganization of the Armed Forces (Gerow, 1946, p. 7).

Ultimately, the fate of the proposed University and the five colleges came down to a matter of resources. The Gerow report recommended that the Army War College, which suspended operations during World War II, remain closed; that the new NWC occupy the facilities; and that the Army War College funding be used for the new College. The proposals for a National Security University, Joint Administrative College, Joint Intelligence College, and Department of State College were ultimately rejected as a result of limited resources (Masland & Radway, 1957).

The Establishment of the National War College

As the Gerow Board was meeting and developing an overall education plan in 1946, there was a desire by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to simultaneously work on the specific details for a NWC. To do the actual planning for the curriculum, student composition, and other essential specifics for NWC, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, selected Vice Admiral Harry Wilbur Hill (Hill, December 4, 1945). Hill replaced DeWitt as the Commandant of the Army-Navy Staff College and was responsible for creating an implementation plan for NWC. Hill took over the Army-Navy Staff College in August of 1945. When the twelfth and last class graduated on December 7, 1945, Hill was able to devote his full attention to plans for a new college. Intent on keeping the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully informed of the progress, Hill forwarded his proposed curriculum to General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz, who had assumed responsibilities of Army Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations respectfully (Hill, 1946).

Nimitz and Eisenhower were satisfied with the curriculum, but the location and funding needed to be resolved before the doors could open. Admiral Hill brought up the subject of the location for the College and submitted the identical proposal contained in the Gerow report for using the building in Washington, D.C. that had been occupied by the Army War College. General Eisenhower not only donated the Army War College building, he ensured the Army would provide the funding to maintain and operate the institution (Orders, 1946). The Army’s funding included the hiring of civilian faculty members (NWC, 1947).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized NWC on April 23, 1946 (Orders, 1946).

The first class started on September 3, 1946 and had a joint student body and faculty. The class was made up of 30 Army ground force and service officers, 30 Army Air Force officers, 30 Navy and Marine officers, and 10 Foreign Service officers. This student composition established a balance that would remain for at least the next 50 years. The military students were divided into thirds: one-third Army, one-third Air Force (Army Air Corp at that time) and one-third Sea Service (Navy, Marine Corps and later Coast Guard).

The faculty selected to serve at NWC provided a mixture of backgrounds. Similar to the students, a blend of military and civilian faculty members was desired so that as courses were developed, military and civilian perspectives could be incorporated (Hill, January 22, 1945; January 26, 1946). To demonstrate the State Department’s full support of the new college, a well-regarded State Department representative was hand selected to join the faculty. Secretary of State Byrnes assigned George F. Kennan to the faculty to act as Hill’s deputy for foreign affairs. Kennan was a career diplomat and recognized as one of the State Department’s outstanding experts on Russia (Horner, 1946). The selection of such a prestigious individual for assignment to NWC was an indication of the tremendous support the State Department offered to the institution. Other civilian faculty members were well-known names in educational circles. They included Professors Hardy Dillard, University of Virginia; Bernard Brodie and Sherman Kent, Yale University; and Walter L. Wright, Jr., Princeton University (Horner, 1946). The civilian faculty had the credentials and backgrounds to add instant prestige to NWC.

The second joint professional military institution that would eventually become a part of NDU had now been established thanks to Eisenhower’s support. The purpose of the new college was to prepare military graduates for the highest echelons of leadership in the armed forces and State Department. Additionally, its purpose was to develop an understanding among the students of capabilities of State Department and other agencies. It was located near the heart of the U.S. government, at the Army War College in Washington, D.C.

The Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC)

ICAF and NWC educated military officers at a senior level. There was still a recognized need to educate mid-grade officers, something accomplished by the Army and Navy Staff College. This section will depict events which led to the establishment of AFSC, an institution designed for mid-grade officers.

NWC was not the only college that evolved from the Army and Navy Staff College. The Richardson Committee’s report recommended an intermediate-level school to develop officers capable of preparing and participating in joint operations. However, no detailed planning had been conducted to arrange for a joint college to fulfill that requirement. Recognizing this, General Eisenhower sent the following memorandum to Admiral Nimitz on April 17, 1946:

As I indicated over the telephone Monday [April 15] there is a need for a school which will conduct short courses of approximately five months duration in joint staff technique and procedures in theatres and joint overseas operations. These courses will be similar to those conducted at ANSOL [Army and Navy Staff College] during the war. I visualize that this school will be operated on a co-equal basis by the Army, Navy and Air. There is a distinct joint necessity for a school of this type for officers of our services prior to attendance at the National War College, thus permitting the scope of this college to embrace national planning and strategy. Since the National War College and the Industrial College are located at an Army installation, I presume you would like to have this new school located at a Naval installation. (Eisenhower, April 26, 1946, p. 1)

This initiative set into motion a working group that would develop a plan for establishing such a college.
General Eisenhower’s presumption that Admiral Nimitz would like to have the new school located at a Naval installation turned out to be correct. Upon receiving the memorandum, Admiral Nimitz assigned two admirals to work out the details with their Army counterparts. The committee was directed to identify a wartime facility that would no longer be of use to the Navy. The chosen site was the Receiving Station of the Norfolk Naval Operating Base (Whitley, 1981).

