When the fight is over, servicemembers must face the challenges of coming home. Now, a number of assistance programs are easing that transition.

Interview by Tom Philpott

Gen. Michael W. Hagee, 60, became the Marine Corps’ 33rd commandant in January 2003 as tens of thousands of Marines moved to Persian Gulf staging areas to prepare to invade Iraq. Almost three years later, 23,000 Marines are still there, part of a U.S. force of 140,000 fighting a difficult insurgency while training Iraqi security forces to defend a fledgling democratic government. Marines have suffered a third of U.S. casualties in Iraq, with almost 600 killed and 5,000 wounded. ■ Because Hagee commanded the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) before becoming commandant, he helped plan the invasion and advance on Baghdad. In light of the Corps’ experiences in the global war on terrorism, Hagee last April updated his “vision and intent” for the Corps. Marines, he said, must remain the nation’s “force-in-readiness”; individual Marines are the most critical weapon, and they must be better trained, educated, and equipped for irregular or asymmetric warfare. ■ Hagee has served at every operational level during a 37-year career, from infantry platoon commander in Vietnam to commanding general 1st Marine Division and the 1st MEF. Staff assignments included director of character development at the U.S. Naval Academy and executive assistant to John M. Deutch, director of Central Intelligence (1995-1996). ■ Hagee discussed the challenges of Iraq and their effects on the Corps with Contributing Editor Tom Philpott. The interview has been edited for length.

Wars can change individuals and perhaps entire services. How has the Iraq experience changed the Marine Corps?

The most important thing it’s done is we have the best, battle-hardened, well-trained, experienced Marine Corps we have had in some time. Just about every unit, regular and reserve, has rotated into Iraq or Afghanistan, some more than once.

Did the experience influence your vision statement for the Marine Corps and how it must evolve?

Yes. We looked at not only Iraq and Afghanistan but also to the future. History demonstrates we are very poor at determining where we’re going to fight next. But [Iraq] brought home that the basic nature of warfare hasn’t changed. There’s a lot of chaos and friction and uncertainty. It’s very dangerous on the battlefield, and you’re going against a thinking enemy.

So what sort of Marine Corps do we need to succeed in that environment? That’s what we tried to put into our guidance. The individual Marine is our most important weapon system. If we do education, training, and equipping right, then we will be successful [on any battlefield], from the high-end, march-to-Baghdad type of warfare down to counterinsurgency.

Looking at those factors — education, training, and equipment — how has Iraq affected each? Take education first. Do you want more emphasis on language skills?

That’s just a small portion of the more important topic of cultural understanding of different peoples of the world. We’re not going to fight in San Diego or New York where we understand the culture. We’re going to be in areas with different languages, different cultures, especially if you’re talking what some people call irregular warfare. To be successful, you have to understand the people and their culture and how they see the situation. So we are putting a segment on cultural intelligence in all of our schools.

We can’t cover the entire world at one time. Right now we’re focused on the Muslim world, of which the Arab world is only a part. The four or five largest Muslim nations are not in the Gulf. They are Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and elsewhere in the Asian Pacific.

Once an individual has committed to a career — that is, the first time [Marines reenlist] — we’re going to assign [them] to an area of the world, encourage them to study it, give them an opportunity to learn the language, maybe even be stationed there. It will be the same with officers. We’ll build a cadre of individuals who have expertise in that part of the world.

Have Afghanistan and Iraq also affected training?

[Yes, they affect] not only what we train for, but … procedures so that lessons observed there are brought back to our schools. … A battalion going through stability and security operations training today is getting a better understanding of the challenges than did the battalion of seven months ago. The battalion that goes through four or five months from now will have a better understanding than the battalion going through today.

And the Marine entering Iraq today is equipped differently than in March 2003 when the war began?

Absolutely. When Marines came out, in June 2003, we didn’t think we were going back. Then in October 2003 we got word we were going to relieve the 82nd Airborne in the Al Anbar Province. The 82nd said we’d face IEDs [improvised explosive devices]. I’m proud of what Marines did here, inside the United States, to get ready.

We had no 1114s [factory-produced armored Humvees]. None of our vehicles [was] armored. By the time our forces were on the ground, in February 2004, every vehicle that went into harm’s way had some armor. It was first generation and not the armor we have today. We have continued to spiral develop. We have fielded today the so-called MAK (Marine armor kit) vehicle. We have the MAS (Marine armored system) for our seven-ton trucks. A year ago we didn’t have either.

I was commanding general of the 1st MEF and so did most of the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the march to Baghdad. I know what we had then. By the time we finished taking Baghdad we had added the M16-A4 rifle. More individuals had the advanced combat optical gun sight, which slides on the M16. We had almost no personal radios. Now almost everyone has a personal radio. Everyone had the SAPI plates (small arms protective inserts) but we are going to enhanced SAPI plates. Individual Marine equipment has changed significantly in the past couple of years.

The focus now is how to reduce the weight. A Marine wearing only his outer tactical vest, SAPI plates, helmet, web gear, weapon, ammunition, and water carries 65 pounds. Most carry 80 to 100 pounds. American engineering can do better than that. We are working that issue aggressively.

Given the heat and carrying such weight, how do Marines operate over there?

First, morale is very high because they know they are making a difference, doing something important. They are well-trained [and] well-educated, and they’ve got the best equipment we can offer them today.

Second, they are in condition. Quite often individuals make fun of [Marines], all the physical training and running. It’s like a doctor studying. It’s part of being a Marine.

To be successful, in cold or heat, you’ve got to be in condition. These young men and women are in great condition. They are not going to run four or five miles in 130 [or] 140 degrees with 80 pounds on their backs. But they can operate.

You said Marines didn’t expect to go back to Iraq after June 2003. The last several years it has been deployment after deployment. Can you sustain this pace of seven months deployed for every seven months home?

That’s something we’re watching very closely. Right now we’re okay. It’s important to understand it’s the flag moving back and forth [not the same units]. Also, we’re a young force of 178,000. We recruit 38,000 a year. The Army is about 500,000 and recruits 80,000, or twice the number for a much larger force. The reason for this is we only keep about 25 percent of individuals we recruited four years before. We need a lot of privates first class and lance corporals, but they turn over. Individuals, for sure, will make two deployments but maybe not the third.

We are working aggressively to bring the tempo back down to at least two to one [months home versus time deployed]. We would like three to one.

Will that require reducing the number of Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan?

It requires a couple of things. We’re going to stand up an additional infantry battalion this year — 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. Over a year from now we’re going to stand up another — 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. We’re standing up additional light armor reconnaissance companies and additional reconnaissance platoons. That will help.

At the same time, [the Marine Corps] and the Army are training Iraqi security forces. They are able to operate at platoon and company level in some areas. Last year [at] this time we had 35,000 Marines in the Al Anbar province. This year we have 23,000. That slack has been taken up by Iraqis.

It’s going to be some time before they operate at the battalion level. But they bring something we don’t have. An individual talks, and they know which tribe he belongs to and whether he’s Iraqi or Syrian. Even with language training, we cannot pick that up. They have skills we really need in this type of warfare.

With 23,000 Marines still in Iraq, does that number have to be halved to move to a two-to-one deployment rotation?

The Marine Corps has 24 infantry battalions. If we want to get to a three-to-one ratio, only eight can be deployed at any time. We have had as many as 12 deployed.

In July, you told Congress overall readiness, from battalion to squadron-size units, had dropped 14 percent. Why?

It’s a combination of things. First, we brought a great deal of equipment into Iraq. We are using more communictions equipment than a normal division, regiment, or battalion normally has. The reason is, we are spread over a very large area in Iraq. That extra communication capability comes from units in the United States.

A unit goes over, leaves its vehicles, comes back, and falls in on someone else’s equipment. Well, we may have taken some of that equipment over already. Some is being consumed, and we are purchasing more. But the industrial base can only react so fast.

Technical readiness, in fact, has gone down. So the question comes up: “What happens if have to deploy somewhere else?” Well, we use equipment in our pre-positioning squadrons.

But hasn’t pre-positioned equipment and even your Norway stocks been drawn down?

Norway stocks and one of three maritime pre-positioning squadrons have been drawn down. We have fenced the other two. Each would provide a brigade-sized unit with ground equipment — Humvees, tanks, and so on.

So if you had to respond to another large contingency operation, there would be equipment shortages?

It would depend on where we are going. Timing, rather than equipment, is the greater challenge. Do we leave all the forces in Iraq? Do we swing some of those? The [Joint Chiefs] chairman has testified that we can do another major contingency, though maybe not as fast as we had predicted. On the other hand, the force has never been more ready.

Last July you said the Marine Corps has seen 5,300 major pieces of ground equipment, Humvees and the like, consumed or destroyed in Iraq. How many years will it take, given industrial capacity, to get back to where you need to be?

If the war stopped today we would probably take close to three years to completely reconstitute. Some of that is money, but quite a bit is the industrial base. It can produce just so much. And in some cases you’re not going to produce the same equipment again.

Take an AAV (amphibious assault vehicle). We’re not going to produce another one of those. We’re going to wait for the expeditionary fighting vehicle.

Likewise, if we lose a CH-46 — I flew those when I was a lieutenant in Vietnam­­ — we’re not going to replace it with a CH-46. We will stand up the first squadron of MV-22s next year. We will stand up two a year and the first squadron will deploy in [fiscal year] 2007. But we can only build those so fast.