Soon after the working group drafted a plan for the school, a disagreement surfaced between General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz concerning the curriculum. Admiral Nimitz sent a memorandum to General Eisenhower indicating he was unhappy with the scope of the courses as described in a draft of the curriculum. He thought there should be a clear distinction between NWC and the proposed staff college. The War College should teach joint command and stress the development of commanders and doctrines associated with joint operations; these disciplines should not be taught at the new staff college (Nimitz, 1946).

The draft directive Admiral Nimitz was referring to contained the following objectives:

1. To produce officers of all armed services qualified to function effectively as commanders and key staff officers in joint and overseas operations.

2. To develop commanders and key staff officers of all armed services, qualified to establish theaters of operation and coordinate and direct strategic, tactical, and logistical operations therein.

3. To foster mutual confidence and understanding among officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

4. To develop and recommend improvements in standard practice, instruction, and doctrine for joint overseas operations. (Whitley, 1981)

Admiral Nimitz initially disagreed with all but the third proposed objective. He felt that the other objectives were either accomplished elsewhere or unnecessary.

General Eisenhower responded a few days later and stated:

While I agree that the college must primarily teach joint staff procedure, I believe that the functions of command and staff are inseparable and that the former cannot be ignored in the instruction given the school. Since this is the only college in the school system where the basic mission will be to give instruction on the theater and major joint task force level, it is the only one in which the functions of command and staff on that level can be logically and efficiently taught. I feel that this college should be a prerequisite for entrance into the National War College where selected ground, air and naval officers will be trained for meeting responsibilities in the highest echelons of the armed forces. (Eisenhower, June 12, 1946, p. 1)

Nimitz ended up assenting to Eisenhower’s argument and concurred with the proposed objectives.

An appropriate name for the new institution was also negotiated between Nimitz and Eisenhower. Nimitz wanted to ensure that the distinction of its mission was clear by including the word “Staff” in the name for the college. Eisenhower, conveying his belief that there would soon be an additional branch of the armed services, countered Nimitz’s proposal of “Army-Navy Staff College” with “Armed Forces College” (Eisenhower, June 12, 1946; Nimitz, 1946).

The special committee of flag and general officers selected by General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz drafted a directive for the new college and submitted it for approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The proposed name, “Armed Forces Staff College” addressed both of the leaders’ concerns. The planned scope of instruction did include “study of the organization, composition, and functions of theaters and major joint task forces and responsibilities of the commanders” (JCS, 1946) as General Eisenhower had suggested. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposal and approved the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) on June 28, 1946, a mere two months after General Eisenhower’s original memorandum. The stated mission of the college was “to train selected officers of the armed forces in joint operations” (JCS, 1946).

Similar to the students selected at NWC, the students and faculty selected to attend and teach at the AFSC had equal representation in land, sea, and air forces. The student body and instructors were entirely military because the curriculum was focused on joint military operations (Whitley, 1981). The first class of students arrived in late January 1947 for their five-month course of instruction, which ran from February 3 until June 28, 1947. The students all lived on the 55-acre site that had been used during the war for processing and reassignment of Navy personnel. The U-shaped barracks housed the students and their families and each building was named after a World War II joint land, sea, and air operation such as Sicily, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa (Whitley, 1981). The Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Rear Admiral James L. Holloway, spoke to the students during opening ceremonies for the first class. His remarks captured the idea of improving relationships through acculturation. Holloway said:

You officers of the Navy, Army and Marine Corps will work together and play together; your wives and children will live within the same compound and will come out of it as friends, with a mutual understanding and mutual customs. (Holloway, 1947, p. 2)

The theme of attaining mutual understanding of different perspectives as part of an educational experience, in and out of the classroom, is the underpinning of “joint” in joint professional military education. The goal of attaining an enhanced appreciation for each other is the major difference between a Service school, such as the Army’s Command and General Staff College described in Chapter II, and a joint school.

A third joint professional military education institution had now been established, again as a result of Eisenhower’s support. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had oversight of all three. They were funded independently and operated independently. It was Eisenhower’s vision that students would attain one level of knowledge at the AFSC then build upon that knowledge later in their careers when they attended NWC. To build on knowledge would imply close coordination of curriculum development. Operating independently made coordination challenging. This would change once the schools became parts of one university. Although the AFSC was initially not a part of NDU, it joined the institution in 1981.

Summary

Joint professional military education fosters intellectual growth through exposure and understanding of multiple perspectives. If understood the importance of this it was Dwight D. Eisenhower. Today the Joint Forces Staff College (previously the Armed Forces Staff College), National War College, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces educate leaders for the 21st century. They are able to accomplish thanks to the support of Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Improving the education system has been a solution to problems facing the Nation and the military. The U.S. military been encouraged to reorganize, reform, and transform—in other words, change. Change begins in the mind and that is why education has been the key. To achieve this, joint professional military education contains curriculum components designed to educate students in preparation for working with officers and civilians from other services, agencies, and countries. The birth of the Industrial College may be credited to Davis, Baruch, and others, but the birth of the system should be credited to its graduates. Eisenhower appreciated the joint education he received at the Industrial College. He appreciated it when he was Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and later when he was Commander in Chief. A few weeks before he passed away, President Eisenhower wrote a note to the ICAF Commandant. He closed the note by stating:

It is my conviction that the educational programs conducted by the [Industrial] College are of the greatest importance in developing the kind of enlightened military and civilian leadership our Nation must have if its purposes and security are to endure. (Eisenhower, 1969, p.1)

These words are as true today as when Eisenhower penned them from Walter Reed Hospital in 1969, and they are also applicable to the system of joint professional military education.

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