Probably our biggest challenge is what to replace the Humvee with. We’re an expeditionary force; we come from the sea. In a lot of cases we don’t need the vehicle armored. Armor weighs a lot. What we need is a vehicle maybe not designed like the Humvee. Though it’s a powerful vehicle, it’s square. It’s a box. You have a square and a cube problem on board ship. Against mines or IEDs, you probably wouldn’t design a vehicle with the same big, flat surfaces. So, do we replace our fleet of Humvees with Humvees or something else while working on the next generation vehicle? We’re working on that right now.

The projected life cyle of a Humvee is 13 years, but I understand they last no more than two in Iraq.

That’s pretty close. We are committed to replacing the Humvees we have today either with MAKs or 1114s.

Your vision statement notes that the Marine Corps must be the most ready of services. If the war in Iraq continues, will the Marine Corps say, “Look, we’re nation-building here. It’s hurting readiness. We have to bring Marines out and prepare for other contingencies and recapitalize our equipment”?

That’s a great question and one we talk about a great deal. I have a problem saying, “Okay, we’ve got to train and get ourselves ready for whatever comes down the pike.” Wait a minute. We’re at war, aren’t we? So we’ve got to be there.

The real challenge for the Marine Corps while we’re fighting the war, for the Army too, is we’ve got to reconstitute ourselves — not only replace the equipment we’re losing with like equipment but, in the case of the CH-46, for example, replace it with MV-22s.

We are remanufacturing the Cobra engine from a two-blade to four. So we’re taking Cobras off-line in the middle of a war, modifying their electronics and blades, and making [the Cobra] a much more capable machine.

That presents some challenge, because we are also using them at a high rate. We’ve got to be able to manage that, both the war and the reconstitution. We’re not going to be able to reconstitute quite as fast as we would have liked. Fortunately, Congress appears very supportive by giving us the supplemental [budgets].

With recruiting and retention, what are your concerns?

The Marine Corps is in good shape. We made our first-term reenlistment goal in fiscal 2005 earlier than we had in the past three or four years. We had a better military occupational specialty match, so we’re retaining the right guys and gals. … The number of individuals leaving before completing their four-year commitment — either because they are in jail, or [are] deserters, or hurt themselves, [or] show bad conduct — is way down. We had 900 fewer such attritions in fiscal 2005 than projected. All of that is great news.

The cohort most often reenlisting are married individuals, a little surprising given our deployment tempo. So families feel comfortable staying in the Marine Corps.

On recruiting, as fiscal 2005 came to a close, we were 103 percent of where we wanted to be. We put more people into boot camp than we thought we would be able to. We like to start a new fiscal year with 50 percent of the year goal already recruited. We were at about 45 percent. Before Sept. 11, recruiters spent about four hours per successful recruit. Today they spend 12 hours on average, mostly with the parents. That challenge isn’t going to go away anytime soon.

With both recruiting and retention we are going to have to work very hard. We will not reduce our quality. To be successful on that chaotic battlefield we have to have high-quality individuals.

Support for the war among Americans, polls show, is going down. Many feel the war was a mistake. You served in Vietnam. Are you worried what this can do to morale and the mission?

Having come home from Vietnam I can tell you there is no comparison. I was not allowed to wear a uniform. You were going to have a tomato or egg thrown at you. As you came off the aircraft there was no band. There was no support. Only my wife met me.

The American population is torn, [but] I have seen no lack of support for the individual serviceman or-woman. There’s unbelievably strong support. Any time I’m out talking to [the public] they want to know “What can we do?”, “What can we send them?”, “How can we support them?”
 
On the other hand, these same people are questioning whether their sons or daughters should go in. There’s an understandable tension there. All of the service chiefs have been talking about the value of service to this nation. But it is a challenge, especially when you have individuals asking — and this is not in my lane — whether or not we should have gone in [to Iraq]. I know that’s what the American people are concerned about. But this is really important. We need to be successful.

Assume we weren’t in Iraq. As a member of the Joint Chiefs, if you were told the president wanted to democratize Iraq — that there were no [weapons of mass destruction], but the mission you’re now conducting was the premise for the war — would you advise against it?

I don’t like to play what-if games, because you usually have one part of the what-if but not the others. …

My job as a service chief is to advise the president on what is militarily feasible. That includes not only major combat operations but [also], if we’re going to be involved in nation-building or stability and security, what the challenges are and what we need. And based upon the entire situation, at least the chiefs we have now, [and] the chiefs before, are very blunt on what’s required, the readiness of the force, and where shortages are.

That’s probably as far as I go.